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Abstract
Chapter 1 studies the role of investment-related emissions for the efficient distribution of
investment among dirty and clean technologies. Dirty technology is not used depending
on technology parameters, though clean technology may be relatively more expensive on
all scales, and the societal effect of the first pollution unit may be small. In plausible
cases there is a unique stationary point. Disregarding emissions from investment in dirty
technology biases the stationary cost of polluting downward if dirty technology is used
and the time discount factor is not too small. An inverse relationship between the cost
of polluting and the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of consumption on an
optimal path is established.
Chapter 2 examines the retirement of pre-existing capital and irreversible investment
in dirty and clean technologies in Pareto optimum and competitive equilibrium. Dirty
capacity is optimally underutilized in equilibrium if government policy internalizes the
pollution externality after such policy is sufficiently long delayed. Dirty technology capi-
tal, for example, fossil-fuel using engines and plants, should be underutilized if pollution,
such as atmospheric carbon dioxide, is below its long-term level. Underutilization of the
pre-installed dirty technology capital diminishes it optimally because it is not needed in
the long-term or smooths it through postponing its use until investment becomes worth-
while in dirty technology. Clean technology capital, for example, solar panels or wind
turbines, are efficiently underutilized to save emissions from investment or because cre-
ating new units is more costly than forwarding existing units.
Chapter 3 considers production using a dirty and reliable technology, for example, coal-
using electricity generation, versus production using a clean and unreliable technology, for
example, solar energy conversion into electricity, in a dynamic economy. Consumption can
be equalized across states because investment absorbs the fluctuation in clean technology
productivity in days in which consumption is maximized. Clean output subsidies such as
feed-in premiums for grid-distributed electricity can implement a Pareto optimum. For
example, the subsidy rebates a uniform energy tax or a uniform tax on investment goods.
In a further example the subsidy is funded by price surcharges that are differentiated
between households.
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Introduction
In this thesis heterogeneous capital is considered from a welfare point of view and in
competitive equilibrium. The use of dirty technology creates emissions. The use of clean
technology does not create emissions. At each date society can build assets in different
technologies that have a fixed emission intensity of output by using these assets in future
periods. Building new capital units in clean technology may increase pollution of the
same kind that production of a general factor using dirty technology creates. Climate
change is the leading example. Primary steel, cement, and mineral processiong gener-
ate carbon dioxide and methane emissions for the construction of both physical capital
that converts fossil fuels coal, petroleum, or natural gas into useful energy, and physi-
cal capital that harnesses so-called renewable energy—solar, wind, geothermal, biomass,
hydro, tidal and wave energy. The extraction of fossil fuels creates carbon dioxide and
methane emissions. Fossil-fuel use in producing ‘useful energy’ generates carbon dioxide
emissions. This energy can be used for producing consumption or investment goods. The
use encompasses services generated from space or water cooling and heating, lighting, and
motion. Renewable energy conversion does not create such emissions. Carbon dioxide
and methane (and some other) emissions alter the climate with adverse effects by current
scientific knowledge. These effects are modeled through direct impact of the pollution
stock on the period-utility function. The following relates the assumption of irreversibility
of technology-specific capital to the central contributions of the thesis, explains their rel-
evance to controlling the climate, and contrasts inefficient investment under externalities
and cyclical inefficient investment.
(i) Outlook. Introducing emissions of investment in clean technology, as Chapter 1
shows, enlarges the set of qualitatively different stationary points. These emissions do not
affect the nature of the controlled dynamical system in optimum which generates unique
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paths of the environmental stock, human-made capital, and their marginal contributions
to welfare, the so-called shadow prices. Exclusive use of clean technology, joint use of dirty
and clean technology, versus exclusive use of dirty technology, in the long-term depend on
technology parameters including their productivity, emission intensities, and individual
maximum scale in terms of output. The emissions in building clean technology assets are
responsible for a time-invariant allocation in which only clean technology is used. This
insight gains some weight in the climate problem, because there is capital in energy use
besides capital in energy production. The emissions in creating energy-use capital, that
is, buildings including equipment and furniture, roads, and vehicle shells, can motivate
such a point in the future if the construction of renewable energy technology capital
becomes clean. These conclusions hold because consumption goods that spend utility,
consistent with the real world, use energy that is produced by dirty or clean technologies,
and utilize capital that uses such energy. The emissions in producing dirty technology
assets add to the emissions of using these assets without qualitative effect for the use
of dirty versus clean technologies. However, the emissions in building dirty technology
capital affect the long-term cost of polluting if dirty technology is used in the long-term.
Chapter 1 analyses the distribution of investment in dirty versus clean technologies when
capital in each technology is fully utilized. Chapters 2 and 3 posit variable utilization
of capital that leads to the efficient temporary pausing or permanent abandoning of the
production using specific capital because of concerns about the environment.
Chapter 2 examines underutilizing pre-existing capital to preserve the environment
building on Chapter 1. Emissions of clean technology investment can rationalize the
immediate retirement of dirty technology capital. Only clean technology produces energy
for consumption and investment in the long-term on such a path, on paths with initially
partially utilized and successively idle dirty technology capital, and on paths in which
dirty technology capital is used up in finite time and is not rebuilt. All these paths
require that large renewable energy capital can be built at sufficiently low cost. This
cost does not need to be lower than the cost of building fossil-fuel engines and plants.
Empirical examinations have to determine if technological improvement in recent years
has been sufficient for this. The former two paths apply now in this situation and in the
near future if technological improvements lead to this situation within the next 50 years
which is the usable time of a newly built coal power plant. Pre-existing fossil-fuel engines
and power plants for cooling and heating, light, stationary drive, or mobility (dirty energy
2
production capital) are stranded—in the former two paths—because the endogenous cost
of polluting in growing the economy with energy production using solar panels, wind
turbines, geothermal heat pumps, and hydroelectric dams for stationary energy use and
transportation, and energy conversion from sugarcane or algae for mobility (clean energy
production capital), is greater than the cost of reducing pollution by not using the dirty
energy production capital.
Decommissioning productive dirty technology capital can be also optimal if the harm
of affecting the environment is sufficiently large. The latter, for example, can motivate a
phase-out of nuclear power with underutilization or a ban of using pre-existing genetically
modified seeds, pesticides, or derivatives of fossil fuels in contact with food. In these cases
the basic model may benefit from an extension to uncertain effects of pollution. The model
applies to the underlying environmental concerns of practiced public policy on local air
pollutants, lead pipes, acid rain, ozone-depleting substances, or ocean fish that aims at
retiring specific automobiles, water pipes, refrigerants, or fishing vessels, respectively,
under a strong environmental feedback. In these cases seemingly in the allocation that
the policy targets, that might be an optimum, investment is banned by governments in
some technologies whose (1) capital in place is used up or (2) capital is underutilized and
unutilized capital becomes unproductive.
Determining an optimal climate policy taking into account the emissions of invest-
ment and locational technology scale for given productivity requires empirical modeling
in further research. Postponing the use of dirty technology capital early in the planning
horizon optimally smooths both the sequences of pollution and dirty technology capital if
there is efficient use of such pre-installed capital. A simulation shows that this occurs for
initial pollution levels in the optimization that are smaller than its long-term level given
a strictly convex utility function in pollution on a competitive equilibrium path that has
started without government policy and with a pollution level that does not marginally
affect utility. This result is in contrast to a model in the literature with chosen under-
utilization of fishing vessels that fosters the regeneration of fish stock, where capital is
optimally underutilized only if the biomass is smaller than its long-term level. This seems
to be the only model in the literature with optimized utilization of a variable capital stock
and a replenishable environmental stock. In Chapter 2 and in this fishery example there is
a trade-off between consuming output and an environmental impact of production. Here
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production enhances pollution which adversely affects utility. There production reduces
the fish stock and the fish stock positively affects productivity. Here lack of government
policy leads to a large dirty technology capital stock that is efficiently underutilized be-
cause in any period the absorption of pollution in the environment is lower than pollution
which thus can be persistent. There the economy escapes an open-access regime with
full utilization toward the efficient long-term allocation because the open-access regime is
located for steady biomass levels derived from an inverted U-shaped regeneration function
of biomass. The long-term steady state of the competitive equilibrium without taxes or
subsidies is in the subregion of underutilized dirty technology capital in the state plane
of pollution and dirty technology capital. The difference with the level comparison of the
environmental stock arises because here the marginal utility of consumption is an oppor-
tunity cost of investment and there the cost of investing is exogenous. This is important
for climate policy as the current atmospheric carbon dioxide content may be below its
efficient long-term level in a model in which it has deterministic effects on society.
In Chapter 3 the dispatch of dirty and clean production capacity responds to the
fluctuation of clean technology inputs, in particular of renewable energy for electricity
production. This contingency is considered in a structure of uncertainty and embedded
in an extension to the economy of Chapter 2. As in reality, uncertainty about solar or
wind energy technology productivity resolves after its investment. The result of Chapter
1 about exclusive use of clean renewable energy technology is modified in a given pe-
riod that consists of multiple days with fluctuating renewable energy supply. Fossil fuels
are efficiently deployed to back up clean solar or wind energy conversion when the solar
radiation is sufficiently weak or the wind speed is sufficiently low in some day within a
period, to smooth consumption. Chapter 3 shows that certain technology-specific gov-
ernment policy internalizes the pollution externality. One example is a uniform tax on
energy and a clean energy subsidy that rebates the tax amount. A further example is
a discriminatory surcharge between households on the uniform price of dirty and clean
technology output that funds a clean output subsidy.
(ii) Efficiency. In Chapter 2 the underutilization of capital is optimal because the
investment is inefficient prior to optimization. This leads to overcapitalization in dirty
technology relative to an optimum. In regard to climate change this can be explained by
the lack of knowledge about the dirtiness of production at the time of investment. As
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time goes on and the dirty character of production is known, one may argue that the
political process fails to develop policies that internalize the external effect. Similarly,
research may show that some reason is majourly responsible for the cyclical inefficient
investment in low-productivity projects. As bubbles recur one might argue that the
political process is inapt to provide a legal framework in which private agents make
efficient decisions. In contrast, the overinvestment regarding the environment does not
fundamentally self-correct while each cyclical bubble succeeds a correction of prices on
markets. The overinvestment regarding the environment may be corrected incompletely
in competitive equilibrium without taxes or subsidies when pollution affects output.
Deterministic effects of emissions on society facilitate discussion of results prone to
technological explicitness. There is uncertainty about the effects of human activities on
climate change, and the latter’s effects on society. Understanding the implications of this
uncertainty for optimal and market equilibrium allocations given heterogeneous capital
is the subject of future research.
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1Capacity choice in dirty technology and
clean technology
This chapter examines the efficient use of dirty and clean technologies when their in-
vestment creates emissions of the same kind that the use of dirty technology generates.
Clean technology use does not create emissions. Full utilization of capital is assumed to
focus on the role of investment-related emissions for the efficient long-term distribution
of investment among dirty and clean technologies. Then dirty technology capital is used
up in finite time if there is no dirty technology capital in the long-term. In Chapter 2
the utilization of capital is optimized so that pre-installed dirty technology capital can
be optimally idle.
A novelty is the classification of efficient dirty and clean technology use given a dirty
character of clean technology. Climate change is an example, because building capital
in renewable energy technologies creates carbon dioxide and methane emissions. Opti-
mal greenhouse gas emissions plans should take into account the optimal deployment of
technologies that are responsible for the emissions. This chapter concludes that clean
technology may be exclusively used in optimum though its investment is polluting—
replacing emissions of dirty technology use. Clean technology may be used exclusively in
the long-term, even if it is less productive than dirty technology on all scales of invest-
ment. Renewable energy technologies are less productive than fossil-fuel technologies on
large scale. A necessary condition for the exclusive long-term use of clean technology is
that the stationary technology-specific cost of pollution reduction is weakly smaller for
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dirty technology. This may well be true for renewable energy versus fossil-fuel technolo-
gies on small scale of aggregate investment. Future work may determine if or under what
pace of technical progress the scale of high-productivity renewable energy technologies
is large enough to support such a long-term optimum. Three known reasons why clean
technology should be used exclusively in the long-term are (1) pollution harms society
strongly, (2) abandoning the use of an input in dirty technology is optimal, because its
extraction is too expensive or its stock is depleted, for example in Tahvonen (1997) de-
pending on the extraction cost function, and (3) clean renewable energy technology takes
over dirty fossil-fuel energy technology in terms of productivity, for example, through a
learning effect in Hartley et al. (2010) when pollution is not controlled. In a study of
directed technical change, Acemoglu et al. (2012) assume imperfect substitution of the
output of clean and dirty technology types, so that optimal technological progress involves
a switch in research effort toward clean technology but prevents its optimal exclusive use.
In contrast to Acemoglu et al. (2012), emissions in renewable energy technology invest-
ment suggest that a carbon tax or another instrument to internalize a carbon emissions
externality should be applied permanently.
The second point of interest of emissions in investment is its effect on the long-term
cost of polluting if dirty technology is used in the long-term. The cost of polluting is the
marginal rate of substitution of pollution reduction and consumption increase. This cost
equals the relative price of pollution reduction corresponding to the dirty technology if
dirty technology is used. Society is willing to pay more consumption units to preserve
the environment if it has less polluting technology. Accounting a greater portion of
emissions in investment lowers the complete emission intensity of dirty technology if the
time discount factor is not too small. Then disregarding emissions from investment in
dirty technology biases the stationary cost of polluting downward.
I use heterogeneous capital to study effects of the technology-specific rate of emissions
in investment. Optimal minimum pollution can be ruled out by assuming small societal
impacts by small pollution, there is no nonreproducible factor or cumulative cost for us-
ing dirty technology, and no technological progress, so that only the emissions remain as
an incentive for exclusive stationary use of clean technology. The emissions from using
dirty technology are proportional to valuable output. Finite resources can be consumed
or invested. Dirty and clean technologies produce perfectly substitutable output. There-
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fore, the model differs from those used in the literature with technology choice and the
environment even if technology-specific investment does not control emissions. In Ace-
moglu et al. (2012) finite resources can be distributed to dirty and clean production in
each period. They stress an imperfect substitution of dirty and clean inputs that suits an
energy-using good and a non-energy using good. In Fischer, Withagen & Toman (2004)
investible resources are finite and there is no trade-off between consumption of capital
services and investment. But optimal investment is unconstrained so it could be un-
bounded. These papers assume complementary services and emissions.1 Keeler, Spence
& Zeckhauser (1971), Brock (1977), Tahvonen & Kuuluvainen (1993), Stokey (1998), and
Brock & Taylor (2010) assume that output is produced using the substitutable factors
capital and emissions. This substitutability can be interpreted as technology choice in
controlling the emission intensity of gross output (Stokey 1998, Copeland & Taylor 2004).
Luptacˇik & Schubert (1982), van der Ploeg & Withagen (1991), and Ayong Le Kama
(2001) assume one technology with a specific emission intensity of output, to focus on
the respective purpose of their papers. I extend their modeling approach to multiple
technologies and emissions of investment. Aggregate investment in clean technologies
and the cost of polluting in the following period relate weakly positively if emission in-
tensities of investment in dirty and clean technologies are equal. This follows from the
scale-dependent relative cost of dirty and clean technologies. In a study of nonrenew-
able resource depletion, Tahvonen & Salo (2001) formulate a scale-dependent relative
advantage of a nonrenewable resource technology and an alternative renewable resource
technology. Pollution is not controlled, whereas this paper has an environmental motive.
The next section characterizes stationary points and studies the dynamic behaviour
of optimal plans. The section shows how the accounting of emissions in producing a
factor versus proportionally to investing the factor biases the stationary cost of polluting.
Section 1.2 examines optimal clean technology investment when there are multiple dirty
technologies versus one dirty technology, and characterizes investment in multiple dirty
technologies. Section 1.3 views delayed effects of emissions on society, and Section 1.4
concludes with a discussion of results.
1Tsur & Zemel (2009) make the size of the economy responsible for technology adoption in producing
a factor that is used with a reproducible factor in a substitutable manner. The economy switches from a
flow-cost technology to a capital-based technology when this becomes affordable starting at low amounts
of the reproducible factor.
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1.1 The economy
Consider a discrete-time economy with heterogeneous reproducible assets. A planner
chooses a policy that internalizes feedbacks from the environment on society. For example,
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reduces the utility of consuming following floods or
droughts, or diminishes health through climatic effects.
Preferences.—There is a unit mass of infinitely-lived households with identical prefer-
ences regarding consumption c ∈ R+ and pollution Z ∈ R represented by
J =
∞∑
t=0
βtU(c(t), Z(t))
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and time is t. The period-utility function U(c, Z) ∈
R is twice-differentiable for positive consumption, increasing in consumption c ∈ R+,
∂U/∂c > 0, and decreasing in pollution, ∂U/∂Z < 0, for c > 0. The utility func-
tion is strictly concave in consumption and concave in pollution, ∂2U/∂c2 < 0 and
∂2U/∂Z2 ≤ 0 for c > 0. Both pollution reduction and consumption are noninferior
goods.2 The marginal utility of consumption ∂U/∂c approaches a large positive value
M as consumption tends to zero, limc→0 ∂U/∂c = M ≤ ∞, for all Z. Then at least
one household consumes a positive amount in any period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} in a Pareto
optimum.
Technology.—Each technology indexed j ∈ {B,C} uses capital Kj to produce a factor
that is input in producing consumption and investment goods. The input amount xj
produces additions to the capital stock of technology j. The resource constraint of the
factor is
c(t)/B + xB(t) + xC(t) ≤ KB(t) +KC(t) (1.1)
all t ≥ 0. A change in the productivity B > 0 in the consumption sector has real effects.3
2Noninferiority, min[(∂2U/∂c2)(∂U/∂Z)/(∂U/∂c), (∂2U/∂Z2)(∂U/∂c)/(∂U/∂Z)] ≥ ∂2U/∂c∂Z such
that at least one inequality is strict, is a reasonable assumption. If there were markets for consumption
and environmental quality then a household with greater income acquired weakly more consumption and
reduction of pollution, and more of one of them. Keeler et al. (1971) assume noninferiority.
3A greater B makes both pollution reduction and consumption more affordable yet polluting relatively
more expensive in terms of welfare. Thus it increases long-term consumption while its effect on long-
term pollution is ambiguous. One may rewrite the inputs in the investment sector and capital amounts
in terms of the consumption good and rescale both the productivity in the investment sector and the
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The capital stock equals production capacity. The law of motion of capacity is
Kj(t+ 1) = Qjxj(t) (1.2)
where Qj > 0. Thus capital is useful once. Multiple use-periods of capital would yield
the same timing of investment. Importantly, capital of some technology is scrapped
rather than used when investment in this technology is not worthwhile for a long time.
The perpetual inventory method, which the law of motion (1.2) is consistent with at full
depreciation of capital, would imply that a technology is used forever when there is capital
in this technology at some date at less than full depreciation. I assume the following.
Assumption 1.1 QB > β
−1.
Then growth of consumption and output is feasible and optimal absent environmental
cost. I do not substitute the new capital units into the resource constraint to analyse the
stability of fixed points locally using a dynamical system with shadow prices of capital.
Capacity of technology j ∈ {B,C} is bounded,
K¯j ≥ Kj(t+ 1), (1.3)
all t ≥ 0 because of limited recyclable material to create capital or finite space to put cap-
ital, whichever yields the lower bound. This constraint is plausible for energy-producing
capital and different for each technology j ∈ {B,C} for simplicity. At least one capacity
level is positive among the given Kj(0) ∈ [0, K¯j] for j ∈ {B,C}.
Environment.—Production of one unit of the good using dirty technology B, for exam-
ple, fossil-fuel based production of useful energy for consumption or investment, creates
dB > 0 units of emissions. The use of clean technology C, for example, solar or wind
energy conversion, does not create emissions, dC = 0. Investment-related emissions are
proportional to the input in investment at rate ρj. Aggregate emissions are
E =
∑
j
(djKj + ρjxj)
where ρj ≥ 0 to visit the case of emission-free investment, ρj = 0. Emissions specific to
emission intensity of processes, which are described below, without affecting results.
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investment occur in the production of copper, aluminum, and primary steel using coking
coal in smelters and foundries, cement production using limestone, and land-use change in
mining. Some emissions from agriculture and deforestation may be specifically attributed
to investment. I posit the law of motion of pollution
Z(t+ 1) = Z(t) + E(t)− A(Z(t)) (1.4)
all t ≥ 0 to analyse a stable environmental state. The absorption A(Z) < Z of pollution
is a twice differentiable nondecreasing concave function, ∂2A/∂Z2 ≤ 0 ≤ ∂A/∂Z. I make
one assumption about the parameters.
Assumption 1.2 (ρC − ρB)QC < dBQB.
Then there is stationary clean technology investment if its productivity is relatively
greater, QB < QC , and it is more emission-intensive, ρB < ρC . The relationship holds
trivially if ρB ≥ ρC , and is plausible else, if there is a technical upper bound on QC .
Let the utility function U satisfy essential independence of the distribution of consump-
tion among households and the Pareto optimal level of pollution. Then any redistribution
of consumption yields the same Pareto optimal path of pollution. Bergstrom & Cornes
(1983) define essential independence of the distribution of a private good and the level of a
public good or bad.4 For simplicity I focus on an allocation with equal consumption of all
households. A Pareto optimal policy of consumption and input in investment (c, x) ∈ R3+
maximizes welfare J subject to the resource constraint (1.1), the laws of motion (1.2) and
(1.4) and capacity constraints (1.3) for j ∈ {B,C} all t ≥ 0. Lagranges’ function
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
U(c(t), Z(t)) + ǫ(t)
[
Z(t+ 1)−
∑
j
(djKj(t) + ρjxj(t))
− Z(t) + A(Z(t))
]
+
∑
j
(qj(t)[Qjxj(t)−Kj(t+ 1)] + λKj(t+ 1)Kj(t+ 1)
+ βwj(t+ 1)[K¯j −Kj(t+ 1)] + λxj(t)xj(t)) + λ(t)
[∑
j
(Kj(t)− xj(t))− c(t)/B
]}
contains the multipliers ǫ of the transition law of pollution and qj of the law of motion of
4Kreps (1990, 161) shows that a set of nonnegative welfare weights of households exists such that each
Pareto optimal allocation maximizes the weighted sum of utilities of all households.
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capital in technology j, λ of the resource constraint, and wj of the capacity constraint in
technology j. These multipliers can be interpreted as the shadow prices of the respective
constraints in an optimum, for example, ǫ(t) of the constraint with leading pollution
Z(t + 1), and qj(t) of the constraint with leading capital Kj(t + 1). One may call these
multipliers shadow prices of the respective states, and refer to λ and wj as the shadow price
of contemporaneous output and of the contemporaneous capacity bound, respectively.
Maximizing L yields the following first-order necessary conditions. They are written
as inequalities when any of the nonnegative multipliers λKj or λxj is positive and the
respective capacity Kj or input amount xj is zero. The first-order necessary condition of
pollution in period t ∈ {1, 2, . . .},
ǫ(t) = β(−∂U/∂Z(t+ 1)) + β(1− ∂A/∂Z(t+ 1))ǫ(t+ 1), t ≥ 0, (1.5)
is a difference equation of the shadow price ǫ. This standard condition tells that ǫ(t) is
a weighted sum of future marginal disutility of pollution, the weights being the marginal
contributions of current emissions to future pollution.5 The shadow price of pollution
enters the unit value {λ − dBǫ} of dirty technology capacity as a cost. The discounted
marginal benefit from additional capital in period (t + 1) balances the shadow cost of
holding capital,
β{λ(t+ 1)− djǫ(t+ 1)} − βwj(t+ 1) ≤ qj(t), = if Kj(t+ 1) > 0, (1.6)
all j ∈ {B,C} and t ≥ 0. The shadow rental value of space, wj(t), is zero if Kj(t) < K¯j.
The marginal utility of consumption ∂U/∂c equals the shadow price of output divided by
the productivity in the consumption sector, λ/B, since ∂U/∂c is large as consumption
tends to zero. The marginal benefit of investing xj units at most equals its marginal cost,
Qjqj(t) ≤ λ(t) + ρjǫ(t), = if xj(t) > 0, j ∈ {B,C} (1.7)
all t ≥ 0. The marginal cost comprises the cost of reduced current output and envi-
5The law of motion (1.4) of pollution specifies Z(t) = Φ(E(0), E(1), . . . , E(t − 1), t) all t ≥
1. Let Φ(·, t) be differentiable with respect to emissions amounts. The weighted sum ǫ(t) =∑∞
j=1 β
j(−∂U/∂Z(t+ j))(∂Φ(·, t+ j)/∂E(t)) is the forward solution of (1.5) at ∂Φ(·, t+ 1)/∂E(t) = 1
and ∂Φ(·, t+ j)/∂E(t) =
∏j−1
s=1(1− ∂A/∂Z(t+ s)) for j ≥ 2.
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ronmental cost by the investment sector. The next proposition states an existence and
uniqueness result regarding an optimal plan, that is defined as an allocation of policy
variables and the states pollution and capital.
Proposition 1.1 There is a unique optimal plan.
Thus, the planner’s objective is well-defined. A proof of Proposition 1.1 is in the appendix.
The following examines efficient investment.
1.1.1 Investment in dirty versus clean technology
Technology switching.—The optimal technology choice depends on the value of the (marginal)
cost of polluting, or benefit of pollution reduction, defined as
θ = ǫ/(∂U/∂c)
which hinges on its numerator, the shadow price ǫ of pollution in terms of utils, and
its denominator, the marginal utility of consumption. Precisely, θ is the relative will-
ingness to pay for pollution reduction versus consumption increase. Furthermore define
the marginal rate of substitution of consumption in periods t and (t + 1), R(t + 1) =
(∂U/∂c)(t)/β(∂U/∂c)(t+ 1). Then the conditions (1.6) and (1.7) imply that
Qj{B − djθ(t+ 1)}
B + ρjθ(t)


>
=
<

R(t+ 1) =⇒ Kj(t+ 1)


= K¯j
∈ [0, K¯j]
= 0
, (1.8)
all j ∈ {B,C}. There is investment Qjxj(t) > 0 only if the marginal rate of return on
investment, the left side in (1.8), is weakly greater than the shadow return R(t + 1).
The costs of polluting θ(t) and θ(t + 1) suppress the rate of return on investment below
the marginal product Qj. Investing in a given technology costs more if building new
capital units or using these capital units creates more emissions. Thus, the rate of return
Qj{B − djθ(t + 1)}/{B + ρjθ(t)} on investment decreases in the emission intensities dj
and ρj. The condition (1.8) confirms the intuition that if the return on investment in
some technology exceeds the return on investment in another technology, then there is
investment in the latter technology only if the former technology exhausts its capacity
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Figure 1.1: Investment if QB > QC .
bound. The following analyses dirty versus clean technology investment using the critical
curve that equates their rates of return. This helps finding an optimal path knowing the
long-term cost of polluting, which is examined below. One particular sequence of θ is
optimal. I distinguish three cases with different qualities.
(a) Case QB > QC . A relatively small productivity of clean technology makes investing
in clean technology particularly dependent on the relative emission intensity in producing
capital. Figure 1.1 shows the regions of investment in the dirty and clean technology in
(θ(t), θ(t + 1)) space. In each of the panels there is a different relationship of ρB and
ρC . In the shaded region IC investing in clean technology has priority, xC ∈ (0, K¯C/QC)
and xB = 0, or xC = K¯C/QC and xB ≥ 0. The region IB below the critical curve then
designates allocations with favoured dirty technology investment, xB ∈ (0, K¯B/QB) and
xC = 0, or xB = K¯B/QB and xC ≥ 0. Clean technology is relatively more attractive for a
large current cost of polluting θ(t) if building dirty technology capital is relatively more
emission-intensive, ρB > ρC . The incentives to invest in dirty versus clean technology do
not depend on the concurrent θ if the input use for these investment is equally polluting,
ρB = ρC , since then the input use in either technology has the same environmental
effect. These incentives still depend on the cost of polluting in the period in which the
investment good is used. Clean technology must overcompensate its relatively greater
emission intensity in creating new capital, ρB < ρC , through a greater cost of polluting
θ(t+ 1) in the period following investment given θ(t), because θ(t+ 1) negatively affects
the net benefit of using the dirty technology.
(b) QB ≤ QC and ρB < ρC . A weakly greater productivity of clean technology than the
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Figure 1.2: Investment if ρB < ρC .
productivity of the dirty technology, QB ≤ QC , induces clean technology investment in a
stationary allocation in which consumption, technology-specific investment, and pollution
are constant (stationary point). This can be seen in Figure 1.2. The intercept of the
critical curve in θ(t)-θ(t+ 1) is nonpositive. Assumption 1.2 guarantees that the slope of
this curve is less than one, so that the dashed 45-degree line that includes any stationary
cost of polluting lies in the space of investment in clean technology.6 As will become
clear below, dirty technology investment then requires a current high cost of polluting
and decreasing shadow cost of pollution ǫ, or small scale of clean technology. The first
situation requires strictly concave utility in pollution and therefore seemingly arises only
if pollution Z is greater and aggregate capacity KB + KC is smaller than their long-
term levels, respectively. This situation is unlikely the outcome of an economy subject
to no taxes and subsidies in which pollution is accumulated by emissions proportional to
capital.7
(c) QB ≤ QC and ρC ≤ ρB. A relatively large productivity and small environmental
cost of clean technology make clean technology investment optimal at any date t ≥ 0. The
critical curve has a nonpositive intercept and is nonincreasing in θ(t). Thus investment
in technology C is worthwhile in the entire space R2+ of nonnegative costs of polluting.
Dirty technology investment may be efficient—as in case (b)—if the scale K¯C of clean
6The general condition required for the slope is (ρC−ρB)(dB−dC)QCQB < (dBQB−dCQC)
2. Assume
that dBQB > dCQC ≥ 0. Then (dθ(t+1)/dθ(t))|θ(t)=0 < 1 if and only if the symmetric condition holds.
7Capital destruction can lead to low capital and high pollution. This means that dirty technology
investment efficiently recovers an economy after the unanticipated capital destruction before a switch to
clean technology.
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technology is small relative to desired output.
Investment switches between technologies if their scale K¯j is large and the pair of the
costs of polluting crosses the critical curve. I examine this switching after showing the
uniqueness of certain types of stationary points and their stability.
Stationary points.—A stationary point is a set of values of policy variables and pollution
which are constant in a dynamic plan.8 The following two lemmata provide results that
are helpful in proving the uniqueness of certain stationary points.
Lemma 1.1 The cost of polluting is bounded above, θ ≤ θj = B(βQj − 1)/(ρj + βdjQj),
at a stationary point with investment, xj > 0, in technology j ∈ {B,C}—dirty technology
B or emission-intensive clean technology C, that is, ρC > 0.
Proof. Either capital is interior, Kj ∈ (0, K¯j), or at the upper bound, Kj = K¯j. Then
condition (1.8) at R(t+ 1) = β−1 implies that θ = θj or θ ≤ θj, respectively. Q.E.D.
The relative price of pollution reduction versus consumption increase is θj, with price of
pollution reduction in the numerator. The marginal rate of substitution of consumption
and pollution, θ, equals θj if the use of technology j is scaled to optimize pollution and
weakly undermines θj if society uses technology j to its full extent K¯j. The stationary
level θ depends on tastes only through the discount factor when investment is interior,
Kj ∈ (0, K¯j), for some technology j, because the technologies are linear.
9
Lemma 1.2 There is constant consumption or an inverse continuous relationship be-
tween consumption and pollution on a curve φ(c, Z) = β[(−∂U/∂Z)/(∂U/∂c)]/(1−β(1−
∂A/∂Z)) equal to the stationary cost of polluting θ.
This result follows from the noninferiority of pollution reduction and consumption. A
proof is in the appendix. Consumption is constant for pollution levels at which both
8Idling capital may depreciate so that capital does not need to be constant if the utilization of capital
can be chosen. At any stationary point capital is fully utilized if investment occurs, since investment has
occured in the preceding period and ongoing underutilization is wasteful. Investment in clean technology
is zero if and only if clean technology capacity is zero, because there is no cost of using clean technology
capital.
9The stationary level of θ may depend on preferences of consumption and pollution if the factor was
substitutable for another factor, for example, labour in producing consumption goods and investment
goods. In models with production using substitutable factors capital and emissions preferences are needed
to find the levels of capital and emissions, which are necessary to compute the stationary cost of polluting.
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the utility and the absorption is a linear function of pollution. The stationary cost of
polluting is positive. The shadow return equals β−1 in a stationary allocation. Thus there
is no stationary investment in the clean technology, if its marginal product is smaller than
the inverse of the discount factor, QC ≤ β
−1 and ρC > 0, or QC < β
−1 and ρC = 0. The
next two propositions consider this.
The following lemma helps proving the next proposition and the type of an optimal
stationary point when there is a continuum of stationary points.
Lemma 1.3 Consumption increases more relative to pollution when expanding clean ca-
pacity than when increasing dirty capacity, (QC − 1)/ρC > (QB − 1)/(ρB + dBQB), if
the cost of pollution reduction is weakly greater for the clean technology with emissions of
investment, θB ≤ θC and ρC > 0.
Proof. The result is immediate from (QC − 1)/(QB − 1) > (βQC − 1)/(βQB − 1) ≥
ρC/(ρB+βdBQB) > ρC/(ρB+dBQB) using the definition of θj and discounting, β < 1, if
QB > QC . Assumption 1.2 implies that (ρB − ρC + dBQB)(QC − 1) > 0 ≥ ρC(QB −QC)
since 0 ≤ ρC and 1 < QB, if QB ≤ QC and ρB < ρC . Rearranging the outer relations
implies the result. The same applies to QB ≤ QC and ρB ≥ ρC , alternatively then
(QC − 1)/(QB − 1) ≥ 1 > ρC/(ρB + dBQB) for dB > 0. Q.E.D.
The previous lemma does not require Assumption 1.2 if the emission intensities in
investment are equal, ρB = ρC . The next proposition reports different stationary points.
Proposition 1.2 Let investment in the clean technology create emissions, ρC > 0. There
is a unique stationary point with exclusive clean technology use (CU), xB = 0 < xC, or
joint dirty and clean technology use (JU), xB > 0 and xC > 0, if the cost of pollution
reduction in terms of consumption decrease is smaller for the dirty technology, θB < θC.
There is a continuum of stationary points, that includes a unique optimal point, which
is either of type CU or JU, if θB = θC and K¯B + K¯C is sufficiently large. There is a
unique stationary point JU, or a unique stationary point with exclusive dirty technology
use (BU), xB > 0 = xC, if θC < θB.
Proof. Lemma 1.2 implies a horizontal or downward-sloping curve φ in the pollution-
consumption space. Consumption may be constant for some or all pollution levels. (I) If
θB < θC then let xB = 0 and vary xC ∈ (0, K¯C/QC ]. The laws of motion at stationary
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levels, Z(t) = Z(t+1) andKj(t) = Kj(t+1) all j ∈ {B,C}, read c/B =
∑
j(Qj−1)xj and
A(Z) =
∑
j(djQj + ρj)xj. These equations are differentiable with respect to consumption
c, input amounts xB and xC in investment, and pollution Z. The resulting curve χ(c, Z)
from these laws slopes upward and is depicted in Figure 1.3. Clean capacity is below the
maximum amount K¯C if the intersection with the curve θC = φ(c, Z) is Southwest to the
point on χ for KC = K¯C . Clean capacity is constrained if this intersection is Northeast.
There is no investment in dirty technology, xB = 0, if the point is on the thick section in
Figure 1.3. Depending on the location of the point on χ relative to θB = φ for small K¯C
there is investment in dirty technology, xB > 0. Dirty capacity is constrained so that θ ≤
θB if K¯B is small. (II) If θB = θC then there is a continuum of stationary points provided
that there is an intersection of χ on {xB = 0, xC ∈ (0, x¯C ]} ∪ {xB ∈ (0, x¯B], xC = x¯C}
and θC = φ, that is, given sufficiently large x¯j = K¯j/Qj some j ∈ {B,C}. The optimal
stationary point is unique, because by Lemma 1.3 investing in clean technology yields
relatively greater consumption for given pollution increase—(i) xC ≤ x¯C and xB = 0,
or (ii) xC = x¯C and xB > 0 depending on where φ intersects χ with hypothetical large
K¯C . Figure 1.3 shows these two points for different bounds K¯C as the two leftmost dots.
(III) The case θC < θB is reversed to (I). The slope on χ may be relatively smaller
or equal for the dirty technology, which cannot occur for the clean technology in (I)
given the assumption (ρC − ρB)QC < dBQB. There is relatively more consumption
through expanding dirty capacity if QC < βQ = ((dBQB + ρB − ρC)/(ρB + dBQB)) +
(ρC/(ρB+dBQB))βQB. In this case and for equal consumption increase for given pollution
among the dirty and clean technologies QC ∈ [βQ,Q). Clean technology productivity
is QC ∈ [βQ,Q) if there is relatively less consumption from investing more in dirty
technology despite θC < θB. Q.E.D.
The unique stationary point has either exclusive use of clean technology, simultaneous
deployment of dirty technology and clean technology, or exclusive use of dirty technology,
in contrast to dichotomy between the latter two (called Golden Age and Murky Age)
in Keeler et al. (1971) in terms of emission prevention in producing output. Multiple
stationary points exist only if the perpetual relative price of pollution reduction through
dirty technology and clean technology is equalized, θB = θC .
Only clean technology is used if the cost of pollution reduction in terms of consumption
decrease is smaller for the dirty technology, θB < θC , and the scale of the clean technology
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Figure 1.3: Stationary points for θB ≤ θC .
is sufficiently large. This requires sufficiently productive clean technology, QC > β
−1.
Only dirty technology is used when the pollution reduction cost of the dirty technology
is relatively high, θC < θB, unless the scale of the dirty technology is too small. Table
1.1 shows the stationary points dependent on the emission intensity of clean technology
holding all other parameters constant. Here QC > β
−1 is assumed in three cases of
different scale of clean technology, K¯C . Define φC as the level φ in Lemma 1.2 evaluated
at c = B(1 − 1/QC)K¯C and Z = A
−1((ρC/QC)K¯C). Let ρ
∗ be the level ρC at which
φC = θC and define ρ
∗∗ as such level that solves θB = θC .
10 A type CU stationary point
with interior clean capacity requires a large scale of clean technology, that is, θB < φC ,
since only then θB < θC < φC , or equivalently, ρ
∗ < ρC < ρ
∗∗, is feasible. In the cases
denoted by asterisk clean capacity is constrained, KC = K¯C , because the cost of polluting
θ is high relative to the clean technology scale K¯C so that ρC ≤ min[ρ
∗, ρ∗∗].
An exclusive use of clean technology arises because its investment carries an environ-
mental cost. Such an allocation can be optimal if dirty technology has a relative advantage
to clean technology at all scales of clean technology, QB > QC , and for utility functions
with small marginal utility of small pollution.11 This result can be extended to include
multiple clean technologies when there are multiple technologies. Capacity in both the
10There is a unique level ρ∗ because φC weakly increases in ρC and θC decreases in ρC such that
θC → 0 as ρC →∞ and θC →∞ as ρC → 0.
11Stationary clean technology investment follows from Lemma 1.1 if QB ≤ QC . The Case ρB < ρC
yields θB < θC , because (ρC − ρB)QC < dBQB implies that ρC < ρB + β(ρC − ρB)QC < ρB + βdBQB .
The Case ρC ≤ ρB directly shows that θB < θC .
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Large scale of clean technology, θB < φC
0 < ρC < ρ
∗ CU, θ ∈ (θB, θC) (*)
ρC = ρ
∗ CU, θ = θC (*)
ρ∗ < ρC < ρ
∗∗ CU, θ = θC
ρC = ρ
∗∗ optimum stationary point JU, θ = θB = θC
ρ∗∗ < ρC BU, θ = θB, if K¯B is large, otherwise JU, θ ≤ θB
Medium scale of clean technology, θB = φC
0 < ρC < ρ
∗ CU, θ = θB (*)
ρC = ρ
∗ optimum stationary point JU, θ = θB = θC (*)
ρ∗ < ρC BU, θ = θB, if K¯B is large, otherwise JU, θ ≤ θB
Small scale of clean technology, θB > φC
0 < ρC < ρ
∗∗ JU, θ = θB (*)
ρC = ρ
∗∗ optimum stationary point JU, θ = θB = θC (*)
ρ∗∗ < ρC BU, if K¯B is large, otherwise JU, θ ≤ θB
Note: CU=exclusive clean technology use, JU=joint use of dirty and clean technol-
ogy, BU=exclusive dirty technology use.
Table 1.1: Stationary points.
dirty and clean technology is constrained in the unique stationary point if the capacity
bounds are too small. Dirty technology may only have a small scale if it is endogenous.
The scale of dirty energy technology may be endogenous through nonrenewable fossil
fuel supply, which is the subject of further research. Dwindling fossil fuel supply and
limited technical progress in converting its energy may lead to exclusive long-term use of
renewable energy technologies for a wide array of energy services.
A stationary point is generally unique because goods are noninferior and the utility
function is concave. These assumptions imply uniqueness if substitutable capital and
emissions produce net output, for any returns to scale and proven in notes available upon
request. The literature has not made this clear. Contrary to a supposition of Keeler et al.
(1971) multiple stationary points do not exist in their model. The reason is that the
noninferiority ensures that (−∂U/∂Z)/(∂U/∂c) equal to a constant relates pollution and
consumption negatively or holds one of them constant. Tahvonen & Kuuluvainen (1993)
prove uniqueness under the more restrictive assumptions (1) nonincreasing marginal util-
ity of consumption in pollution, ∂2U/(∂c∂Z) ≤ 0, compared to noninferiority, and (2)
strict concavity of utility in pollution compared to concavity.
Multiple stationary points arise from production technology—at locally constant re-
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turns to scale of dirty and clean technology. The wealth effect of the environmental asset
on utility is special in assuming noninferior goods. Multiplicity in Tahvonen & Kuulu-
vainen (1993) using two assets pollution and a production factor can occur because of the
unspecified wealth effect for the same reason as in a model with one asset in Kurz (1968).
A decreasing absorption motivates multiple stationary points in Tahvonen & Withagen
(1996) and Tahvonen & Salo (1996).
Without emissions from investment in clean technology, ρC = 0, dirty rechnology
use is the only source of pollution inflow. There must be dirty technology capital in a
stationary point unless the scale of clean technology is sufficiently large and the marginal
utility of pollution at minimum feasible pollution Zmin is sufficiently large. The exclusive
investment in clean technology in Proposition 1.2 does not rest on the latter condition.
The following proposition shows the stationary level of clean capacity and when it is the
only provider of output.
Proposition 1.3 Let investment in the clean technology be emission-free, ρC = 0. There
is a unique stationary point with KC = K¯C (KC = 0) if the clean technology productivity
QC is greater (smaller) than β
−1. There is a continuum of stationary points, and clean
capacity is at its upper bound, KC = K¯C, at the unique optimal point if QC = β
−1. Clean
technology is exclusively used, xC > 0 = xB, in the unique stationary point if and only if
QC > β
−1 and the cost of polluting φ evaluated at c = (1 − 1/QC)K¯C and Z = Zmin is
weakly greater than the cost of pollution reduction of the dirty technology, θB, and in the
unique optimal stationary point if and only if QC = β
−1 and φ ≥ θB.
Proof. (i) The result follows for QC 6= β
−1 since R(t + 1) = β−1 in a stationary point.
Expanding clean capacity KC on [0, K¯C) for QC = β
−1 weakly increases consumption and
strictly reduces pollution through substitution for KB on the given curve χ(c, Z) = θB.
Then KC = K¯C is the preferred clean capacity level. (ii) “if.” Dirty technology use would
raise θ above φ evaluated at mB = 0 and thereby contradict that investment in dirty
technology is worthwhile. “only if.” The relation of the marginal product QC of clean
technology and the time discount factor β follows from (i). The cost of polluting is φ
evaluated at c = (1−1/QC)K¯C and Z = Zmin if there is exclusive use of clean technology.
At φ = θ < θB investing in dirty technology is efficient. Q.E.D.
A constant level of investment in clean technology is not sustainable because investing in
clean technology is too costly relative to time preference if clean technology productivity is
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smaller than the inverse of the discount factor, QC < β
−1. This holds with or without the
emissions in building new capital, ρC ≥ 0. The upper bound on clean capacity guarantees
that there is a stationary point when QC > β
−1 and investment does not create emissions,
ρC = 0. This bound implies finite clean capacity at all points of a continuum of stationary
points if QC = β
−1. As with dirty investment multiple stationary points exist only under
a special parameter constellation. The most plausible case when ρC = 0 is when the
creation of dirty technology capital lacks emissions too, ρj = 0 all j ∈ {B,C}, though
the results in Proposition 1.3 do not depend on ρB. Next I examine if a Pareto optimal
plan converges to a unique stationary point as time tends to infinity.
Convergence of an optimal plan.—The following proposition shows that an optimal
plan may converge to a unique stationary point with an interior capital stock starting at
a nearby state (Z,KB, KC) if θB 6= θC .
Proposition 1.4 A stationary point with interior capacity Kj ∈ (0, K¯j) of technology j
and boundary value Kj′ ∈ {0, K¯j′} of technology j
′ 6= j, can be locally a saddle point.
A proof in the appendix shows that the decisive matrix of the linearized dynamical
system of necessary optimality conditions and laws of motion around such a stationary
point has reciprocal characteristic values. The saddle point property (of existence of a
stable and unstable manifold) does not follow from linearization even if the discount factor
β is not too small. In examples I found exactly one pair of complex characteristic values,
which by the property that its modulus must be greater than one, precludes convergence
of the linearized system. Then nevertheless the optimal policy converged in numerical
simulations using grid search. A saddle point is reached asymptotically in infinite time.
Unique stationary capital levels of both the dirty and clean technology equal to their
maximum levels or one of them at its maximum level and the other equal to zero should
be reached in finite time. In such a case the cost of polluting and the shadow return need
to reach critical levels rather than be at their long-term levels to sustain the appropriate
investment.12 Any state of pollution, dirty capacity, and clean capacity, that belongs
12The saddle point property, if it can be proven, or a finite-time approach path of capital stocks, if
it can be constructed, implies that there is access to the stationary point. Then the sufficiency of the
necessary optimality condition shows that a path on the stable manifold of the stationary point or with
finite-time approach of capacities, respectively, is optimal. Claim. A convergent plan that satisfies the
necessary optimality conditions (1.5)-(1.7) is optimal if utility U or absorption A is strictly concave at
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to a nonoptimal stationary point and is given at the initial date is a trap. None of
the stationary points in a continuum can be a saddle point. The policy of staying at
any of them satisfies the necessary optimality conditions including the transversality
conditions, so that if these are sufficient (see the previous footnote for a condition that
ensures sufficiency) then by the uniqueness of an optimal plan convergence to the optimum
stationary point is not optimal. The following presents optimal plans that converge to a
unique stationary point.
Optimal plans.—Time paths of the cost of polluting and the shadow return can be
characterized depending on the relation of the technology-specific cost of pollution reduc-
tion θB and θC . The most obvious candidates are paths with one switch in investment
between technologies and paths with investment in a sole technology at all dates. To get
a clear idea about the roles of productivity and emission intensities let the scale K¯j be
large for j ∈ {B,C}. I focus on polluting clean technology, ρC > 0, with productivity
QC > β
−1 so that clean technology may be exclusively used at θC ∈ (0,∞).
Proposition 1.5 Let θB 6= θC ∈ (0,∞). On optimal paths with a single switch of invest-
ment from dirty technology B (C) to clean technology C (B) the cost of polluting increases
(decreases) and the shadow return decreases (increases) from the date of switching to the
long-term if the dirty technology is relatively more productive, QB > QC. There is only
investment in clean technology, xB(t) = 0 < xC(t) all t ≥ 0 close to the stationary point
if the clean technology is relatively weakly more productive, QB ≤ QC.
Proof. (i) QB > QC . The rates of return on investment in the dirty technology B and
the clean technology C in (1.8) equal β−1 for different levels θB and θC . These rates are
equal at the same level θ(t) = θ(t + 1) = θ∗ either less than or greater than θB and θC
since each stationary rate of return decreases in θ. The level θ∗ cannot be greater than
θC if θB < θC because then the critical curve for technology switching in θ(t)-θ(t + 1)
space would imply dirty technology investment at θ∗ = θC , which lies in the space of clean
technology investment given θB < θC . Then θ
∗ < θB < θC and analogously θC < θB < θ
∗.
any Z. Proof. Convergence satisfies the transversality conditions limt→∞ β
tǫ(t) and limt→∞ β
t[qj(t) −
βwj(t+ 1)]Kj(t) = 0 all j ∈ {B,C}. Then a version of Arrows’ Theorem, Proposition II.6.8 of Arrow &
Kurz (1970b), implies that a plan that satisfies the necessary conditions (1.5)-(1.7) and the transversality
conditions is optimal if utility U or absorption A is strictly concave at any Z. Q.E.D.
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Interior investment, xj(t) ∈ (0, K¯j/Qj), satisfies the difference equation
1
θ(t+ 1)
=
(
1
θ(t)
+
ρj
B
)
1
ε(t+ 1)Qj
+
dj
B
for j ∈ {B,C} where ε(t + 1) = βǫ(t + 1)/ǫ(t) using (1.8) and the identity θ(t + 1) =
R(t+1)ε(t+1)θ(t). Investment is optimal in the technology with greatest θ(t+1) given
θ(t) on these curves. There is an intersection of the curves for B and C at long-term
value ε(t + 1) = β and positive θ(t + 1) if ρB ≥ ρC and QB > QC > β
−1 by Assumption
1.2. Figure 1.4 draws these long-term curves. At the intersection of these curves the
slope dθ(t+1)/dθ(t) = (θ(t+1)/θ(t))2/ε(t+ 1)Qj is greater for the C-curve than for the
B-curve since QB > QC . In the left panel θB < θC and thus the intersection of these
curves is to the left of θB. In the right panel θB > θC and thus the intersection is to the
right of θB. Figure 1.4 illustrates these two cases for ρB = ρC . The relation of ρB and ρC
does not affect the conclusions The long-term C-curve lies below the long-term B-curve if
there is no intersection for ε(t+1) = β at θ(t+1) > 0. This can occur only if ρB < ρC by
Assumption 1.2. Then the curves intersect for some ǫ(t) < ǫ(t+1). The given curves yield
the indicated flow of θ. For θB < θC in the left panel R(t+ 1) is greater than β
−1 at the
intersection of the curves of B and C. The cost of polluting θ(t) and the shadow return
R(t + 1) relate negatively on the C-curve. Thus R(t + 1) is greater at the intersection
of the B-curve and the C-curve than for θ(t) = θ(t + 1) on the indifference curve. The
relation θ∗ < θC implies that R(t + 1) that equates the rates of return on investment is
greater than β−1. Analogously, for θB > θC in the right panel R(t + 1) is smaller than
β−1 at the intersection of the B-curve and the C-curve. The shadow return tends to
β−1 in the long-term. (ii) QB ≤ QC . There is no intersection of the long-term difference
equations of the cost of polluting for B and C for positive θ(t + 1) by Assumption 1.2.
The latter is above the former for all θ(t) > 0. Q.E.D.
The left (right) panel in Figure 1.4 designates low (high) environmental cost ρB =
ρC of investment. A small environmental cost of building capital advantages the clean
technology. The sequence of difference equations yields the same direction in the path of
the cost of polluting as the drawn curves when ǫ changes little over time. Thus there may
be exclusive investment in dirty technology B or clean technology C, or a single switch in
investment between these technologies. As indicated earlier, the cost of polluting and the
shadow price of pollution must decrease initially, θ(0) > θ(1) and ǫ(0) > ǫ(1), for optimal
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Figure 1.4: Technology switching.
dirty technology investment at the initial date if QB ≤ QC at large scale K¯C . The B-
curve coincides with the C-curve at the unique ε(1) of indifference between investing in
the dirty and clean technology when QB = QC that corresponds to the left panel in Figure
1.2. The B-curve is steeper than the C-curve at their intersection when QB < QC in a
graph that corresponds to the right panel in Figure 1.2 so that the C-curve lies above the
B-curve to the left of the intersection. Dampened oscillations of θ for particular changes
in ǫ cannot be excluded in general.13 Therefore, a reversal of investment in clean and
dirty technologies cannot be excluded. But a monotone motion of the cost of polluting
implies a monotone path of the shadow return in the opposite direction.
Proposition 1.6 The shadow return decreases, R(t) > R(t+1), on {t′+1, t′+2, . . . , t′′}
if the cost of polluting increases, θ(t) < θ(t+1), on {t′, t′+1, . . . , t′′} in plans with interior
investment in the dirty technology, xB(t) ∈ (0, K¯B/QB), on {t
′, t′ + 1, . . . , t′′ − 1}. The
shadow return increases, R(t) < R(t+1), if the cost of polluting decreases, θ(t) > θ(t+1),
on the given time intervals. The shadow return R(t + 1) and the cost of polluting θ(t)
are negatively related on {t′, t′ + 1, . . . , t′′} with interior investment in clean technology,
xC(t) ∈ (0, K¯C/QC).
Proof. The necessary optimality condition QB(B − dBθ(t+ 1))/(B + ρBθ(t)) = R(t+ 1)
and the level R(t) can be compared if xB(t) > 0 and (1.3) is nonbinding for technology
13The drawn curves are valid at all dates, because ǫ is constant, if the marginal utility of pollution is
constant and absorption is a linear function of pollution.
25
B. If θ(t − 1) < θ(t) < θ(t + 1) then R(t) > R(t + 1). If θ(t − 1) > θ(t) > θ(t + 1) then
R(t) < R(t+1). The necessary optimality condition QC/(B+ρCθ(t)) = R(t+1) delivers
the result if xC(t) > 0 and (1.3) is nonbinding for technology C. Q.E.D.
The shadow return R(t+1) depends positively on consumption at (t+1) and negatively
on consumption at t. Consumption growth is lower to accommodate pollution reduction at
the margin if the willingness to pay for pollution reduction, θ, in terms of the consumption
good is greater. Thus the cost of polluting reflects the willingness to shift consumption
over time in order to preserve the environment, which is costly in terms of consumption.
This argument holds pollution at optimal values if pollution affects the marginal utility
of consumption.
The shadow return tells the consumption growth rate if the effect of consumption
dominates the effect of pollution on the marginal utility of consumption. Consumption
should positively relate to output which positively relates to capital. I conclude that a
single switch from dirty to clean (clean to dirty) technology occurs if the initial aggregate
capital is sufficiently smaller (greater) than the long-term aggregate capital and θB 6= θC .
Emissions paths.—Emissions relate positively to capital. Thus the emissions path is
indicated by Figure 1.4. Increasing (decreasing) cost of polluting is consistent with in-
creasing (decreasing) emissions.
The next section turns to the role of emissions from investment in generating differences
to the cost of polluting.
1.1.2 Comparative analysis of emissions from using and investing in dirty
technology
The emission intensity of output of used dirty technology may be inferred by observing
the ratio of emissions dBKB(t) + (ρB/QB)KB(t+ 1) and output KB(t) on a time path.
What difference does it make to attribute some emissions to investments for the long-term
cost of polluting?
Proposition 1.7 The cost of polluting θ at a stationary point with investment in dirty
technology, xB > 0, increases (decreases) in the emission intensity of dirty technology
investment, ρB, if the observed gross rate of change KB(t + 1)/KB(t) of dirty output is
greater (smaller) than the inverse of the discount factor, β−1.
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Proof. Let gB = KB(t+ 1)/KB(t). Then d(dB) + (gB/QB)dρB = 0 and differentiation of
(ρB/β +QBdB)θ = B(QB − β
−1) imply that dθ/dρB = θ
2B(gB − β
−1)/(QB − β
−1). The
result follows from there since the denominator is positive. Q.E.D.
The greater the emission intensity the smaller is the cost of polluting (equal to the
marginal benefit of emission reduction) because under more polluting technology con-
sumption is smaller.14 Disregarding the emissions from investment, which occur currently,
puts too much weight on dB, which is discounted at the rate of time preference in the
cost of polluting. This explains why the discount factor plays a role. The greater the
ratio [KB(t+ 1)/KB(t)]/QB of growth rate to productivity the greater is the derived dB
for given ρB. Assuming KB(t+ 1)/KB(t) > β
−1 this shifting increases ρB + βdBQB and
thus decreases θ, and is more pronounced the greater the level ρB. Conversely, inclusion
of emissions from investment then increases θ, by more the greater the level ρB. If the
discounted growth rate of capacity is too low, βKB(t+ 1)/KB(t) < 1, then the effects
are reversed. The observed growth rate of dirty output depends on the preferences. With
additively separable utility U = c1−ψ/(1− ψ)−Ψ(Z) and constant index of relative risk
aversion ψ regarding consumption the growth rate of consumption is (βQB)
1/ψ which
exceeds β−1 for QB > (1/β)
1+ψ and may be similar to the growth rate of output. Then
for sufficiently large QB relative to the inverse of the discount factor the inclusion of
emissions raises the long-term cost of polluting.
1.2 Multiple dirty and clean technology types
This section explains why a unique technology is chosen in the theory of substitutable
capital and emissions yet there is investment in multiple clean technologies in the theory
here in evaluating climate change, examines the incentives to invest in clean technology
under one assumed dirty technology versus multiple dirty technologies, and discusses
time paths with unconstrained dirty capacity choice. First I show that there is a unique
stationary point generally, and how the local stability analysis for two technologies applies
to more than two technologies.
14The feasibility frontier χ in pollution-consumption space tilts down and the preference curve φ shifts
in so that at the new intersection consumption is smaller than before and pollution is smaller than at
the intersection of the old φ and the new χ.
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Proposition 1.8 There is a unique stationary point, if the cost of pollution reduction
in terms of consumption units θj differs over all dirty technologies j ∈ J , and all clean
technologies j ∈ J with emissions of investment, ρj > 0.
Proof. The distinct relative cost θj and Lemma 1.1 imply that capital can be interior,
Kj ∈ (0, K¯j) only for one technology j ∈ J . There is a unique intersection of the curves
χ(c, Z) formed by c/B =
∑
j(1 − 1/Qj)Kj and A(Z) =
∑
j(dj + ρj/Qj)Kj, and φ(c, Z)
given (1.5), at Kj = K¯j all j with θj < θ varying one other technology’s investment.
Else consumption and emissions are unique if Kj = K¯j all j in which investment occurs,
Kj > 0. There are no two clean technologies C
′ and C ′′ with ρC′ = ρC′′ = 0 and
QC′ = QC′′ = β
−1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.4 applies consequently to a continuum or a discrete set of dirty or clean
technologies holding a mass or sum of input in investment constant. The sums of constant
capital amounts must be replaced by integrals for a continuum of technologies.15
Clean technology frontier versus dirty technology frontier.—In the theory without com-
mitment Stokey (1998) interprets the unique intratemporal emission control as a unique
technology chosen at the date of production. The choice set can be thought of as a dirty
technology frontier, where there is a trade-off between the productivity of capital and
labour and the emission intensity of output. Nordhaus (2009) views emission control in
this theory as a mix of clean and dirty technologies and energy efficiency choices that
can be adjusted in each period.16 With commitment there is no unique technology choice
if the marginal product QC of clean technologies ranges from QB to below one on small
individual scales K¯C , consistent with data on the dollar cost of avoiding emissions that
Nordhaus (2009) uses to calibrate the mapping between productivity and emission inten-
sity in his model DICE. Given this wide range, and roughly equal emission intensity ρj of
the input in investment for all technologies j ∈ {B,C1, C2, . . .} the condition (1.8) implies
that investment in some types of clean technology is worthwhile if there was investment
in a dirty technology.
One dirty technology versus multiple dirty technologies.—I consider clean technology
investment when the capacity choice of multiple dirty technologies is unconstrained. The
15In the canonical system Z(t+1) = (d+ρ)K(t)+
∑
j ρ(Kj−c(t)/B)+
∑
j(ρj−ρ)Kj/Qj+Z(t)−A(Z(t))
extends (A-1) in the appendix, and K(t + 1) = Q(K(t) +
∑
j(1 − 1/Qj)Kj − c(t)/B) is the resource
constraint for multiple technologies, holding constant each Kj .
16The factor efficiency choice seems a viable interpretation.
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incentives to invest in a given clean technology may become greater or smaller from
introducing multiple dirty technologies. As will be shown below the effect depends on
the clean technology productivity relative to the discount factor and the cost of polluting
relative to its stationary level.
Let fix the ratio 4α = QB/dB of the productivity in creating dirty technology capital
and the emission intensity in using this capital for some productivity levels QB ∈ [Q
′′, Q′]
subject to large scale K¯B all B. The optimal interior choice Q = 2Bα/θ on a continuum
of technologies inversely relates to the cost of polluting so that Q = 2β−1 in a stationary
point if ρB = 0 all B. I disregard the emissions from investment here to focus on tech-
nology choice per se. Suppose that this technology was the only dirty technology and
2β−1 ∈ (Q′′, Q′). This enables comparison of clean technology investment for a narrow
choice set with one dirty technology and a wider choice set with more and less productive
dirty technologies. The critical level for technology switching is θ∗ = θ(2−βQC) given the
stationary level θ = Bαβ if there is one dirty technology. Indifference levels of the cost of
polluting between investing in dirty technologies versus a given clean technology are de-
rived as follows. The level γ∗ = Bα/QC of the cost of polluting equates the rates of return
on investing in any of the dirty technologies with productivity QB ∈ [Q
′′, Q′] as an un-
constrained choice and in the clean technology with productivity QC below its maximum
scale. A clean technology does not have an environmental cost here, ρC = 0 all C. The
optimal dirty technology choice for θ(t+1) ≤ θ′ = 2Bα/Q′ and θ(t+1) ≥ θ′′ = 2Bα/Q′′ is
investing in Q′ and Q′′ at t, respectively. If γ∗ < θ′ then clean technology investment oc-
curs for θ(t+1) > θ′. If γ∗ > θ′′ then clean technology investment occurs for θ(t+1) > θ′′.
Else it occurs for θ(t+ 1) > γ∗.
(i) QC < β
−1. There can be investment in a clean technology, though it would not
be optimal if only one dirty technology was available, at θ greater than its stationary
level. Then the switching level if there is only one dirty technology is greater than θ′′.
In other cases the incentives to invest in the given clean technology are smaller in an
extended choice set for θ ∈ (θ∗,min[γ∗, θ′′]) than under one dirty technology, because a
dirty technology with smaller emission intensity than of this technology is feasible.
(ii) QC = β
−1. The switching level equals the stationary level when there is one
dirty technology. Thus the incentives to invest in clean technology are weaker for θ ∈
(θ∗,min[γ∗, θ′′]) because investing in a dirty technology with productivity smaller than
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Figure 1.5: Shadow return and cost of polluting given investment in coal, oil, and gas technolo-
gies.
the stationary level is optimal in this range.
(iii) QC > β
−1. The hurdle to invest in a given clean technology is greater for low θ
relative to its stationary level when a dirty technology with a large emission intensity is
feasible, because its investment is optimal for low θ ∈ (θ∗,max[γ∗, θ′]).
Unconstrained dirty investment options.—Investment switches between technologies
over time when the pair (θ(t), θ(t+1)) leaves the region of investment in some technology
if there is a continuum or discrete array of more than two technologies characterized by
(Qj, dj , ρj) each on a large scale. The rationale is the same as with two technologies.
Among coal, petroleum, and natural gas energy conversions in an economy with the
relative importance of their prime uses for the single factor in the model and emission
intensity in the same order (trivially) a more dirty technology is more productive so that
dB and QB relate positively all B.
17 Then intersections of the curves QB/R(t + 1) −
1 = (ρB + ε(t + 1)dBQB)θ(t)/B in R(t + 1)-θ(t) space are indifference points regarding
investment at date t. This equation results from combining (1.8) and θ(t + 1) = R(t +
1)ε(t + 1)θ(t). Figure 1.5 plots it for three technologies. Investment in a technology
17The prime uses are stationary motor drive and light using electricity for coal, mobile energy for
petroleum, and space and water heating for natural gas. There is scientific research in reversing this
relationship for fossil fuels, for example, producing clean coal.
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with maximum R(t + 1) given θ(t) is optimal. Let ρB be equal all B and suppose that
the long-term allocation is based on oil. Then it is optimal to move from a coal-based
economy (high dB andQB) to an oil-based economy (medium dB andQB) when θ increases
toward its long-term level—the initial energy production capacity is small relative to its
long-term capacity. In contrast, investment switches from natural gas technologies (low
dB and QB) to oil technologies, when θ decreases toward its long-term level—the initial
energy production capacity is greater than its long-term capacity. I have used the term
energy-carrier based economy. Multiple energy services may be served by different energy
carriers in a given period.
1.3 Delay in societal impacts of emissions
Some scientists argue that carbon emissions from 2010 until about 2100 do not affect
major measures of climate change in 2100. This suggests some inertia in the accumula-
tion of pollutants. This section shows that under preferences that admit an additively
separable utility function delay preserves the monotone or oscillatory type of convergence
of an optimal plan to a unique stationary point. Winkler (2011) compares monotone
approach paths with such separable objective and dampened oscillations with interaction
effects in the objective in a one-state delay problem. There the approach is monotonic in
the undelayed version. My first result applies.18 Moreover I show that then a solution is
readily available from the solution of a problem without such inertia. Let
Z(t+ 1) = E(t− τ) + Z(t)− A(Z(t)) (1.9)
be pollution at the beginning of period (t + 1), where the emissions amount is de-
fined as before. The planner knows the pollution Z(−τ) for τ ≥ 0, and the sequence
{E(−τ), E(−τ + 1), . . . , E(−1)} of emissions if τ ≥ 1. The greater τ the greater is the
inertia in the response of pollution to emissions.19
18Winkler (2011) views the time structure of differential equations that implies the preserved type of
convergence albeit concludes only preserved monotonicity in a model without oscillations in the separable
form in the undelayed version.
19Here pollution measures an environmental state that has contemporaneous adverse impacts on soci-
ety. Claim. Delay between emissions and impacts yields the same results as any additive delays between
emissions and accumulation of pollutants, and the latter and impacts on society, given absorption of
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Optimal choice of pollution in periods τ + 1, τ + 2, . . . satisfies the difference equation
ǫ∗(t) = β(−∂U/∂Z(t+ 1)) + β(1− ∂A/∂Z(t+ 1))ǫ∗(t+ 1), t ≥ τ , (1.10)
of the current value shadow price ǫ∗ of pollution. Define the discounted shadow price
ǫ(t) = βτ ǫ∗(t + τ). Then the conditions (1.6) and (1.7) are necessary for an optimum.
Predetermined pollution has no effect on the cost of polluting θ(t) = ǫ(t)/(∂U/∂c)(t) at
any date except through the effect on ∂U/∂c(t) for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ}. This identifies the
additively separable specification U(c, Z) = U0(c)−Ψ(Z) whose optimal plan subject to
arbitrary delay solves the problem of welfare maximization for a similarly defined utility
function and a one-period lagged effect of emissions on pollution, and vice versa.
Proposition 1.9 The optimal policy for utility function U(c, Z) = U0(c)−β
τΨ(Z∗) given
pollution Z∗(t) = Z(t + τ) in (1.9) all t ≥ 0 with one-period lagged effect of emissions
on society and the optimal policy for utility U(c, Z) = U0(c) − Ψ(Z) subject to (1.9) all
t ≥ τ ≥ 1 with delayed effect of emissions on society coincide.
Proof. All necessary optimality conditions are equivalent. In particular, substituting
Z∗(t) = Z(t+ τ) into
ǫ(t) = β(βτ∂Ψ/∂Z∗(t+ 1)) + β(1− ∂A/∂Z∗(t+ 1)ǫ(t+ 1)
for t ≥ 0 yields (1.10). These necessary conditions are sufficient for a maximum of J
because there is a unique optimal plan by Proposition 1.1. Q.E.D.
Thus for additively separable utility function the stability properties are the same and
given there is a unique stationary point locally consumption, investment, pollution, and
capital are on saddle paths toward this steady state.
The following representation of the shadow price ǫ∗(t) helps interpretating the cost of
polluting θ(t) = βτ ǫ∗(t + τ)/(∂U/∂c)(t). The forward solution to (1.10), provided that
pollutants depends on contemporaneous pollutants. Proof. Let pollution Z(t) in period t depend on the
stock of a pollutant P in period (t − j), and P (t + 1) = E(t + j − τ) + P (t) − A(P (t)), τ ≥ j ≥ 0.
Substitution of Z(t+ 1) = P (t− j + 1) and Z(t) = P (t− j) yields (1.9). Q.E.D.
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the transversality condition with respect to pollution holds,
ǫ∗(t) =
(
1−
∂A
∂Z(t)
)−1 ∞∑
j=1
[
βj
j−1∏
s=0
(
1−
∂A
∂Z(t+ s)
)](
−
∂U
∂Z(t+ j)
)
,
reveals that the marginal willingness to pay for pollution reduction in terms of utils is
positive, ǫ∗(t′) > 0, if pollution has a nonzero effect on welfare at some period t ≥ t′ + 1.
Thus, the cost of polluting is a weighted sum of future marginal disutility of pollution
starting at the first date when current emissions affect pollution divided by the current
marginal utility of consumption.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter draws conclusions about the motions of investment in dirty versus clean
technologies. Clean technology is used if the cost of polluting is sufficiently high. The
relative emission intensity in investment of dirty and clean technology is less decisive
for dirty versus clean technology investment for greater clean technology productivity.
Clean technology is exclusively used only if the cost of reducing pollution relative to
increasing consumption is weakly smaller for dirty technology than for clean technology.
A sustained controlled pollution inflow from building capital enables a long-term steady
state with exclusively producing clean technology. This can prevail if clean technology is
less productive than dirty technology at all scales of aggregate investment.
There is investment in only one technology at a given date when all technologies can
produce large output. The reason is the linear technology in the investment sector and in
the production of the factor. Then on paths with roughly constant discounted marginal
effects of pollution on society there is investment in one technology at all dates or switches
occur in investment such that investment in any technology is optimal on a closed time
interval or from some date onward infinitely. Multiple use-periods of capital will retain
this switching in investment. Decreasing returns to scale in using capital may lead to
simultaneous investment of multiple technologies that I relegate to further research.
A rationale for the exclusive conversion of renewable energy such as wind and solar
energy into useful energy for consumption and investment is the carbon dioxide and
methane emissions that occur in the manufacturing of wind turbines and solar panels,
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when these emissions may alter the climate. The production of capital that uses energy
such as buildings, roads, and other structures currently creates these emissions too, for
example, in steel and cement production, and mineral processing, and the use of wood
with the effect of deforestation. The exclusive use of renewable energy technologies thus
can follow if their investment does not create emissions.
A carbon tax that internalizes a carbon externality may be applied permanently if
the carbon emissions in building capital of alternative non-carbon emitting technologies
cannot be avoided. This likely holds when clean technology productivity increases over
time. In contrast, Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn & Hemous (2012) derive that decreasing
use of dirty technology lowers the atmospheric carbon stock such that marginal effects of
pollution on utility become zero because they disregard the emissions of investment. A
topic for further research may be directing resources toward technical change in improving
the emission intensity versus the productivity of such technologies.
The chapter refines a set of assumptions (noninferior goods and concave utility in pol-
lution) that implies the uniqueness of stationary points when there is a wealth effect. The
noninferiority of pollution reduction and consumption specifies the wealth effect. Multi-
ple stationary points reside in a continuum and exist only if the relative cost of pollution
reduction is equal among two technologies (and necessarily occurs if there are only two
technologies that satisfy this condition). Expanding capacity of clean technology max-
imizes consumption and minimizes pollution so that the optimal stationary point in a
continuum is unique and exhibits clean capacity if the emission intensity of investment is
equal in the technologies. In an optimal stationary point either dirty and clean technolo-
gies are simultaneously used or dirty technology is exclusively used if emissions only occur
in using dirty technology given that small pollution has small marginal effects on utility.
The economy possesses a reciprocal root property that allows saddle-path stability and
is known in the literature.
Attribution of emissions to investment versus use of dirty technology generally alters
the stationary cost of polluting when dirty technology is used in the long-term. Disregard-
ing emissions from investment in dirty technology biases the stationary cost of polluting
downward if the discount factor is not too small. The reason is that the willingness to pay
for pollution reduction relative to consumption increase is greater when production is less
emission-intensive. This holds if the discount factor is not too small and with account-
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ing of emissions in investmen rather than without it given an observational equivalence
condition when dirty capacity grows.
Under preferences that admit an additively separable utility function in consumption
and pollution delay in the impact of emissions on society preserves the monotone or
oscillatory type of convergence of an optimal plan to a unique stationary point. Moreover,
then a solution is available from a problem with adjusted utility function by discounting
and without delay in the impact of emissions on pollution.
1.5 Appendix: Uniqueness of optimal plan, noninferiority, saddle
point
Proof of Proposition 1.1. (i) Existence. A plan satisfies feasibility conditions and yields
finite welfare J . The policy c(t) = B(1 − 1/QB)min(KB(0) + KC(0), K¯B), xB(t) =
(1/QB)min(KB(0) + KC(0), K¯B), xC(t) = 0, is an example. Thus J is bounded from
below, J > −∞, for some feasible plan(s). What remains to be shown is that there is a
plan that cannot be improved upon. Welfare J is bounded from above because the state
space is closed and bounded and given the admissable compact set of consumption and
investment and discounting. Moreover the utility function U is continuous in consumption
c and pollution Z. (ii) Uniqueness. Suppose that two policies maximize J . This is to
be contradicted. The vectorized average capital Kε = εK1 + (1 − ε)K2, 0 < ε < 1,
produces weakly more output than the weighted output εG(K1, L) + (1 − ε)G(K2, L)
because G is concave. Then εG(K1, L) + (1 − ε)G(K2, L) ≤ G(Kε, L). The law of
motion Kj(t+ 1) = Qjxj(t) implies that the policy (c, x) yields the same level of capital
in technology j ∈ {B,C} as the average capital εK1j + (1 − ε)K
2
j at t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
Thus c + B(xB + xC) ≤ G(K
ε, L) ≤ G(K,L) shows that the policy (c, x) = (εc1 +
(1 − ε)c2, εx1 + (1 − ε)x2) is feasible. The emissions under the policy (c, x) are equal
to the ε-weighted average emissions resulting from the proposed policies, since the size
of dirty technology capital is its average size, KB(t) = K
ε
B(t), all t ≥ τ ≥ 0. The law
of motion of pollution and the emissions sequence imply that pollution Z(t) is weakly
smaller than the average pollution Zε = εZ1 + (1 − ε)Z2 in periods t ≥ t′ + 1 if the
absorption A(Z) is strictly concave in at least one period t′ ≥ 1. Then J(c, Zε) < J(c, Z).
Else J(c, Zε) = J(c, Z). The utility function U is strictly concave in consumption and
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concave in pollution. Therefore, εJ(c1, Z1) + (1− ε)J(c2, Z2) < J(c, Zε) ≤ J(c, Z). This
contradicts that the two proposed policies maximize welfare. Q.E.D.
The proof extends the method of using concave production functions and utility func-
tion in consumption, as outlined in Becker & Boyd III (1997), to a stock that is an
argument in the welfare function such as the environment. The proof applies in the case
of a lagged effect of emissions on society, τ ≥ 1. Furthermore, there is a unique optimum
if U is concave in consumption and U or A is strictly concave in pollution at some t ≥ 1.
The constant returns to scale in producing dirty technology capital are needed in this
proof, because this capital enhances pollution of which more is worse, or equivalently,
reduces environmental quality of which more is better. An average policy would produce
more than the average capital and thus more emissions than the average emissions under
decreasing returns to scale in dirty technology investment. In economies without such
an environmental asset, production of capital goods at nonincreasing returns to scale is
sufficient for the uniqueness of an optimal plan.20 Arrow’s sufficiency theorem is applica-
ble so that the same results hold at nonincreasing returns to scale in the production of
investment goods of dirty technology.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. In any stationary point the conditions (1.5) and (1.8) imply that
θ[β−1 − (1− ∂A/∂Z)] = βτ (−∂U/∂Z)/(∂U/∂c)
at given value of θ. In the undelayed version τ = 1. (i) ∂2U/∂c∂Z 6= 0, ∂2U/∂Z2 6= 0,
or ∂2A/∂Z2 < 0 for a closed interval of Z. The ratio r = (−∂U/∂Z)/(∂U/∂c) implicitly
defines a function c = ϕ(Z, θ) with slope
∂ϕ/∂Z = −r
(
∂2U
∂Z2
[
∂U/∂c
∂U/∂Z
]
−
∂2U
∂c∂Z
)/(
∂2U
∂c2
[
∂U/∂Z
∂U/∂c
]
−
∂2U
∂c∂Z
)
,
that is negative given noninferiority, ∂U/∂c > 0, and ∂U/∂Z < 0. The terms in
parentheses are positive since both pollution reduction and consumption are noninfe-
rior goods and utility is strictly concave in consumption. The concave shape of absorp-
tion preserves this sign or yields it if marginal absorption ∂A/∂Z depends on pollu-
20One may show uniqueness of a plan with exclusive investment in clean technology using the proof
of Proposition 1.1 and verifying this exclusive investment subject to decreasing returns to scale in clean
technology investment.
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tion locally, ∂2A/∂Z2 ≤ 0. Marginal utility of pollution, marginal utility of consump-
tion, and absorption are continuous since these are differentiable by assumption. (ii)
∂2U/∂c∂Z = ∂2U/∂Z2 = ∂2A/∂Z2 = 0 for a closed interval of Z. Consumption is
constant. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. There is a canonical system of the four equations (i) (1.5), (ii)
βQq(t+ 1)− β(d+ ρ)ǫ(t+ 1) = q(t) from (1.6) and (1.7), (iii) (1.4), and (iv) K(t+ 1) =
Q(K(t)+(1−1/Qj)Kj−c(t)/B) inX = [Z K −ǫ q]
′ holding constantKj of one technology.
Consumption c is an implicit function of Z, ǫ, and q from Qq = B∂U/∂c + ρǫ. A first-
order Taylor series expansion around a stationary point with interior capital K ∈ (0, K¯)
yields the linearized system A1X(t + 1) − A0X(t) = ω, where A1 = [βP βS; I 0] and
A0 = [0 I; S
′R]. The matrices P and
R =
(−1)
B2∂2U/∂c2
[
ρ2 ρQ
ρQ Q2
]
, S =
[
(1− ∂A/∂Z + ρr) rQ
(d+ ρ) Q
]
,
are evaluated at the stationary point given r = [(∂2U/∂c∂Z)/(B∂2U/∂c2)]. The matrix
P has [∂2U/∂Z2 + (∂2A/∂Z2)ǫ − B(∂2U/∂c∂Z)r] in the upper left position and zeros
elsewhere. S is nonsingular, in general, and in particular if ∂2U/∂c∂Z = 0 or d = 0. The
matrix
A = A1
−1A0 =
[
0 I
(βS)−1 −S−1P
]
A0 =
[
S ′ R
(−S)−1PS ′ (βS)−1 − S−1PR
]
determines the stability of the linear map. Define J = [0 (−S ′)−1;S−1 0]. Then
βAJA′ =
[
S ′ R
(−S)−1PS ′ (βS)−1 − S−1PR
][
0 β(−S ′)−1
βS−1 0
]
A′
=
[
βRS−1 −βI
(S−1 − βS ′PR)S−1 βS−1P
]
A′ = βAJ
[
S SP (−S ′)−1
R (βS ′)−1 −RP (S ′)−1
]
= J
follows exploiting the symmetry of P and R. By definition β1/2A is symplectic because of
this result and the skew-symmetry of J . Symplectic matrices have a reciproal polynomial.
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For any nonzero characteristic value ψ then
0 = det(A− ψI) = det(−βψA) det((βA)−1 − (1/βψ)I)
= det(JA′J−1 − (1/βψ)JJ−1) = det(J) det(A′ − (1/βψ)I) det(J−1)
= det(A′ − (1/βψ)I)
using det(−βψA) 6= 0, det(J) det(J−1) = 1, and (β1/2A)′ = J−1(β1/2A)−1J . A matrix
A and its transpose A′ have the same characteristic values. Therefore, if ψ 6= 0 is
a characteristic value then 1/βψ is too. In fact, the determinant of A, which is the
product of all characteristic values, is positive at β−2, so that all characteristic values are
nonzero. Boyd III (1989) shows that the characteristic values ψ and 1/βψ have the same
multiplicity. Q.E.D.
The reciprocity of characteristic values is obtained using a skew-symmetric matrix J
different from J∗ = [0−I; I 0]. The continuous-time analog of the property that leads to
this result is that the Jacobian A of the modified Hamiltonian system with time discount
rate ρ satisfies J−1AJ = −A′ + ρI for some skew-symmetric matrix J . For a canonical
system in continuous time J∗ is useful. For example, van der Ploeg & Withagen (1991)
use this in an economy without emissions of investment.
The emissions from investment conform to saddle-path stability. Substitution of the
resource constraint into the law of motion of pollution yields
Z(t+ 1) = (d+ ρ)K(t) + ρ(Kj − c(t)/B) + (ρj − ρ)Kj/Qj + Z(t)− A(Z(t)) (A-1)
so that the next period’s capital stock K(t + 1) is purged. The leading capital stock
of the other technology j is constant. Therefore, limit cycles, which can appear when
consumption is proportional to emissions (Ryder & Heal 1973), are not expected. The
resource constraint c(t)/B + K(t + 1)/Q = K(t) and the law of motion Z(t + 1) =
ρc(t) + Z(t) − A(Z(t)) imply a difference equation that contains Z(t + 1) and K(t + 1)
as substitutes. Heal (1982) interprets Ryder & Heal (1973) in terms of the environment.
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2The timing of capital retirement in
pollution control
Underutilizing pre-existing dirty technology capital prevents current emissions. With this
policy the capital use can be postponed and thus emissions of investing can be avoided
when delayed capital use replaces investment. Underutilization of pre-installed clean
technology capital can indirectly save emissions if building it creates emissions. The
leading example is climate change. Fossil-fuel technologies produce energy and carbon
dioxide emissions proportionally using long-lasting capital, and their current capacity has
been built irreversibly and without regard to a negative externality. This capacity may be
greater than the optimum long-term energy yield of fossil fuels. Both building fossil-fuel
assets and clean renewable energy technology capital creates carbon dioxide and methane
emissions. I use a dynamic model with heterogeneous capital to show how allocations in
optimum and in a decentralized economy without government policy differ, simulate their
trajectories of pollution and capital, and characterize government policy that implements
an optimum.
There are four major findings. (i) Dirty technology capital is optimally underutilized
when pollution is smaller or greater than its long-term level to rapidly approach long-term
levels, because consumption and investment use the same resource. (ii) Only capital that
is installed at the initial date of optimization is underutilized in the deterministic setting,
possibly over multiple periods. All or a portion of pre-existing dirty technology capital
is idle forever, it is underutilized until it is used up or investment becomes worthwhile,
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or such capital is fully utilized. Investment in the dirty technology is followed by fully
utilized dirty technology capital. (iii) The Pigouvian emissions tax, which is proportional
to the cost of polluting, is lower in the early periods in which dirty technology use is
postponed in the optimum than the tax that implements full utilization at each date
by assumption in the constrained optimum, because underutilization mitigates societal
effects of pollution. (iv) Clean technology capital can be optimally underutilized if the
scale of other, more productive, clean technology types is large because of the environ-
mental impact of creating new capital or because capital that is expensive to construct
is pre-installed.
Emissions predictions and optimal emissions plans for climate control have focused on
the investment in dirty versus clean technologies, change in energy efficiency through
new equipment and retrofits, and removal of carbon from the atmosphere. Studies in
the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 22 assume fully utilized capital stocks in testing
the hypotheses of staying below given carbon levels formulated as a constraint (Clark
et al., 2009). Some of these models predict that currently installed and long-lasting
capital leads to atmospheric greenhouse gases in excess of 450 ppmv CO2 equivalent
units in 2100. Recent attempts to determine the social cost of carbon using continuous
feedback of carbon on output, for example, Nordhaus (2009) and Golosev et al. (2011), or
Barrage (2012) with output and utility feedback and distortionary fiscal policy, presume
fully utilized capital. In their framework capital can be substituted for emissions (see
more detailed comments below) so that a commitment to technology stock at the date
of investment is lacking. In reality capital utilization can be varied beside directing
investment toward technologies with fixed emission intensity of output.1 Second these
studies do not differentiate between the emissions in producing energy that is useful for
consuming or investing and emissions solely for investment.
I build a model with heterogeneous capital to show the optimal timing of abandon-
ing the use of dirty technology or postponing the use and investing in dirty and clean
technologies when there are these two sources of emissions. The use of dirty technol-
ogy creates emissions while the use of clean technology does not create emissions. The
1Utilization balances time-varying demand and supply in peak-load theories of electricity that Crew,
Fernando & Kleindorfer (1995) review, and that models in the EMF may account for. The government
of Mexico City has recognized that limiting the time of use of polluting technology below full capacity
may save emissions. However the policy of precluding about a fifth of automobiles each weekday from
driving (Hoy No Circula since 1989) may be ineffective because of double car-ownership (Davis 2008).
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optimum consumption approaches a steady level in the long-term in contrast to Ace-
moglu et al. (2012) because I assume constant technology to focus on the retirement of
capital in different technology states. The model in the present paper (given multiple
clean technology types) can explain current clean technology investment by its relatively
greater productivity on small scale. In a study of directed technical change, Acemoglu
et al. (2012) assume nondepreciating heterogeneous capital types that produce imperfect
substitutes, and cannot explain current clean production because of its relatively lower
cost as the high-cost technology produces the low portion of output.2 In a study of non-
renwable resource depletion, Tahvonen & Salo (2001) assume scale-dependent relative
advantage of a nonrenewable resource technology and an alternative renewable resource
technology, analogously to the dirty and clean technology types here. Pollution is not
controlled, whereas this chapter has an environmental motive.
The opportunity cost of using output to invest is a consumption benefit and resources
are finite in a given period as one would presume in the world economy, in contrast to
literature with variable utilization and an environmental motive. Van Long (2006) allows
underutilizing an endowment of time-invariant size to control pollution. The model of the
sole owner fishery of Clark, Clarke & Munro (1979) and Boyce (1995) with chosen utiliza-
tion of fishing vessels does not suit climate control, because it lacks a trade-off between
consumption and investment. Second, the depreciation of capacity (or the productivity of
capital) and utilization are linked. The finite usable time of capital with storage of unused
capital contrasts the perpetual inventory method used in the fishery models, to suit the
energy-climate context. A finite usable time of capital allows a sensible comparison to the
constrained optimum with full utilization, because some technology may become obsolete
in the long-term. Given infinite lifespan optimal and constrained optimal capital stocks
would differ in the long-term if initially there was capital in a technology that is optimally
unused in the long-term. Halting capital use increases the lifespan of capital. In Puu’s
(1977) resource extraction and in some business cycle research greater utilization raises
depreciation. In contrast to my model, there fully utilized capital leaves some capital in
infinite time under no investment.3 In particular, electric power plants, heating machines,
2They can explain the major share of clean energy in the late 19th century, and contradict the
increased share of dirty energy that is observed until the late 20th century. According to their model the
research should have efficiently focused on clean technology without government incentives.
3In the real business cycle literature homogeneous intensity of capital use, for example Greenwood,
Hercowitz & Huffman (1988), or heterogeneous intensity, for example Cooley, Hansen & Prescott (1995),
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and automobile engines, that produce energy and greenhouse gas emissions are long-lived
and can produce currently, or pause and produce later, and are scrapped in finite time.
The production at any given productivity is bounded from above, to be consistent with
renewable energy production. For example, given solar modules are more productive in
California than in Washington State. The number of times in which capital is useful is
exogenous as in Buhl et al. (1982). The basic model has an underpinning from vintage
capital with invariable emission intensity. There capital is useful once so that a period is
long. An extension exhibits vintage-dependent emission intensity and multiple times of
use. Since capital is useful for an exogenous finite number of periods, no second factor
is necessary for the efficient scrapping of capital in contrast to vintage capital models of
Johansen (1959) or Solow et al. (1966).
Stokey (1998) argues that several technologies can be lumped into a single variable
that expresses the overall emission intensity of output. This approach prevents con-
clusions about technology-specific capacity utilization. In the present approach instead
emissions are controlled intratemporally through utilization and intertemporally through
technology-specific investment which allows distinct capital to idle, or to not exist, when
consumption is positive. Capital services and emissions are complementary in any period.
Keeler et al. (1971), Brock (1977), Tahvonen & Kuuluvainen (1993), and Stokey (1998)
assume that capital and emissions produce output at a positive substitution elasticity in
the context of a pollution stock. This substitution can be interpreted as choosing the
emission intensity of gross product below or at an exogenous upper bound—in Nord-
haus’ Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE), and by Hassler et al. (2011), given
calibration of emission prevention to a mix of dirty and clean technologies and energy
efficiency (Nordhaus 2009). An alternative view is controlling the emission intensity of
gross output through expending resources on abatement (for example, carbon seques-
tration).4 Interpreting emission control in this paradigm as utilization of capital seems
troublesome. This implies underutilization at all levels of the cost of polluting given a
strictly increasing emission intensity in the utilization rate, contradicting previously and
responds to changing aggregate or plant-level productivity, respectively. Lower depreciation of capital
for lower utilization or the clearing of an economy-wide labour market motivate the response.
4An intratemporal trade-off between this emission intensity and technology choice or real emission
prevention flow-expenditure, for example in model I of Keeler et al. (1971), can be rewritten in terms of
net production with substitutable factors capital and emissions.
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presently planned efficient plant scales in reality.5
Luptacˇik & Schubert (1982) and van der Ploeg & Withagen (1991) fix the emission in-
tensity of output permanently. Variable utilization may improve their plans. Acemoglu et
al. (2012) posit emissions and specific output in fixed proportion and distribute resources
among production technologies in each period. While there is commitment to produc-
tivity, underutilization would not be optimal because of the intratemporal adjustment.
Studies in the EMF 22 use heterogeneous capital to exploit data on mitigation options.
Given a planner maximizes welfare subject to constraints on environmental quality in
these models underutilization through postponement of using or early retirement of some
technology stock will bring about a solution when the problem has no solution at full
utilization.
The model includes emissions from investment, for example, in the production of steel
and concrete, and mining of minerals, for fossil-fuel and renewable energy technologies.
This realistic assumption can make a portion or all of the pre-installed dirty technology
capital obsolete. The use of pre-installed clean technology capital that is expensive to
create may be postponed because more productive types of clean technology at a large
scale can sustain high consumption. This incentive for underutilization is stronger, if
investment creates emissions, since then investing bears an environmental cost. (Dirty
technology capital may then not be used.) This may be relevant in the future if govern-
ments continue to push expensive clean technologies by subsidies.
The next section examines the Pareto optimal retirement of capital. Section 2.2 charac-
terizes competitive equilibrium allocations in a decentralized economy and shows how an
optimum can be implemented. Section 2.3 provides results of numerical simulations. Sec-
tion 2.4 presents production using bounds on physical capital, fuel that serves as an input
in the dirty technology, energy-use capital and variable energy efficiency, and time-variant
emission intensity of output and depreciation. Section 2.5 concludes with a discussion of
results. The appendix sections contain technical results.
5Joskow (2010) finds that lower utilization of existing coal power plants weakly raises their emission
intensity of electricity output in response to greater supply of intermittent renewable-based electricity.
Underutilization of capital in DICE only at sufficiently high cost of polluting can be optimal upon in-
troduction of complementarity. Kolstad (1996) constrains future control by current control such that a
planner temporarily cannot adjust the emission intensity of gross output upward, yet does not enable un-
derutilization. In a plan with decreasing emission intensity over time Kolstad (1996) requires uncertainty
to make this constraint ever binding.
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2.1 The economy
Consider a discrete-time economy with heterogeneous capital.6 Feasibility conditions are
introduced with each one dirty and clean technology. The use of dirty technology only is
polluting. The investment is polluting in both these technologies. A dirty technology or
clean technology may be a composite of any fossil-fuel using technologies or any renewable
energy technologies, respectively, that produce energy that can be consumed or invested.
2.1.1 One dirty technology and one clean technology
Preferences.—A unit mass of infinitely-lived households populates the economy. They
have an identical preference ordering represented by a period-utility function U(c, Z) :
R+ × R → R of consumption c and pollution Z that is twice-differentiable for positive
consumption, increasing in consumption, ∂U/∂c > 0 for c > 0, and decreasing in pollu-
tion, ∂U/∂Z < 0 for c > 0. Marginal utility of consumption ∂U/∂c approaches a large
positive value M as consumption tends to zero, limc→0 ∂U/∂c = M ≤ ∞, for all Z. Then
consumption cℓ of at least one household ℓ is positive in any period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} in
a Pareto optimum. Households have equal endowments of financial capital in the de-
centralized economy in Section 2.2 so that uniform transfers of government revenue to
households implement uniform consumption. The utility function is strictly concave in
consumption and, for small pollution levels or all pollution levels, concave in pollution.
Thus ∂2U/∂c2 < 0 for c > 0 and ∂2U/∂Z2 ≤ 0 for c > 0 and Z ≤ Z∗. A household
discounts utility in the welfare function
J =
∞∑
t=0
βtU(c(t), Z(t))
by a factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Technology.—In each period society allocates perfectly substitutable output mB from
dirty technology B and mC from clean technology C between the use for consumption
c =
∫ 1
0
cℓdℓ, and as an input xj in investment of technology j ∈ {B,C} = J . Using
6An exogenous finite usable time of capital in continuous time seems to demand vintages whose
productivity depreciates. Burmeister & Dobell (1970, 377) argue that exogenous full depreciation of
capital in an instant requires an infinite outflow which is infeasible when (dis)investible resources are
finite.
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dirty technology creates emissions in proportion to output. Clean technology use does
not create emissions. The emission intensities are defined below. One unit of the good
yields B > 0 units of service that households consume. Thus,
c/B + xB + xC ≤ mB +mC (2.1)
is the resource constraint all t ≥ 0. The productivity in the consumption sector is not
normalized to one to point to a difference between the cost of pollution in terms of the
consumption good and the willingness to pay for pollution reduction in terms of output.
Production using technology j ∈ J yields mj = ujKj units of output given chosen
utilization rate uj ∈ [0, 1] of capital Kj > 0. This measure of capital is production
capacity since there is no substitutable factor in production. Limited recyclability of the
earth’s material or finite geographical space lead to the capacity constraint
K¯j ≥ Kj(t+ 1) (2.2)
all t ≥ 0. This constraint is different for each technology j ∈ J for simplicity. At least
one capital stock is positive among the given Kj(0) ∈ [0, K¯j ] for j ∈ J . The number
γj ∈ (0, 1] is one minus the depreciation rate of unused capital and thus represents its
portion that is useful in the next period. Investment, xj(t) > 0, is not necessary to
generate capital Kj(t + 1) > 0. A positive γj is plausible for energy-producing capital.
Incomplete depreciation refers to mothballing boilers, motors, or turbines and can be
incentivized through government policy in the decentralized economy in Section 2.2. New
capital of technology j ∈ J is built at the constant marginal product Qj > 0. Then
Kj(t+ 1) = γj(1− uj(t))Kj(t) +Qjxj(t) (2.3)
is capital at the beginning of period (t+1). Investment is irreversible, because the input
in investment is nonnegative, xj ≥ 0. The constraint (2.2) may be binding for clean tech-
nology at an optimum and in equilibrium. Observed current clean technology investment
on small scale K¯C is explained in the decentralized economy absent government policy
that corrects the pollution externality by QC ≥ QB. I make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1 QB > β
−1.
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Then sustained growth of consumption and output is feasible in the absence of environ-
mental cost. Fully utilized capital Kj(t) > 0, that is, if uj(t) = 1, completely depreciates
within one period. An interpretation is that a period is long. Grubb (1997) and Naki-
cenovic & Gru¨bler (2000) point to long lifespans of currently existing capital in energy
production as a reason of inertia that could impede stabilizing the atmospheric content
of carbon dioxide soon at a non-hazardous rate.7 Clean capacity is underutilized only
if dirty capacity is idle or absent when postponing consumption by underutilizing clean
capacity yields a smaller rate of change in consumption than by using dirty capacity to
invest in dirty technology. This appears if unused capital of dirty technology depreci-
ates at a relatively weakly smaller rate, γC ≤ γB. I assume this, which helps a clear
characterization of an optimal allocation.
Assumption 2.2 0 < γC ≤ γB.
This assumption—that the unused clean technology capital depreciates at a weakly greater
rate—is plausible if dirty technology capital can be literally wrapped and clean technol-
ogy capital is exposed to natural hazards, for example, in fossil-fuel using and renewable
energy technologies, respectively.
Environment.—Production of one unit of output using technology j generates dj emis-
sion units where dB > 0 = dC .
8 The emissions specific to building capital occur at
rate ρj ≥ 0 per unit of the quantity xj of the input in investment. Emissions of in-
vesting in dirty technology affect both the critical cost of polluting at which full uti-
lization and investment in dirty technology becomes optimal, and that may be reached
at some date if dirty technology capital is used in the long-term, and the long-term
7Given this inertia in calendar time vintages that are useful once or more than once regarding model
periods yields the same results on the timing of utilization and identity of underutilized units, that is,
pre-installed units. The scrapping after one period of use implies that there are at most two vintages given
the timing of investment and utilization that is optimal. This is formalized in Section 2.4.1. If capital
vintages are useful multiple times, then underutilization distributes output over vintages and extends
their lifespan early in the planning horizon. This yields the same conclusions regarding the timing of
utilization and investment as one-period use if technology does not change and depreciation between
ages is constant. Section 2.4.4 assumes multi-period use to examine the roles of technology improvement
in regard to the emission intensity, and depreciation of capital over the lifespan, for underutilizing old
versus young vintages.
8The optimal utilization rate of aggregate dirty technology capital is weakly greater given any pollution
and capital amounts compared to the assumed no response if some dirty technology capital exhibited
a greater emission intensity of output for lower utilization. The response may be relevant for current
baseload coal electricity, if its underutilized plants are not wholly mothballed.
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cost of polluting. The environmental cost of investing in clean technology can lead to
idle dirty technology capital and to underutilized clean technology capital.9 Emissions
E(t) =
∑
j∈J (djmj(t) + ρjxj(t)) accumulate to the stock of pollutants
Z(t+ 1) = Z(t) + E(t)− A(Z(t)) (2.4)
at the beginning of period (t+ 1), for example, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which
is equal to pollution.10 This helps characterizing long-term allocations. The absorptive
capacity of the environment may vary with pollution. The absorption A is a twice dif-
ferentiable nondecreasing function, which is concave, ∂2A/∂Z2 ≤ 0 ≤ ∂A/∂Z, and less
than or equal to pollution, A ≤ Z. A plan is defined as an allocation of controls and
state variables pollution and capital. Strictly concave absorption at given Z guarantees
a unique optimal plan when utility is not strictly concave in pollution for such a Z. The
pollution level Z(0) is given.
Necessary conditions for Pareto optimal investment and utilization.—A Pareto opti-
mum with equal consumption of all households may not be implementable in a decentral-
ized economy with nonnegative transfers from the government to households if government
revenue is small and households have unequal endowments. Other Pareto optima may
then be implementable. However, the distribution of consumption does not affect the
Pareto optimal allocation of pollution, if these are essentially independent, which I as-
sume for the utility function U .11 Then uniform consumption is without loss of generality
for pollution. There are τ(t) positive capacity levels at date t which helps to define the
control space. Only τ(t) ≥ 1 enables consumption at date t.
The planner chooses a policy of consumption, input in investment, and capital utiliza-
tion (c, x, u) ∈ R3+ × [0, 1]
τ(t) on {0, 1, . . .} to maximize welfare J subject to the resource
constraint (2.1), the upper bound on capital (2.2), and the laws of motion (2.3)-(2.4)
9The quantity xj may be the sum of direct input in investment goods and inputs in material produc-
tion, which generates emissions specific to investment.
10In general there is some mapping of past emissions onto current pollution.
11Following Bergstrom & Cornes (1983) a utility function satisfies essential independence of the public
good or bad and the distribution of a private good if for all interior Pareto optimal allocations every other
distribution of interior private goods amounts is Pareto optimal holding constant the public good or bad
and the aggregate private goods amount. For example, the utility function U(cℓ, Z) = U
′(Z)U0(cℓ) +
U ′′(Z) where U0 is a power function, satisfies essential independence, because there is a unique Pareto
optimal (
∫ 1
0
cℓdℓ, Z), and it is interior given the assumed feasibility set.
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in the form Kj(t + 1) − Kj(t) = rKj(t) for j ∈ J and Z(t + 1) − Z(t) = rZ(t) all
t ≥ 0. Let ǫ and qj for j ∈ {B,C} be the Lagrangean multipliers of the laws of mo-
tion of pollution and capital. The inclusion of the endogenous terms rZ(t) and rKj(t)
all j ∈ J is helpful to prove the uniqueness of an optimal plan. A vector G ≥ 0 de-
scribes the admissable set of investment and utilization and the resource constraint and
contains the nonnegativity constraints of capital. Then maximization of Lagranges’ func-
tion L =
∑∞
t=0 β
t[U(c(t), Z(t)) − ǫ(t)rZ(t) +
∑
j qj(t)rKj(t) − ǫ(t)(Z(t) − Z(t + 1)) +∑
j qj(t)(Kj(t)−Kj(t+1))+
∑
j βwj(t+ 1)(K¯j −Kj(t+ 1))+w(t)G(t)], where (wB wC)
and w are nonnegative vectors, gives rise to the following necessary optimality conditions.
The present values of the Lagrangean multipliers ǫ(t) and qj(t) are the marginal valu-
ations ∂J/∂Z(t+ 1) and ∂J/∂Kj(t+ 1) of the state variables at an optimum, and thus
ǫ(t) and qj(t) are called their (current value) shadow prices.
12 Optimal interior values of
pollution Z(t+ 1) satisfy the difference equation
ǫ(t) = β(−∂U/∂Z(t+ 1)) + β(1− ∂A/∂Z(t+ 1))ǫ(t+ 1), t ≥ 0, (2.5)
of the shadow price ǫ of pollution. The marginal benefit from additional capital is the
marginal net benefit of utilized capital plus the marginal value of nonutilized capital. The
sum of these benefits discounted from (t+1) at most equals the marginal cost of building
capacity in period t,
βuj(t+ 1){B(∂U/∂c)(t+ 1)− djǫ(t+ 1)}
+ βγj(1− uj(t+ 1))qj(t+ 1)− βwj(t+ 1) ≤ qj(t), = if Kj(t+ 1) > 0,
(2.6)
for j ∈ J all t ≥ 0. Greater environmental cost measured by the shadow price of pollution
ǫ reduces the benefit of using dirty technology capital but has no effect on the benefit of
using clean technology capital since dB = b > 0 = dC. The shadow rental value of space,
wj(t), is zero if K¯j > Kj(t). The marginal benefit of using an output unit for investment
is Qjqj in terms of utils. This benefit cannot exceed the marginal cost of investing output,
Qjqj(t) ≤ B(∂U/∂c)(t) + ρjǫ(t), = if xj(t) > 0, (2.7)
12The present value of the costate multiplier at t is the shadow price of the law of motion that has the
state variable at its leading value at (t+ 1) which can be taken as a parameter locally in optimum.
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all j ∈ J , because the input in investment is finite. The latter marginal cost comprises the
cost of reduced current output and environmental cost by the investment sector. Partial
capacity utilization in period (t+ 1) ≥ 0 balances the values of idle and utilized units of
capital on the left side in (2.6). Else all capital in a given technology j ∈ J is either idle
or fully utilized. Therefore
uj(t+ 1)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0


=⇒ β{B(∂U/∂c)(t+ 1)− djǫ(t+ 1)}


=
=
≤

 qj(t)


≥
=
=

 βγjqj(t+ 1)
(2.8)
given Kj(t+ 1) ∈ (0, K¯j) for t ≥ 0. The outer relations at weak inequalities are relevant
regarding utilization in period t = 0.13 Before analysing these conditions an existence and
uniqueness result on an optimal plan is stated—of which a proof appears in the appendix.
Proposition 2.1 There is a unique optimal plan if utility U or absorption A is strictly
concave in pollution at any pollution Z.
Hence the welfare function is well-defined. There is a unique optimal plan because
there is a unique optimal policy and the laws of motion map the current policy and states
uniquely into future states.
The (marginal) cost of polluting, or equivalently, the (marginal) benefit of pollution
reduction, is defined as
θ = ǫ/(∂U/∂c)
and thus hinges on the motion of its numerator, the shadow price ǫ of pollution measured
in utils, and that of its denominator, marginal utility of consumption. This cost may be
referred to as a social cost because ǫ measures the effect of pollution on all households
13The outer relations in the condition (2.8) follow from differentiation of the Lagrangean function with
respect to the utilization rate. The relations to the lagged shadow price of capital result presuming that
Kj(t + 1) > 0 and examining (2.6). For Kj(t + 1) = K¯j the discounted land rent βwj(t+ 1) must be
subtracted on the left and on the right sides.
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who are identical and have a unit mass for simplicity.14
Critical level of cost of polluting.—The next lemma reports bounds of the cost of pol-
luting for utilization and underutilization, which help to characterize and solve for an
optimum. There is a cost of pollution reduction θj = (Qj − γj)/(γjρj + djQj) of any
technology j ∈ {B,C} that allows saving emissions by storing capital as an alternative
to using output for its investment, dj > 0 or ρj > 0.
Lemma 2.1 The cost of polluting is bounded above, θ(t) ≤ B/dB, if dirty technology
capital KB(t) > 0 is utilized, uB(t) > 0. Capital Kj(t) > 0 is underutilized, uj(t) < 1,
only if θB ≤ θ(t) for dirty technology B, and θC ≤ θ(t) for clean technology C with
ρC > 0. The cost of polluting is bounded above for dirty technology, θ(t) ≤ θB, and for
clean technology, θ(t) ≤ θC, if ρC > 0, given investment occurs, xj(t) > 0, and capital
Kj(t) > 0 is utilized, uj(t) > 0.
Proof. Define λ as the marginal product of consumption goods, B, times the marginal
utility of consumption, ∂U/∂c. The first result follows from the condition λ − bǫ ≥
γBqB ≥ 0 noting that ǫ/λ = θ/B. The second result is immediate from Qj(λ − djǫ) ≤
Qjγjqj ≤ γj(λ+ ρjǫ) given underutilization, uj < 1. For the upper bound of θ given
investment, xj > 0, and utilization, uj > 0, the condition (2.7) holds at equality, and the
inequality in (2.8) is reversed. Q.E.D.
The upper bound for utilizing dirty technology capital results because this capital
has a nonnegative shadow price, unlike in the constrained optimum in which utilization
cannot be chosen. Clean capacity use is consistent with arbitrarily high θ because it does
not affect the environment. There is a lower bound θj for underutilization of capacity
Kj(t) > 0 for j ∈ {B,C} because society forgives current capital services to save rather
than invests in new units only if pollution reduction costs large consumption amounts.
The level θj decreases in both the storage return γj and the emission intensity ρj of
investment inputs because unused capital is worth more for smaller depreciation rate (1−
14Recall that γB > 0 and γC > 0. Dirty capacity KB(t) > 0 is underutilized only in the initial period
t = 0 because of concerns about the environment that the planner internalizes if γB = 0. Investment in
period t is necessary for KB(t+1) > 0 if unused dirty capacity becomes unproductive. Then QBqB(t) =
B(∂U/∂c)(t) + ρBǫ(t) > 0 from (2.7). The condition (2.8) contradicts qB(t) > 0 if KB(t + 1) > 0
is underutilized, uB(t + 1) < 1. Investment that precedes underutilization would be wasteful. Clean
technology capital KC(t) > 0 is fully utilized all time if γC = 0. The marginal net benefit of utilizing
clean capacity, B∂U/∂c, is strictly positive all t ≥ 0.
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γj), and investing bears a greater environmental cost for greater ρj. The range between
the critical technology-specific cost of pollution reduction at which both investment and
underutilization are optimal and the upper bound for utilization narrows, θj → B/dB,
as unused capacity becomes less productive, γj → 0. Second, θj is greater than the
stationary level of the cost of polluting if there is investment in technology j, since the
discounted retained fraction of unused capital, βγj, is less than one. Perpetual investment
and underutilization would be wasteful. Therefore a capacity is fully utilized if there is
investment in the associated technology in a plan that converges to a stationary point.
The bounds of the cost of polluting can be found through the policy (c, x, u) if capital
is used at decreasing returns to scale. To simplify the exposition I chose the convex
production technology. Some dynamic programming results are helpful to characterize
an optimum. The next Lemma presents one result.
Lemma 2.2 There is a continuously differentiable value function v(Z,KB, KC) = max J
given the initial state (Z,KB, KC).
Proof. Standard arguments in Stokey & Lucas (1989) or Acemoglu (2009) can be used
because the planner controls pollution. In particular, the welfare function J , which is to
be maximized, is bounded from above, J ≤ U(c¯, Z)/(1− β) < ∞, for all feasible plans
since output and pollution are bounded from above and below, respectively. Maximum
consumption is c¯ = B(K¯B + K¯C). Minimum pollution is Z = φ(. . . φ(φ(Z(0)))) given
φ(Z) = Z − A(Z). Q.E.D.
Welfare J can be defined recursively for any initial state. Lemma 2.2 can be used to
show that the Lagrangean multipliers of the states are the slopes of the value function,
ǫ(t) = −β∂v/∂Z(t+ 1) and qj(t) = β∂v/∂Kj(t+ 1). In the following roman numeral I
denotes paths with exclusive long-term use of clean technology, and those with II have
long-term use of dirty technology.
Timing of investment and utilization in dirty technology.—Investment in the dirty tech-
nology may never occur (in I-1 to I-3). Its capital may be always underutilized, being idle
at all dates but the initial date. This policy (I-2) in the next proposition is optimal only
if the cost of polluting exceeds B/dB at dates t ≥ 1 by the arguments above, and clean
technology has a sufficiently large productivity QC , a sufficiently small positive emission
intensity ρC , and a sufficiently large scale K¯C as seen as follows.
15 Chapter 1 has shown
15Large marginal disutility of pollution at minimum feasible pollution can lead to exclusive use of clean
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that clean technology is exclusively used in the long-term at θ ≤ B(βQC − 1)/ρC .
16 This
implies large QC or small ρC > 0. A large scale K¯C makes the exclusive use of clean
technology feasible at θ > B/dB.
Proposition 2.2 Dirty technology capital KB(t) > 0 is partially utilized at t = 0,
uB(0) ∈ (0, 1), and idle, uB(t) = 0, at dates t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, and there is no investment in
dirty technology, xB(t) = 0 all t ≥ 0, if dirty capacity KB(0) is large and clean capacity
KC(0) is small, and clean technology is exclusively used in the long-term at θ > B/dB.
Proof. There is a curve τ(Z,KC) such that θ = B/dB when holding xB = uB = 0. This
follows from QCqC(t) = (B/θ(t))ǫ(t) + ρCǫ(t) if xC(t) > 0 that utilizes (2.7) for j = C
and the definition of θ. Then the ratio qC(t)/ǫ(t) of shadow prices implies a continuous
θ-isoquant in the space of Z and KC because these shadow prices measure the marginal
valuation of those state variables. Let KB(0) +KC(0) > K > KC(0) for (Z(0), K) ∈ τ .
If θ(0) < B/dB then dirty technology capital was used up in finite time, yet the output
that this generates exceeds the output at which such low θ(0) is optimal. If θ(0) > B/dB
then dirty technology capital was idle at all dates, yet initial clean capacity insufficient
to afford the jump on the optimal path. Q.E.D.
The requirement 1/dB < (βQC − 1)/ρC , sufficiently large clean technology scale K¯C ,
and the relation of initial capacity levels that induces B/dB = θ(0), are sufficient for an
immediately retired portion of dirty capacity. The initial dirty capacity helps growing
the economy with clean technology investment. Dirty capacity is idle at all dates t ≥ 1
because the cost of pollution reduction by not using dirty capacity is smaller than the
cost of polluting. Dirty capacity is never used (I-1) if the economy has the sufficient clean
capacity initially for the same reason. A rationale to idle a capital stock in the literature
is production cost. Some portion of a resource is efficiently unused after the marginal
cost of using it has increased to the constant marginal cost of an alternative technology
in Herfindahl & Kneese (1974, Chapter 4.5) and Heal (1976) or the marginal cost of a
technology. Ruling out this possibility for the climate ρC > 0 remains as a reason for exclusive use of
clean technology.
16The stationary level θ is less than or equal to the right side of the cost of pollution reduction θj
when replacing γj by β
−1 given investment in technology j, equal at Kj ∈ (0, K¯j). There is a unique
stationary point if the stationary level differs between the technologies, and one imposes noninferior
pollution reduction and consumption through the utility function, see Chapter 1. The optimal allocation
converges to a unique stationary point, if such exists.
52
technology with diminishing returns in Tahvonen & Salo (2001). Too large pre-installed
clean capacity induces underutilization of clean capacity as seen below given the same
parameter values.
The following proposition shows the timing of investment and utilization in dirty tech-
nology on some paths with θ(t) > θ(t + 1) given underutilized dirty capacity at (t + 1).
In the first case (I-3) initial dirty capacity is used up without investment because θ con-
verges to a level above the cost of pollution reduction using reproduced capital in dirty
technology, θ∗ = B(βQB − 1)/(ρB + βdBQB), and below the cost of pollution reduction
by not using its installed capital, B/dB, so that investing in dirty technology is ineffi-
cient but using dirty capacity is worthwhile. In this case the clean technology marginal
product is large, QC > β
−1, and the clean technology scale K¯C is large, which sustains
such θ at exclusive clean output. In the second case (II-1) there is investment in dirty
technology in the long-term because θ converges to a level less than or equal to θ∗, which
is smaller than the cost of pollution reduction θB. In this case the stationary cost of
pollution reduction is relatively smaller for the clean technology, B(βQC − 1)/ρC < θ
∗,
or the clean technology scale K¯C is small. In the third case of the next proposition dirty
technology capital is fully utilized at all dates. This can be on a path leading to exclusive
clean technology investment under the parameters that yield Proposition 2.2, because the
initial aggregate capacity (KB(0)+KC(0)) is smaller than the level required for the path
in this proposition (I-4), or on a path with long-term use of the dirty technology under
the parameters of the second case (II-4). In the latter case the initial aggregate capacity
is not sufficiently greater than the long-term aggregate capacity and the stationary clean
technology cost of pollution reduction or the clean technology scale is small.
Proposition 2.3 Dirty technology capital KB(t) > 0 is either partially utilized, uB(t) ∈
(0, 1), in an early time interval {0, 1, . . . , t′} and ceases to exist, uB(t
′ + 1) = 1 and
KB(t) = 0 all t > t
′ + 1, or is fully utilized later, uB(t) = 1 all t > t
′, or this capacity is
fully utilized, uB(t) = 1, all t ≥ 0, in an optimal plan in which (i) dirty technology capital
KB(t) > 0 is not idle, uB(t) > 0, and either is zero after it is positive, KB(t) > 0 all
0 ≤ t ≤ t′′ and KB(t) = 0 all t > t
′′, or always positive, KB(t) > 0 all t ≥ 0, and (ii) the
cost of polluting decreases, θ(t) > θ(t+1), if dirty capacity KB(t+1) > 0 is underutilized,
uB(t+ 1) < 1. There is no investment in dirty technology, xB(t) = 0, all 0 ≤ t < t
′.
Proof. Suppose that KB(t) > 0 is fully utilized, uB(t) = 1. Then either xB(t) = 0 or
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xB(t) > 0. Dirty capacity KB(t+1) is zero by assumption all t ≥ 0 if xB(t) = 0. Lemma
2.1 implies that θ(t) ≤ θB ≤ θ(t+1) if investment in the dirty technology, xB(t) > 0, and
utilized dirty capacity, uB(t) > 0, precede underutilized dirty capacity, uB(t + 1) < 1,
which contradicts θ(t) > θ(t + 1). After capital is fully utilized either capital ceases
to exist or is fully utilized. Thus partial utilization occurs early. Following investment
in dirty technology, xB(t
′) > 0, and utilized dirty technology capital KB(t
′) > 0, dirty
technology capital KB(t
′ + 1) > 0 is fully utilized, or dirty technology capital does not
exist in all following periods. Then xB(t− 1) = 0 if xB(t) = 0 all t < t
′. Q.E.D.
Investment and partial utilization occur only once simultaneously, given investment
occurs in the long-term. There may be no such date after underutilization (II-2)—which
depends on the productivity of clean technology as will be shown below. There may
be earlier dates with underutilization and without investment, and later dates with full
utilization and investment. Dirty technology capital may be underutilized initially, be
used up in finite time and become zero, and be built up later, in allocations without
the joint investment and underutilization (II-2) and yet other allocations with it (II-3)—
which depends on the effect of the pollution level on utility. The type of path depends on
where the initial state is relative to the long-term state. I discuss these incentives after
stating conditions that replace a statement on the endogenous θ in Proposition 2.3 in the
following.
(i) Depreciation and clean technology productivity. Let the marginal rate of substitu-
tion of consumption in periods t and (t+1) be R(t+1) = (∂U/∂c)(t)/β(∂U/∂c)(t+1). In
an optimum the foregone benefit of consuming dirty technology capital services, uB(t) < 1
and KB(t) > 0, and the benefit of consuming them one period later, uB(t + 1) > 0, are
necessarily balanced by
βγB(1− (b/B)θ(t+ 1))∂U/∂c(t+ 1) = (1− (b/B)θ(t))∂U/∂c(t), (2.9)
given KB(t+1) ∈ (0, K¯B).
17 Then R(t+1) exceeds γB if and only if θ(t) > θ(t+1). The
“only if” statement given underutilization at (t+1) cannot be inferred if dirty technology
capital KB(t) > 0 is fully utilized, or there is no dirty technology capital, KB(t) = 0. In
Proposition 2.3 there is utilized capital at some date, because this can be used to preclude
17Equalities in (2.6) and (2.8) imply that βγj{λ(t+1)−djǫ(t+1)−wj(t+1)} = γjqj(t) = λ(t)−djǫ(t).
If (2.2) is slack then wj(t+ 1) = 0. The condition (2.9) follows by rearranging for j = B.
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underutilization immediately following investment at this date given the assumed decrease
in the cost of polluting. The latter presumption can be replaced by (i) a condition on
depreciation if investing in dirty technology does not create emissions, ρB = 0, or (ii)
sufficient productivity and scale of clean technology, to attain the same results.
Condition 2.1 Pollution depreciates at smaller rate than unused dirty capacity, ∂A/∂Z <
1− γB all Z.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) reports that atmospheric carbon
and other so-called greenhouse gases are persistent, which suggests that Condition 2.1
holds. This condition is formulated for all Z and thus is an exogenous object. The
simulation in Section 2.3 satisfies it.
Condition 2.2 QC > γB(1 + (ρC/B)θB) if ρC ≥ ρB and QC > QB(1− (b/B)θB) if ρC ≤
ρB. K¯C is large.
Under these parameters investment in clean technology is preferred to investing in dirty
technology and underutilizing dirty technology capital in the next period. The simulations
in Section 2.3 do not meet the large scale in Condition 2.2. Empirical work is needed to
uncover the relations in the first part and the necessary scale for different pollution and
dirty capacity levels. The first two conditions amount to greater productivity of clean
technology investment than the preserved portion of unused dirty capacity, QC > γB, if
investment in both the dirty and the clean technology is emission-free, ρB = ρC = 0.
This case may be relevant only in the future, for example, if all steel is produced from
scrap steel using the electric arc furnace rather than some steel is produced with coking
coal that creates carbon dioxide emissions.18 Condition 2.1 and ρB = 0, or Condition 2.2,
rule out investment and succeeding underutilization for decreased or increased θ. The
following two lemmata summarize results that lead to this conclusion. The first lemma
uses results from the appendix. The second lemma exploits that the discounted marginal
net benefit equals the marginal cost of investing xB(t) > 0 in dirty technology,
QB(1− (b/B)θ(t+ 1))/R(t+ 1) = (1 + (ρB/B)θ(t)), (2.10)
18Interestingly, cement that uses limestone, a source of CO2 emissions in investment, can be replaced
increasingly by flyash of coal power plants or slag from coking coal of primary steel mills, in producing
concrete.
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if its capital KB(t+ 1) ∈ (0, K¯B) is utilized, uB(t+ 1) > 0.
Lemma 2.3 Dirty technology capital KB(t+1) ∈ (0, K¯B) is fully utilized, uB(t+1) = 1,
if there is emission-free investment in dirty technology, xB(t) > 0 and ρB = 0, dirty
technology capital KB(t) > 0 is utilized, uB(t) > 0, and Condition 2.1 holds.
Proof. Evaluating the result of Lemma 2.9 in the appendix when xB(t) > 0, ρB = 0, and
uB(t + 1) < 1, shows that R(t + 1) ≤ γB. This contradicts Lemma 2.8 in the appendix
when uB(t) > 0 and KB(t+ 1) < K¯B, which yields R(t+ 1) > γB. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.4 Dirty technology capital KB(t + 1) > 0 that is utilized, uB(t + 1) > 0, is
fully utilized, uB(t + 1) = 1, if there is investment in dirty technology, xB(t) > 0, and
Condition 2.2 holds.
Proof. (i) θ(t) ≥ θ(t + 1). For xB(t) > 0 and uB(t + 1) < 1 Lemma 2.9 in the
appendix implies that R(t + 1) ≤ γB. Clean technology investment satisfies BQC ≤
R(t+ 1)(B + ρCθ(t)) ≤ γB(B + ρCθB) at θ(t) ≤ θB and KC(t+ 1) < K¯C . Either
(1) ρCγB/(ρBγB +QBb) < (QC − γB)/(QB − γB) ⇐⇒ BQC > γB(B + ρCθB) or
(2) (ρB + b)γB/(ρBγB +QBb) < QC/QB ⇐⇒ BQC > QB(B − bθB)
for (1) ρC ≥ ρB or (2) ρC ≤ ρB, respectively, imply that BQC > γB(B+ ρCθB), a contra-
diction to the weak inequality in the reverse direction. (ii) θ(t) < θ(t+1). Equation (2.10)
holds for xB(t) > 0 and uB(t+1) > 0. ThusQB(B−bθB) ≥ QC(B + ρBθ(t))/(B + ρCθ(t)).
In case (1) ρC [θB − θ(t)] ≥ ρB[θB − θ(t)] yields (B + ρBθ(t))/(B + ρCθ(t)) ≥ (B +
ρBθB)/(B + ρCθB) so that BQC ≤ γB(B + ρCθB). In case (2) the contradiction follows
directly. Therefore capital KB(t+ 1) > 0 is fully utilized. Q.E.D.
One may be cautious that clean technology is not sufficiently productive at large scale
when ρB > 0. The cost of polluting may turn to θB from lower values after investment and
full utilization in the dirty technology, because high-productivity clean technology has a
small scale. Then the state moves from the region R1 = {(Z,KB, KC) | xB > 0, uB = 1}
to the region R2 = {(Z,KB, KC) | xB > 0, uB ∈ (0, 1)}, if this exists, or to the region
R3 = {(Z,KB, KC) | xB = 0, uB ∈ (0, 1)}, if R2 does not exist. I have found dampened
oscillations in the cost of polluting in a LQ problem without such a return. In the model
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of a fishery in Clark et al. (1979) underutilization succeeds full utilization because capital
does not vanish after it is fully utilized and investment lacks. This incentive does not
exist here.
(ii) Clean technology productivity and disutility of pollution. Lemma 2.4 does not
require dirty capacity KB(t) > 0. Thus under Condition 2.2 the early underutilization
in Proposition 2.3 extends to allocations (II-2 and II-3) with reinvestment in the dirty
technology at a date at which θ(t) ≤ θB when there is temporarily no dirty technology
capital, KB(t) = 0.
Proposition 2.4 Dirty technology capital KB(t) > 0 is partially utilized, uB(t) ∈ (0, 1),
only in an early time interval {0, 1, . . . , t′ − 1} and fully utilized later, uB(t) = 1 all
t > t′ − 1, in an optimal plan in which (i) dirty technology capital KB(t) > 0 is not
idle, uB(t) > 0, and is zero after and before it is positive, KB(t) = 0 all t
′ < t ≤ t′′,
and KB(t) > 0 all 0 ≤ t ≤ t
′ and t > t′′, (ii) θ(t′′) ≤ θB, and (iii) Condition 2.2 holds.
There is no investment in dirty technology, xB(t) = 0, all 0 ≤ t < t
′′ on the path with
underutilization.
A proof is straightforward and thus omitted. The following discusses the allocations of
Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 and how either one depends on the productivity of clean technol-
ogy and the disutility of pollution. Allocations (II-1) that pass through or start in R2 are
examples of Proposition 2.3. The economy may lack dirty technology capital following
a period with fully utilized dirty technology capital, possibly after underutilization (in
II-2), before the economy enters R1, as examples of paths in Proposition 2.4, if there is
no such R2. To examine when there is a region R2, rewriting equation (2.5) as
R(t+ 1)θ(t) = [(−∂U/∂Z)/(∂U/∂c)](t+ 1) + a(t+ 1)θ(t+ 1) (2.11)
is useful where a(t+1) = 1− ∂A/∂Z(t+1). For any state in period t at which investing
and underutilizing is optimal in the dirty technology, the equation
QB
R(t+ 1)
[
1 +
(
−∂U/∂Z
∂U/∂c
)
(t+ 1)
dB
a(t+ 1)
]
= 1 +
(
ρB +
dBQB
a(t+ 1)
)
θB
from (2.9) and (2.11) at θ(t) = θB gives the shadow return R(t+ 1). This shadow return
depends only on the successor state (Z,KB, KC)(t + 1). R2 is empty if the marginal
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return QC/(1 + (ρC/B)θ(t)) of investing in clean technology at θ(t) = θB exceeds the
level of R(t + 1) just identified when omitting clean technology from the model, though
the optimal clean technology stock KC(t + 1) is less than K¯C (II-2). Sufficiently large
productivity and scale of clean technology prohibit R2 so that there is no dirty capacity
temporarily. For parameters that yield R2 dirty capacity may still vanish temporarily
(II-3). R2 is characterized as follows, provided that it exists.
Proposition 2.5 A region R2 in the state space with the policy of investment in dirty
technology and partially utilized dirty technology capital KB(t) > 0, that is, xB(t) > 0
and uB(t) ∈ (0, 1), satisfies (dB − B/θB)∂v/∂Z(t+ 1) = γB∂v/∂KB(t+ 1). R2 extends
to K¯B as γB is small.
Proof. The conditions ǫ = θB∂U/∂c and B∂U/∂c − dBǫ = γBqB hold in R2. The
shadow prices of states are the differentials of the value function with respect to the state,
ǫ(t) = −β∂v/∂Z(t+ 1) and qB(t) = β∂v/∂KB(t+ 1). See, for example, Sargent (1987).
Then (dB −B/θB)∂v/∂Z(Z
′, K ′B, K
′
C) = γB∂v/∂KB(Z
′, K ′B, K
′
C) describes a hyperplane
in the state space that is reached from any state in R2, letting prime denote next period
values. The utilization rate is uB(t) ∈ [u
∗, 1] for some u∗ ∈ (0, 1) at which the utilization
rate uB(t) is minimized in R2. Since K
′
C = QCxC there is a system of four equations—the
relationship of c and Z from ǫ = θB(∂U/∂c)(c, Z) at ǫ that satisfies (2.5), which depends
on the policy c′ given (Z ′, K ′B, K
′
C) and on Z
′ in general, the resource constraint, and
the laws of motion—in the five unkowns consumption c, input xB in investment and the
utilization rate uB in the dirty technology, pollution Z, and dirty capacity KB, given
clean capacity KC . The input xC ∈ (0, K¯C/QC) has to be determined through equating
QC/(1 + (ρC/B)θB) to the shadow return R(t + 1) or xC = {0, K¯C/QC}. In special
cases the choice of xC may be obvious. The system determines a state manifold, which
is the boundary of R1 and R2, for uB = 1, and yields a state manifold, which forms
the boundary of R2 and R3, for xB = 0. As γB shrinks the dirty capacity KB becomes
arbitrarily large when xB = 0. Q.E.D.
Clean technology capital may be installed exclusively when dirty technology capital is
used up following an interval of fully utilized dirty technology capital, because of high
disutility from pollution at large pollution levels (II-3). This incentive prevails too in the
constrained optimum in which capital is assumed to be fully utilized.19 Other allocations
19The incentive does not prevail if the sequence of ǫ is roughly constant, for example, if the marginal
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Exclusive long-term use of clean technology
I-1 (0, 0), (0, 0), . . .
I-2 (0, u), (0, 0), (0, 0), . . .
I-3 (0, u), . . . , (0, u), (0, 1), (0,−), (0,−), . . .
I-4 (x, 1), . . . , (x, 1), (0, 1), (0,−), (0,−), . . .
Long-term use of dirty technology
II-1 (0, u), . . . , (0, u), (x, u), (x, 1), (x, 1), . . .
II-2 (0, u), . . . , (0, u), (0, 1), (0,−), . . . , (0,−), (x,−), (x, 1), (x, 1), . . .
II-3 early interval as in II-1 until some (x, 1) succeeded by
(0, 1), (0,−), . . . , (0,−), (x,−), (x, 1), (x, 1), . . .
II-4 (x, 1), (x, 1), . . .
Note: Here KB(0) > 0, KB(t) = 0 for t ≥ 1 is indicated by “−”, and x and u stand
for interior values, xB > 0 and uB ∈ (0, 1), respectively.
Table 2.1: Sequences of investment and utilization (xB, uB) in dirty technology on {t, t+
1, . . .}.
may pass through R2 and remain in R1 for the same parameter values. Low levels of
pollution may be on such paths. Table 2.1 summarizes possible sequences of dirty tech-
nology investment and utilization, which themselves or of which terminal subsequences
may characterize an optimal plan.
Timing of investment and utilization in clean technology.—The analogue to the bal-
ancing condition (2.9) for dirty technology is
γC = R(t+ 1) (2.12)
for clean technology, if uC(t) < 1 and uC(t+1) > 0, because using clean technology capital
KC(t) > 0 or KC(t+1) ∈ (0, K¯C) is not environmentally costly. I argue with Assumption
2.2 that clean technology capital may only be underutilized if dirty technology capital
is idle or is not installed. The second result in the following lemma is useful for this.
The first result shows that the environmental cost is necessary for underutilizing clean
capacity that can be created at a productivity that is greater than γC .
utility of pollution ∂U/∂Z and the marginal absorption ∂A/∂Z are nearly constant. In optimum with
underutilized dirty technology capital in (II-3) xB(t) = 0 all t < t
′ − 1 and t∗ ≤ t < t′′, xB(t) > 0 all
t′ − 1 ≤ t < t∗ and t ≥ t′′, uB(t) ∈ (0, 1) all t < t
′ and uB(t) = 1 all t ≥ t
′ when KB(t) > 0. Dirty
technology capital is zero from t∗ + 1 to t′′.
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Lemma 2.5 Clean technology capital KC(t) > 0 is fully utilized, uC(t) = 1, if (i) the
return on emission-free investment in clean technology exceeds the return from storing
its unused capital, QC > γC and ρC = 0, or (ii) the marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution of consumption R(t+ 1) is greater than γC.
Proof. (i) The condition (2.8) reads λ(t) − djǫ(t) ≤ γjqj(t) if uj(t) < 1. Combination
with the necessary condition (2.7) of investment yields Qj(λ(t) − djǫ(t)) ≤ γjQjqj(t) ≤
γj(λ(t) + ρjǫ(t)) where γj > 0. The first result follows from there by contradiction for
dC = ρC = 0. (ii) Since idling and storing capital forever cannot be optimal some
t exists such that uC(t) > 0. Utilization of capital KC(t) > 0 at period t, that is,
uj(t) > 0, requires that β{λ(t)−djǫ(t)−wj(t)} = qj(t−1). Analogous reasoning to (i) for
underutilization in the preceding period, uj(t−1) < 1, implies that λ(t−1)−djǫ(t−1) ≤
γjqj(t). Therefore βγj(λ(t)− djǫ(t)) ≥ λ(t− 1)− djǫ(t− 1) yields the result. Q.E.D.
Using output to create new capital units without emissions, ρC = 0, is superior to
forwarding unused capital if QC exceeds the storage return γC . Consuming the capital
services at t is preferred to such storage if the shadow return R(t+1) is greater than the
return γC from storing the capital. The proof of Lemma 2.5 hints that clean technology
capital may be mothballed if the creation of new capital units stresses the environment,
ρC > 0, or its intrinsic return on investment, QC , is low so that the discounted return
QC/(1 + (ρC/B)θ(t)) from investing does not exceed the rate of return γC from storage,
and in addition the shadow return R(t+ 1) is not greater than γC .
20 The shadow return
is greater than γB if Condition 2.1 holds and dirty technology capital is utilized. This
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6 Clean technology capital KC(t) > 0 is underutilized, uC(t) < 1, only
if dirty technology capital KB(t) > 0 is idle, uB(t) = 0, or there is no dirty technology
capital, KB(t) = 0, if Condition 2.1 holds.
Proof. The shadow return R(t + 1) exceeds γB if dirty capacity KB(t) > 0 is utilized,
uB(t) > 0, and Condition 2.1 holds. Clean capacity KC(t) > 0 is fully utilized, uC(t) = 1,
because γC ≤ γB < R(t+1) using Lemma 2.5. A contrapositive yields the result. Q.E.D.
20Reducing dirty output below dirty capacity to store capital is not preferred to spending output to
invest in dirty technology if the marginal utility of pollution was zero in all future periods, since the
return rate γB to storage is less than the marginal product QB of investment in technology B.
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Long-term use of clean technology
III-1 (0, u), . . . , (0, u), (x, u), (x, 1), (x, 1), . . .
III-2 (0, 1), (0,−), (0,−), . . . , (0,−), (x,−), (x, 1), (x, 1), . . .
III-3 (x, 1), (x, 1), . . .
Exclusive long-term use of dirty technology
IV-1 (0, 1), (0,−), . . . , (x,−), (x, 1), . . . , (x, 1), (0, 1), (0,−), (0,−), . . .
IV-2 (0, 1), (0,−), (0,−), . . .
Note: Here KC(0) > 0, KC(t) = 0 for t ≥ 1 is indicated by “−”, and x and u stand
for interior values, xC > 0 and uC ∈ (0, 1), respectively.
Table 2.2: Sequences of investment and utilization (xC , uC) in clean technology on {t, t+
1, . . .}.
The shadow return may exceed γB if Condition 2.1 does not hold, and dirty technology
capital is utilized, leading to the same result as in Proposition 2.6.
Clean technology capital may be mothballed if dirty technology use is abandoned at
t = 0. The only case in Table 2.2 that agrees to this is (I-1). The low shadow return
from the Hotelling rule (2.12) means that then initial clean capacity is large relative to
its long-term level. Table 2.2 summarizes the tiandng of investment and utilization in a
clean technology. (III-1) matches (I-1). (III-2) agrees to (I-4). (III-3) matches (I-1 to I-3)
for large scale K¯C and (II-1 to II-4) for small scale K¯C . (IV-1) is consistent with (II-2)
and (II-3). (IV-2) matches (II-1 and II-4). I refer to the discussion of dirty technology
investment and utilization for the sets of the parameters beside K¯C in each case.
Exclusive clean technology use in the long-term requires that QC > β
−1 > γC . Thus
the environmental cost in the construction of solar panels or wind turbines induces under-
utilization in the clean technology that is used in the long-term. In Fischer et al. (2004)
clean technology capital is built more than one period before it is used when pollution is
below its long-term level because of diminishing returns to scale in its investment and a
user flow cost. Renewable energy technologies do not seem to have significant operation
and maintenance cost. Dirty technology does not use capital in their model. Diminishing
returns of renewable energy may result from manufacturing and locating capital in geo-
graphic sites of different productivity, which can be summarized in the notion of multiple
clean technology types.
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2.1.2 Multiple clean technology types
The section discusses the utilization of multiple clean technology types, implications of
underutilized dirty technology capital for the types of invested clean technologies, and a
sufficient condition on the productivity of multiple clean technologies for the timing of
the utilization of dirty technology capital.
Exclusive long-term use of clean technology.—Decreasing returns in building aggregate
capital induce postponing the use of low marginal product capital. For example, each
renewable energy technology is widely applicable in the world, yet at different real cost
across locations of finite size. A similar effect is waiting until the marginal product of
using installed capital has increased in Arrow & Kurz (1970a) because capital depreciates.
A difference to this phenomenon in the one-sector growth model here is that investment
occurs—in sites or engineering systems with high marginal product.21 This incentive
exists if investing has no environmental cost and is strengthened by the environmental
cost.
The shadow return lies between the marginal returns on investment in technologies C ′
and C such that QC′/(1 + (ρC′/B)θ(t)) ≥ R(t+ 1) = γC > QC/(1 + (ρC/B)θ(t)) if there
is clean technology capital in low-productivity sites or of expensive make to begin with,
KC(0) > 0. Then it is optimal to not invest, and to store capital, xC(0) = uC(0) = 0, in
low-productivity sites or technologies and simultaneously invest and fully utilize existing
capital in high-productivity sites or technologies, xC′(0) > 0 and uC′(t) = 1. In such a plan
dirty capacity is idle initially and possibly infinitely. Highly productive clean technology,
that is, QC > β
−1 at sufficiently large scale K¯C , is necessary to sustain consumption that
keeps θ ≥ B/b all time, which prevents the utilization of dirty technology capital KB(0).
22
21The incentive to save much is met by investment in high-productivity types and postponing the use
of low-productivity types. The usefulness of capital only in one period rules out that investment lacks
because past investments have been irreversible. Thus the environmental motive is solely responsible for
zero investment in any technology.
22A growing literature considers making cleaner technology more productive, potentially reversing the
relationship between minimum QC and maximum QB . Chakravorty, Roumasset & Tse (1997), in a
partial equilibrium model in the spirit of Nordhaus (1973), have been overly optimistic in assuming
functional forms about deterministic and exclusive progress in clean technology that predicted counter-
factual reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Edenhofer et al. (2005) posit learning-by-doing for clean
technology only. Hartley et al. (2010) devise a learning effect to make a renewable resource technology
more productive over time. Van Zon and Lontzek (2006) find that a carbon tax diverts research effort
from clean renewables to a polluting technology through directed technical change, if there is no research
funding policy that favours clean technology. Acemoglu et al. (2012) document the optimal paths of
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(2.9)
(2.10)
B/dB
R(t+ 1)
θ(t)
β−1γB
b
O
Figure 2.1: Shadow return and cost of polluting with underutilization in case (II-1).
There is capacity KC(0) such that QB > QC at the initial date zero of optimization if
governments have pushed expensive clean technologies prior to this date. It would be
fully utilized in a laissez-faire equilibrium with QB = R(t+ 1) > γC .
Long-term use of dirty technology.—The shadow return R follows a V-shaped sequence
on a path beginning with partially utilized dirty technology capital and with long-term
use of this technology, for example, when the environmental disutility (−∂U/∂Z) and
marginal absorption ∂A/∂Z are constant or if Condition 2.1 holds. In this specification
the shadow cost of polluting is constant. Under this condition ǫ(t + 1)/ǫ(t) < (βγB)
−1,
which is sufficient for the trough of the shadow return. Figure 2.1 plots the equations (2.9)
and (2.10) using the identity R(t+ 1)(βǫ(t+1)/ǫ(t))θ(t) = θ(t+1) subject to ǫ(t) = ǫ(t+
1).23 The shadow return varies positively with the marginal return QC/(1 + (ρC/B)θ(t))
of the marginal clean technology in which investment occurs since
QC/R(t+ 1) ≥ (1 + (ρC/B)θ(t)) if KC(t+ 1) > 0, (2.13)
at equality for KC(t + 1) ∈ (0, K¯C). The time path of R(t + 1) and θ(t) in an optimal
plan (II-1) follows the indicated flow if capacity of clean technology types is bounded by
sufficiently low K¯C . Capacity in sufficiently productive clean technologies expands to their
bounds in any given period. Then investment in increasingly costly clean technologies
(low QC , high ρC) is efficient when dirty technology capital is underutilized, followed by
an energy tax rate and a non-energy good research subsidy in a calibrated model of directed technical
change with an exogenous rate of progress.
23In other specifications the change in the shadow price of pollution affects the curves.
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backing investment out of expensive clean technologies, when dirty technology capital is
fully utilized. The time path of R(t+1) and θ(t) would follow the downward-sloping curve
if dirty capacity was assumed to be fully utilized. Thus the possibility of underutilization
of dirty technology capital lowers the incentives to invest in expensive clean technologies
if the marginal QC for large aggregate scale in clean techology types is low, which seems
currently plausible in the climate problem. The intersection of the curves in Figure 2.1
marks the turning point of R(t + 1) when the economy is in R2 at date t. The shadow
return R is bounded from below at a level greater than this turning level if the clean
technologies’ minimum QC and its associated scale K¯C are sufficiently large. Then dirty
technology capital is temporarily absent after the economy was in R3 (II-2).
Suppose that ρC is equal all C ∈ {j | dj = 0} and let Q
′′ be the minimum QC . Propo-
sition 2.3 follows given Q′′ > γB(1 + (ρC/B)θB) if ρC ≥ ρB and Q
′′ > QB(1− (dB/B)θB)
if ρC ≤ ρB all B ∈ {j | dj > 0}, and given large aggregate capacity of clean technologies.
The next section turns to decision-making private agents and a government. Before I
collect the optimal policies in a given period.
Consumption.—Postponing the use of capital or investing each maximizes the shadow
return. In view of (2.9) and (2.10) some dirty technology capital is forwarded rather than
used to produce new capital when this offers the greater shadow return, and vice versa.
At a state in R2 reached in period t both the conditions (2.9) and (2.10) hold, which solve
for θ(t) = θB.
24 Investment in clean technology may offer an even greater return. Dirty
technology capital is idle, if this greater return prevails at large scale of clean technology
and clean technology types are exclusively used in the long-term at sufficiently large
θ. As a fourth option, postponing the use of clean technology capital is optimal if this
maximizes the shadow return. Investing in high-productivity clean technology types and
mothballing low-productivity clean technology types can be optimal. The shadow return
R(t+1) depends positively on c(t+1) and negatively on c(t). Thus any policy maximizes
consumption growth, given pollution at t and (t+ 1) at optimal values.
24The shadow price of capital is negative at states in R3 with large dirty technology capital if capital
is constrained to be fully utilized. The constraint KB(t+ 1) ≤ QBxB(t) is binding in R1 and qB(t) ≥ 0.
The constraint KB(t+ 1) ≥ QBxB(t) would be binding at states in R3 and qB(t) ≤ 0.
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2.2 Decentralized decision-making
In each period there is a government that announces a tax and transfer policy for the
current and all future periods. Emissions are taxed and the proceeds returned lump-sum
to households. Actual policy may be delayed such that the announcement comprises
zero tax and transfer rates before an exogenous date t∗.25 Firms own productive capital,
and households own claims to profits of firms. In an equilibrium in which firms make
zero economic profit using asset-market decentralization all agents may trade a single
asset. However, firms earn a differential (Ricardian) rent if the aggregate production is
constrained by (2.2) because, for simplicity, there is no resource ownership that could
absorb the rent.26 Firms may use capital in dirty and clean technologies at different
proportions. Thus there are financial assets specific to firms.27 With reference to energy
production the general factor is net energy or useful energy as, for example, defined in
Erdmann & Zweifel (2008) and Bhattacharyya (2011), respectively.
Households.—All households have an equal endowment αi(0) of tradable equity of firm
i for simplicity. This assumption and equal preferences imply that each household is
representative of all households. The price of the claim to firm i’s profits is qi, and the
dividend it pays is di. One unit of the consumption good costs pˆ units of account. The
representative household receives a nonnegative transfer tr from the government. The
household chooses consumption c(t) and number αi(t+1) of claims all t ≥ τ to maximize
Jτ =
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τU(c(t), Z(t))
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
pˆ(t)c(t) +
∑
i
qi(t)αi(t+ 1) ≤
∑
i
(qi(t) + di(t))αi(t) + tr(t)
on {τ, τ + 1, . . .} taking all prices, dividends, the transfer, and pollution as given. The
25Acemoglu et al. (2012) assume an exogenous delay and do not formalize the announcement.
26There is a similar rent when fossil fuel deposits are simultaneously extracted at different marginal
costs which forms the basis for Harstad’s (2012) proposal to acquire coal deposits to implement an
optimum under spillovers.
27An alternative would be distinct dirty and clean technology producers and two types of assets, private
equity of dirty technology users, and public equity of clean technology producers, without affecting results.
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analysis of delayed government policy requires a belief of private agents. Let τˆ be the
emissions tax rate in the set of policy instruments π = (τˆ , tr). For simplicity households
and firms do not anticipate any change in the government’s policy function {0} ∪ N →
{π(t), π(t+1) . . .} before the date at which this policy function changes. Given a change
occurs once at t∗ ∈ [0,∞) the representative household (and any firm) either makes one
plan, if t∗ = 0, or reoptimizes at date t∗ > 0, so that τ ∈ {0, t∗}.28
Firms.—The number αˆi of equity of firm i is variable throughout the planning horizon.
Firms can pay out and issue shares. Otherwise firms could not pause producing and own
capital between any two periods t < t′−1 and t′ in an equilibrium with nonnegative profit
of all firms in every period. This would be an unnecessarily strong assumption. All firms
have access to the same technologies J to produce energy mj ∈ [0, Kj ], technologies to
convert xj energy units intoQjxj investment goods, and one technology that uses x energy
units to produce consumption goods amount Bx. Firms may utilize assets differently in
equilibrium. Firm i may be a representative firm that is active in all sectors without
change in notation. Then in an equilibrium all firms utilize capital at the same rate.
Firm i’s available capital in technology j follows the law of motion
Kij(t+ 1) = γj(1− uij(t))Kij(t) + Iij(t) (2.14)
given chosen utilization rate uij(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Firm i demands Iij new capital units, xi
energy units, and sells Iˆij = Qjxij new capital units using the proportion ηij = xij/xi
of its factor demand. It sells the energy amount mij = uijKij, and consumption goods
amount ci = B(1−
∑
j ηij)xi. The industry capacity constraint is
K¯j ≥
∑
i
Kij(t+ 1) (2.15)
all t ≥ 0 for technology j ∈ J . Equipment of technology j trades at unit price pj.
The price per unit of energy is p. Any firm is obliged to pay τˆ units of account per
emission unit that the firms’ processes have created. Profit from using and investing in
28Firms may still build capital that is efficiently underutilized if private agents rationally expect a
change in the course of government policy toward implementation of a Pareto optimum. This belief
would require an equilibrium that connects necessary equilibrium conditions of different regimes through
shadow prices of these regimes, because the allocation prior to t∗ generally differs over t∗ for the same
initial conditions.
66
the dirty and clean technologies is Πij = (p− dj τˆ)mij − pjIij in period t ≥ 0. Production
of the consumption good, and of investment goods, using energy creates profit Πˆi =
(pˆB − p)(1−
∑
j ηij)xi +
∑
j(pjQj − (p+ ρj τˆ))xij. Firm i’s profit net of equity trade
Πi(t) =
∑
j∈J
Πij(t) + Πˆi(t) + qi(t)[αˆi(t+ 1)− αˆi(t)] (2.16)
in period t ≥ 0 sums profits from the sectors for the factor energy, consumption goods,
and investment goods, and the trade surplus. Each firm i chooses input demands and
output supplies, and number αˆi(t+1) of equity, on {τ, τ +1, . . .} to maximize the present
discounted value of ex-dividend profits
viτ =
∞∑
t=τ
1∏t
v=τ Rˆ(v)
{Πi(t)− αˆi(t)di(t)}
subject to (2.14) and (2.15) all t ≥ τ taking prices, government policy rates, and the
endogenous nominal interest rate sequence {Rˆ(1), Rˆ(2), . . .} as given, where Rˆ(0) is some
given positive number, and τ ∈ {0, t∗}.29 Any household or firm may offer an asset that
promises Rˆ units of account return, and there is no trade of this asset in equilibrium.
Government.—A government in period t ≥ 0 sets tax rates and lump-sum transfers
{τˆ(t′), tr(t′)} for all dates t′ ≥ t before private agents make decisions about demands and
supplies at date t. The taxes and subsidies appear in a government’s budget constraint
tr ≤ τˆ
∑
i
∑
j∈J
(djmij + ρjxij) (2.17)
all t ≥ 0. The exogenous nature of government policy is helpful in motivating delayed
policy. The tax on polluting activities in all periods that implements a Pareto optimal
allocation is time-consistent. Thus if the government (or successive governments) would
maximize welfare J using taxes on polluting activities and lump-sum transfers and no
other instruments then equilibrium government policy was not delayed.
29Total dividends is Πi(t) = αˆi(t)di(t) equal to total profit all t ≥ 0 given outstanding equity αˆi(t).
For example, a firm using clean technology j makes zero total profit from buying equipment at cost
pj(t)Iij(t) = qi(t)αˆi(t + 1) in period t, and pays out dividend di(t + 1)αˆi(t + 1) and ‘buyback’ qi(t +
1)αˆi(t + 1) in period (t + 1), in sum equal to revenue p(t + 1)Iij(t). The equity of this firm in period
(t+2) may be zero, if the firm does not reinvest. Firms may maximize the discounted value of dividends
taking as given αˆi(t+ 1) all t ≥ 0 without change in results.
67
Equilibrium.—Markets sequentially open and close over time so that households and
firms can revise decisions when government policy begins. Demand equals supply on the
goods markets in a given period, if
∑
i
xi =
∑
i
∑
j∈J
mij,
∑
i
Iij =
∑
i
Iˆij, j ∈ J , c =
∑
i
ci,
for the general factor, investment goods, and the consumption good, respectively. An
equilibrium is a system of prices (p, pˆ, pB, pC , Rˆ) and {qi}∀ i, quantities of demands and
supplies, and equity αi and αˆi, and government policy π on {0, 1, . . .} such that (i) the
representative household and all firms solve their problems taking prices and government
policy variables as given, (ii) the government satisfies its budget constraint all t ≥ 0, (iii)
the law of motion of pollution is Z(t+1) = Z(t)+
∑
i
∑
j∈J (djmij + ρjxij)−A(Z(t)) all
t ≥ 0, and (iv) demand equals supply on the goods markets and securities holdings αi(t)
of households equals issued equity αˆi(t) all i, all t ≥ 0. The following conditions are useful
to characterize an equilibrium without taxes or subsidies and to determine government
policy that implements a Pareto optimum.
A necessary condition for the profit-maximizing choice of capacity Kij(t + 1) of tech-
nology j ∈ J is
(1/Rˆ(t+ 1))(uij(t+ 1) {p(t+ 1)− dj τˆ(t+ 1)}
+ γj(1− uij(t+ 1))υij(t+ 1)− wˆj(t+ 1)) ≤ υij(t)
(2.18)
at shadow prices υij of (2.14) and wˆj of (2.15). The condition holds at equality if the
respective capacity is positive. The shadow price wˆj(t) is zero if capacity Kj(t) is less
than the bound K¯j. Then utilization of the capacities at (t+ 1) of firm i satisfies
uij(t+ 1)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0

 =⇒
1
Rˆ(t+ 1)
{p(t+ 1)− dj τˆ(t+ 1)}


=
=
≤

 υij(t)


≥
=
=


1
Rˆ(t+ 1)
γjυij(t+ 1)
(2.19)
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given Kij(t+ 1) ∈ (0, K¯j) for t ≥ 0. The outer relations at weak inequalities are relevant
regarding utilization at period t = 0. The price-taking assumption should only hold if
individual capacity is smaller than maximum capacity. Equilibrium investment Iij(t) ≥ 0
in technology j ∈ J satisfies υij(t) ≤ pj(t) at equality if Iij(t) > 0 for some firm i. The
shadow prices υij are identical for all firms i that use the technology j ∈ J . Choices of the
consumption goods supply and the energy input demand in producing the consumption
good imply that pˆ(t)B = p(t) since consumption goods are produced in equilibrium. The
necessary equilibrium condition Qjpj(t) ≤ p(t) + ρj τˆ(t) holds at equality if at least one
firm i produces a positive quantity Qjxij of the investment good of technology j ∈ J .
The next section contrasts the allocation in a competitive equilibrium without taxes or
subsidies (laissez-faire equilibrium) to a Pareto optimal outcome.
2.2.1 Laissez-faire equilibrium
The policy announcements are tr(t) = τˆ(t) = 0 and t ≥ 0. Firm i fully utilizes capacity
Kij(t) > 0 all j ∈ J since marginal profit per unit of output, p(t), is greater than γjυij(t)
all t ≥ 0.
Proposition 2.7 Capacity Kij(t) > 0 is fully utilized, uij(t) = 1, in each firm i and all
technologies j ∈ J in a laissez-faire equilibrium.
Proof. The result follows from p ≥ Qjpj ≥ Qjυij > γjυij if Qj > γj. This is true for
the dirty technology. Suppose that clean technology capital is underutilized at the initial
date. First p(1)/Rˆ(1) ≤ υiC(0). Any available capital cannot be unused forever since
the market price of output is positive. Then γC
t−1
∏t
v=1 p(v)/Rˆ(v)p(v− 1) = υiC(0)/p(0)
given date t of utilization for a clean technology with QC ≤ γC . Underutilization at date
zero cannot occur if each real interest rate p(v)/Rˆ(v)p(v − 1) exceeds one. In the long-
term, the real rate of interest approaches β−1 because both consumption and pollution
converge. Consumption may temporarily decrease if the marginal rate of substitution of
consumption depends on pollution. But the product of interest rate factors approaches a
value greater than one. Thus clean technology capital is fully utilized all time. Q.E.D.
Aggregate dirty capacity
∑
iKiB reaches its upper bound K¯B in finite time. Without
emissions pricing investment occurs in the most productive technology until its capacity
bound is reached. Then investment starts in the second most productive technology
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until exhaustion, and so on.30 Investment in a clean technology with marginal product
QC slightly smaller than β
−1 or QC ∈ [β
−1, QB) may occur while the dirty technology
exhausts its capacity constraint. Investment at such productivity level depends on how
pollution affects the marginal utility of consumption.31
Pollution is greater in some period t′ than in period (t′ − 1) if emissions E(t) = Z(t+
1) − Z(t) + A(Z(t)) have increased long enough. The concave regeneration capacity A
implies that if emissions are sufficient to generate an increase in pollution, and emissions
do not decrease, then pollution increases, which Lemma 2.10 in the appendix summarizes.
This lemma is useful to characterize pollution in the long-term if emissions increase.
Lemma 2.6 Pollution approaches the level Z that solves A(Z) = (b + ρB/QB)K¯B +
(ρC/QC)KC if ∂
2U/∂c∂Z ≥ 0, or ∂2U/∂c∂Z < 0 and the effect of consumption dom-
inates the effect of pollution on the marginal utility of consumption, in a laissez-faire
equilibrium. In particular, limt→∞
∑
iKiC(t) = KC equals K¯C if QC > β
−1, or QC = β
−1
and ∂2U/∂c∂Z ≥ 0, and zero else.
Proof. (i) QC ≥ QB. Investment in dirty technology occurs in any period t only if clean
capacity is at its upper bound in period (t+ 1). On an interval with investment in dirty
technology below maximum amount K¯B/QB the real rate of return equals QB. Then dirty
capacity increases because consumption growth is only sustainable with growth in dirty
output. Growth leads to an increasing emissions sequence, E(0) < E(1) < . . . < E(t′′),
and continues until the capacity constraint (2.2) binds for the dirty technology. After-
wards emission is constant, E(t′′) = E(t′′ + s), s ≥ 1. Induction implies that pollution
increases if ∂U2/∂c∂Z ≥ 0. If pollution raises the marginal utility of consumption,
∂2U/∂c∂Z > 0, then greater uncontrolled increase in pollution accelerates growth of
consumption and dirty technology capital. If pollution lowers the marginal utility of
consumption, ∂2U/∂c∂Z < 0, then seemingly greater uncontrolled increase in pollution
may eventually halt growth before KB exhausts the carrying capacity K¯B of the econ-
omy, respectively. The domination rules this out. (ii) QC ∈ [β
−1, QB). Suppose that
30Given full utilization the condition (2.18) becomes (1/Rˆ(t+1))p(t+1)Qj ≥ p(t) if
∑
iKij(t+1) = K¯j ,
and equality if aggregate capacity is interior,
∑
iKij(t+ 1) ∈ (0, K¯j).
31The value of the real interest rate at which consumption stays constant is greater than (equals, is
smaller than) β−1 given pollution increases, if pollution lowers (does not affect, raises) the marginal
utility of consumption. This suggests that if ∂U2/∂c∂Z > 0 and QC is slightly smaller than β
−1 then
investment in clean technology occurs one period before the exhaustion date of dirty capacity, and
consumption decreases later to its long-term level when the real interest rate becomes greater than QC .
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limt→∞KC(t) < K¯C . Then as t tends to infinity (1/Rˆ(t + 1))p(t + 1)QC > p(t) since
(∂U/∂c)(t)/β(∂U/∂c)(t+ 1) = 1/β = Rˆ(t+ 1)p(t)/p(t+ 1). This contradicts investment
below maximum level. In the case QC = β
−1 at constant consumption and increasing
pollution ∂2U/∂c∂Z ≥ 0 is required to make investment in clean technology worthwhile.
Otherwise, ∂2U/∂c∂Z < 0, the real interest rate exceeds the reciprocal of the discount
factor and thereby (1/Rˆ(t + 1))p(t + 1)QC < p(t) implies that KC = 0. (iii) QC < β
−1.
The previous arguments lead to the result. Q.E.D.
Government policy is infinitely delayed, t∗ → ∞, in a laissez-faire equilibrium. This
equilibrium is not optimal because producers not do internalize the effect of pollution on
society in their decisions.
Let the limit value of pollution in a laissez-faire equilibrium be Z¯. Underutilization of
dirty technology capital can prevent a catastrophe, U → −∞ for Z → Zˆ < Z¯, when full
utilization would lead to it. The following proposition summarizes this.
Proposition 2.8 A catastrophe occurs in finite time, at date (t + 1) if Z(t) < Zˆ <
dBKB(t) + Z(t) − A(Z(t)), in a laissez-faire equilibrium and can be prevented by un-
derutilizing dirty capacity KB(t) > 0, that is, uB(t) < 1, and investing a small amount
xB(t) > 0 or xC(t) > 0.
Proof. There is dirty technology capital KB(t) > 0 which is fully utilized, uB(t) = 1, in
the laissez-faire equilibrium. The condition Zˆ < dBKB(t)+Z(t)−A(Z(t)) holds at some
t since Z(t) approaches Z¯ by Lemma 2.6 and this level is greater than Zˆ. The catastrophe
has not occured yet. Thus Zˆ > Z(t) > Z(t) − A(Z(t)). The assumption Z − A(Z) ≤ Z
implies that a small utilization rate uB(t) ≥ 0 and investing a small amount xB(t) > 0 or
xC(t) > 0 creates emissions such that Zˆ > Z(t+ 1) = Z(t) + E(t)− A(Z(t)). Q.E.D.
2.2.2 Implementation of Pareto optimum
A Pigouvian tax internalizes the pollution externality when underutilization is optimal.
Proposition 2.9 An emissions tax equal to the product of the unit price of the consump-
tion good and the cost of polluting, τˆ = pˆ × θ, and transfer tr for all households that
satisfy (2.17) at equality, all t ≥ 0, evaluated at a Pareto optimal allocation, implement
this optimum.
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Proof. Let the marginal utility of income be ψ. The households’ choice of consumption
yields ∂U/∂c = ψpˆ. Its asset holdings αˆi(t + 1) > 0 satisfy β(ψ(t+ 1)/pˆ(t+ 1)){(qi(t +
1)+di(t+1))/qi(t)} = ψ(t)/pˆ(t). Choice of equity issue by firms implies that the term in
braces is the nominal rate of return Rˆ(t+ 1). The necessary optimality conditions (2.18)
for firms’ profit maximization recover the necessary conditions (2.6) for a Pareto optimum,
upon substitution of υij/pˆ = qj/(∂U/∂c), wˆj/pˆ = wj/(∂U/∂c), p/pˆ = λ/(∂U/∂c) = B,
and τˆ /pˆ = ǫ/(∂U/∂c) = θ. The corresponding necessary conditions (2.19) for utilization
in an equilibrium and (2.8) for utilization in a Pareto optimum coincide. The necessary
equilibrium conditions υij(t) ≤ pj(t) regarding investment goods purchases and Qjpj(t) ≤
p(t) + ρj τˆ(t) with respect to production of investment goods become the necessary social
optimality condition (2.7) for investment. Q.E.D.
A firm and thus its owners do not receive a compensation for foregone revenue when
some of its pre-installed dirty technology capital at date t∗ is idle forever (I-1, I-2). Firms
issue new equity to postpone the repayment of equity issued before the date t∗ (buyback
of equity consolidated with equity supply) when initial dirty capacity is underutilized
initially and used in the long-term (I-3, II-1 to II-3). The same policy function as in
Proposition 2.9 implements a constrained optimum with full utilization of capital of any
type—with θ in this allocation.
Normalizing any one price in any period is possible.32 However, the price of consump-
tion goods may be calibrated or estimated in empirical work. Given constant price pˆ
greater income induces to trade greater consumption for additional pollution in form of
the tax rate τˆ , if the marginal utility of consumption decreases in consumption and con-
sumption relates positively to income. This explains why Golosov et al. (2011) observe
that the Pigouvian carbon tax relates positively to income using special preferences and
negative effects of pollution on output.
Government policy rates equal to zero at 0 ≤ t ≤ t∗ − 1 do not implement a Pareto
optimum if equilibrium production creates emissions at a date t prior to (t∗ − 1), and
pollution affects utility in any of the succeeding periods, ∂U/∂Z(t) < 0 for some 1 ≤ t <
t∗, independent on the optimal utilization rates.
32Consumption is measured in dollars so that the price pˆ is set to one in both the approach with carbon
constraint and the approach with continuous effect of carbon on production, for example, in Nordhaus
(2009), on utility, for example, in Acemoglu et al. (2012), or on both production and utility, for example,
in Barrage (2012) in the literature. In a summary of studies Aldy et al. (2010) refer to the imputed
emissions price in models with carbon constraint as least-cost price.
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2.3 Numerical examples
Some questions remain. Does delayed government policy lead to underutilized capital?
Where are the regions of underutilized capacities in the state space? Is dirty technology
capital underutilized when pollution is smaller than its long-term level and the economy
starts with minimum pollution? What is the timing of emissions if dirty capacity is
underutilized? How do the cost of polluting and the level of clean technology investment
compare between the constrained optimum with fully utilized capacity and the optimum?
I find answers in simulations and use two specifications for computational convenience.
The focus of this section is on incentives. An empirical examination of the climate problem
is relegated to future work. The appendix describes the algorithms that delivered the
results. Throughout absorption is proportional to the quantitity of pollutants, A(Z) =
ϕZ, and the portion of preserved capacity of unused dirty technology capital is γB = 0.72.
Pollution is persistent, as only fraction ϕ = 0.1 of current pollution is absorbed.
2.3.1 Strictly concave utility in pollution and one clean technology
Clean capacity is constant at K¯C = QC × 1000 all time because investment in clean
technology has a greater marginal product than investment in dirty technology, QC =
1.1 × QB > QB = (1.02)
20, and this is affordable, KC(0) = K¯C . There is one clean
technology, or equivalently other clean technologies have a low rate of return on investment
that does not make investment worthwhile, and have zero stock at the initial date. This
leads to a problem with two state variables. The utility function is
U(c, Z) = [((1 + ξZ) exp(−ξZ)c)1−ψ]/(1− ψ)
with constant index ψ = 2 of relative risk aversion and parameter ξ = 1/442.5. Marginal
utility of pollution is finite for all pollution levels so there is no catastrophe level of
pollution.33 The values of other parameters are β = 0.9675, B = 1, b = 1/30, and
ρB = ρC = 0. This example abstracts from emissions in the investment sector.
The economy subject to no government policy experiences increases in pollution and
33The utility function U is strictly concave in Z ∈ (0, ξ−1) and yields the simple expression
(−∂U/∂Z)/(∂U/∂c) = (ξc)(ξZ)/(1 + ξZ). Acemoglu et al. (2012) use a similar function whose dif-
ferential with respect to pollution becomes −∞ for some finite pollution level.
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Figure 2.2: Trajectories of optimal (solid) and constrained optimal or laissez-faire (dotted)
pollution Z and dirty capacity KB (squares on curves show values in successive periods).
dirty capacity along the dotted upward-sloping trajectory in Figure 2.2 for the initial state
(Z,KB, KC) = (0, 0, K¯C). The squares on curves starting on this laissez-faire curve for
different delay dates t∗ depict optimized values of state variables in six successive periods.
A date t∗ corresponds to some initial date that is indexed zero in the planner problem
subject to initial values of pollution and capital stocks equal to the date t∗ values. Such
states on solid curves arise in the global optimum with chosen utilization. These states on
dotted curves are solutions to the planner problem that sets the utilization rate of capital
to one, uB(t) = uC(t) = 1 all t ≥ t
∗ in the constrained optimum. States in further periods
lie on the respective trajectory. All optimized trajectories converge to the same steady
state (448, 0.82K¯C , K¯C) as time goes to infinity. The constrained optimal trajectories
starting at points in the designated region R1 in which dirty capacity is optimally fully
utilized, such as path A, are globally optimal because these trajectories remain in this
region. Underutilization of dirty capacity is efficient to smooth dirty capacity early on.
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Figure 2.3: Time paths of optimal (solid) and constrained optimal (dotted) utilization rate
uB of dirty technology, emissions buBKB and pollution Z.
This underutilization occurs when the pollution stock is below or above its long-term
level. Capital of the dirty technology in the laissez-faire equilibrium becomes so high that
optimization at date t∗ > 0 calls for its underutilization. The simulation shows that given
large upper bound K¯B there may be a minimum delay date t
′ such that for all t∗ ≥ t′
underutilization is optimal for any initial state at date zero.34
The cost of polluting is θB = 15.46 in all states (Z,KB, K¯C) in region R2 of joint
investment and underutilized capital. The appendix shows how this parametric value
was useful in finding the region R2 and the region R3 without investment and with
underutilized capital in the dirty technology. For sufficiently large scale K¯B of the dirty
technology a region R3 exists.
The optimal plans B to E with initial states in R2 and R3 in Figure 2.2 obtain lower
emissions in early periods and lower pollution in all periods relative to the constrained
optimal plans B’ to E’ with same initial states. The underutilization of dirty capacity
avoids current emissions that occur given assumed full utilization of capital. Figure
34This may not be true in a model in which the laissez-faire economy converges to a state with
KB < K¯B .
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Figure 2.4: Time paths of consumption c and cost of polluting θ in optimal (solid) and
constrained optimal (dotted) plans.
2.3 shows the time paths of utilization rate, emissions, and pollution for the two initial
states (Z,KB) = (176, 5130) in the plans C and C’ in the upper graphs, and (Z,KB) =
(331, 8180) in the plans D and D’ in the lower graphs, rounded. The utilization rate in
the initial period can be read off from the time series plots of emissions by dividing the
optimal emissions amount by the constrained optimal emissions amount. These rates are
roughly 0.21 and 0.14 for the paths in the upper panel and lower panel, respectively. The
utilization rate increases over time until it reaches one. The utilization rate uB in the
simulation of C is not one after it has been one. The utilization rate in the simulation of
D is not one in the fourth period. However from the states I know that this is not optimal.
The method used approximates the solution. Comparison of 0.21 and 0.14 suggests that
the utilization rate is expected to be smaller in the first period of an optimal allocation the
longer the delay beyond the smallest delay level at which dirty capacity is underutilized.
Consumption decreases initially in all optimal and constrained optimal plans that start
at states in the regions R2 and R3. Plans with uB(t) = uC(t) = 1 all t ≥ t
∗ by assumption
are constrained optimal. This is not surprising because these plans involve a decrease
in output, and the savings rate moves monotonously, so that consumption and output
comove. The consumption in Figure 2.4 corresponds to the plans C, C’, D, and D’ for two
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initial states with greater capital of dirty technology than its long-term level. Apparently
underutilization lowers the rate of decrease in consumption relative to a constrained
optimum. Figure 2.4 presents time paths of θ, that the summary after the next example
interprets. The value of θ(0) in constrained optimum, 142.6 and 492.6, respectively, is so
large that it is outside the picture at the given scale.
2.3.2 Constant marginal utility of pollution and multiple clean technolo-
gies
This example shows how the incentives to invest in dirty versus clean technologies are
influenced by the possibility of underutilization. This issue was left out in the first
specification for computational simplicity. The utility function
U = c1−ψ/(1− ψ)− dZ
has the constant marginal disutility of pollution d to obtain a two-state problem. There
is a continuum of clean technologies C on [0, C¯] with aggregate capital
∫
C
KCdC. The
marginal product function
Q(x) = Q′′ + (Q′ −Q′′)(1 + vx) exp(−vx), 0 ≤ Q′′ < Q′,
decreases in the aggregate input x in clean technology investment. Along this frontier
there are decreasing returns to scale in using aggregate clean technology capital in loca-
tions of varying productivity. These locations can be occupied with capital. In general,
the new aggregate clean technology capital here is a function of x on geographic sites
with distributed marginal product.35 The equilibrium and efficient motion of aggregate
capital in clean technologies is
∫
C
KC(t+ 1)dC =
∫ ∫
C
xC(t)dC
0
Q(z)dz if all capital units of
clean technologies are fully utilized.36 In addition, then there is a value function in the
35Physical capital is chosen in Section 2.4.1.
36One may define the mass S ⊆ J ′ of a continuum J ′ of technologies with capital in the current
period, S = {j |Kj > 0}, whose utilization rate is optimally either zero or one, with proper subsets
S \ S− = {j | uj = 1} and S
− = {j | uj = 0}. The law of motion of this set is S(t + 1) = S
−(t) ∪ S+(t)
when investment occurs in technologies S+ ⊆ J ′ \ S−. The law of motion of aggregate capital in these
technologies is
∫
j
Kj(t + 1)dj = [
∫
j∈S(t)
γj(1 − uj(t))dj/
∫
j∈S(t)
dj]
∫
j
Kj(t)dj +
∫
j∈S+(t)
Qjdj. Let J
′ =
{j | dj = 0} and j = C. Upon change of variable the new capital stock is
∫
C∈S+
QCdC =
∫ x+(t)
0
Q+(x)dx.
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Figure 2.5: Trajectories of optimal (solid) and constrained optimal or laissez-faire (dotted)
pollution Z, dirty capacity KB, and clean capacity
∫
C
KCdC (squares on curves show
values in successive periods).
states dirty technology capital and aggregate clean technology capital, (KB,
∫
C
KCdC),
since both utility U and absorption A are linear in pollution. I assume scale-dependent
relative advantage of dirty and clean technologies, Q′ = 1.1×QB = 20×Q
′′, and emissions
from investment, ρB = ρC = (βQB)
−1/ψQB(1/20)(1/30) all C. Further parameters are
d = 7.4 × 10−7, v that solves
∫
C
KC(0)dC = 1000/2.4, B = 1.2, and b = (19/20)(1/30).
The horizontal dashed line runs at θB.
The trajectories in Figure 2.5 emanate from states in the laissez-faire equilibrium that
is initialized at Z = KB = 0,
∫
C
xC(0)dC = y, and
∫
C
KC(0)dC =
∫ y
0
Q(x)dx such that
Q(y) = QB. In the laissez-faire equilibrium aggregate clean capacity is
∫
C
KC(0)dC if
dirty technology investment is below K¯B = 14442 in the preceding period. The laissez-
faire economy does not generate sufficient output for optimal underutilization of dirty
technology capital when the pollution stock is below its long-term level. In the first
example, underutilization occurs at such states.
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Figure 2.6: Shadow return and cost of polluting, and time paths of dirty and clean tech-
nology savings.
The policy of underutilization diminishes the incentives to invest in expensive clean
technologies. The right panel in Figure 2.6 shows the time paths of savings. Unused dirty
technology capital (1−uB)KB contributes to the savings ((1−γB/QB)(1−uB(t))KB(t)+
KB(t+ 1)/QB) out of capacity. Clean technology investment
∫
C
xCdC equals its savings
because clean technology capital is fully utilized following Proposition 2.6. In the con-
strained optimum the incentives to invest are aligned in both dirty and clean technologies.
In optimum with underutilized dirty technology capital the incentives to invest in clean
technologies are relatively lower early than in the constrained optimum because underuti-
lization helps mitigating pollution effects on society. Clean technology investment peaks
in the period in which both investment and underutilization in the dirty technology are
optimal, when the state is in R2, below the initial level in the constrained optimum at the
same initial state. This explains the V-shaped path of the shadow return. The shadow
return and the cost of polluting are positively related on intervals with underutilized
dirty technology capital, and negatively related on intervals with full utilization, which
the curve in the upper left panel of Figure 2.6 depicts. The dotted trajectory shows a con-
strained optimal path. The initial values of pollution and dirty capacity are (876, 7790)
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and (1500, 12254) in this Figure. The former values initialize the constrained optimal
path in the upper left panel. The cost of polluting is plotted over time in the lower left
panel. The dashed lines are at the levels (B/dB) and θB.
2.3.3 Summary
The simulation yields the following five insights. (i) Delay of government policy. Emis-
sions are an externality. The longer emissions are unpriced the greater dirty technology
capacity is built relative to the efficient long-term dirty technology output. This means
that delayed government policy leads to efficient underutilization of dirty capacity. (ii)
Location of regions of underutilization of dirty capacity in the state space. Intuitively, the
society can afford underutilization well when capital is large given pollution and desires
it when pollution is large given capital. In fact in the first example pollution Z and dirty
capacity KB relate negatively on the boundary of R1 and R2. In the example with con-
stant marginal utility of pollution a constant KB given the optimal choice KC forms the
boundary of R1 and R2. Then affordability is the dominant force behind underutilization.
The slope of this boundary in the state plane (Z,KB) is minus one (not shown) if utility
is quadratic in both consumption and pollution and absorption is linear in pollution. In
these examples thus underutilization of capital can be optimal when current pollution
is smaller (environmental quality is greater) than its long-term stabilization level. The
Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 do not tell for what initial levels of pollution dirty capacity use
is postponed. (iii) Timing of emissions. The optimal and constrained optimal emissions
on optimal paths that start at the same state in R2 or R3 differ substantially early. Vari-
able utilization allows to start with low emissions followed by greater emissions. Fixed
full utilization necessitates emissions decreases early on in the constrained optimum to
approach lower capital values. (iv) Cost of polluting. The cost of polluting can differ
substantially between an optimal plan with chosen utilization and a constrained optimal
plan with assumed fully utilized capital subject to the same initial condition. The sub-
stantive difference lies in the early periods with optimal underutilization in the Figures
2.4 and 2.6. Underutilization mitigates societal effects of pollution and thus achieves a
lower cost. (v) Clean technology investment. Expensive clean technologies are not needed
when dirty technology capital utilization can be varied.
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2.4 Extensions
Extensions to physical capital and a fuel technology check the robustness of results. The
third extension warrants that a high portion of wealth may be affected by underutilized
dirty technology assets. The fourth aspect examines if distributional effects between asset
owners that have differently aged dirty technology capital are expected from underuti-
lization, if these are efficiently fully utilized at some date.
2.4.1 Physical capital
In this section the productivity of stored unused capital vintages decreases to postulate
bounds on capital rather than capacity. The boundedness of capital is more restrictive
for investment than bounded capacity in Section 2.1.1. However there is an equivalence
in optimum, which is to be shown. Capital aj(t, v) > 0 of vintage v is utilized at chosen
rate uj(t, v) ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ J . Output
mj(t) =
t−1∑
v=−1
χj(t− v − 1)uj(t, v)aj(t, v)
in period t sums production over vintages v, given productivity χj(t−v−1). Productivity
can be interpreted as the available time of capital or net of maintenance expenditures.
A widely held view among professionals is that machines, automobile engines or power
plants, produce at rates independent on age yet incur increased downtime or expenditures
for maintenance when becoming older. This should apply to used and unused capital.
Productivity in the period after creation of capital is χj(0) > 0. Site-specific factors
relative to norm conditions and the average availability in a period may prescribe χC(0).
Capital at the beginning of period (t+ 1) is
aj(t+ 1, v) =
{
σj(1− uj(t, v))aj(t, v)
εjxj(t)
if
{
t > v
t = v
(2.20)
where εjxj(t) is new capital that arrives in period t and is productive with a lag of one
period, and σj ∈ {0, 1} as explained below. For simplicity, χj(t− v − 1) = γj
t−v−1χj(0).
Then productivity of stored capital units depreciates at rate γj ∈ (0, 1], or productivity
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of age greater than or equal to one is zero, γj = 0. Capital is automatically scrapped,
so that σj equals zero if and only if unused capital became unproductive, γj = 0. Then
unproductive capital does not block investment, as in the reduced form in Section 2.1.1.
Finite recyclable supply of minerals for producing capital or finite amount of land and
water for installing capital, whichever is the tight constraint, give rise to the exogenous
upper bound a¯j on capital of technology j. Then
a¯j ≥
t∑
v=−1
aj(t+ 1, v) (2.21)
all t ≥ 0. A discussion of the relationship between welfare-maximizing choices here and
in Section 2.1.1 follows after stating the planner problem.
There are τ(t) vintages with positive capital at t. A planner chooses a policy (c, x, u) ∈
R
3
+ × [0, 1]
τ(t) on {0, 1, . . .} to maximize Lagrange’s function
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
U(c(t), Z(t)) + ǫ(t)
[
Z(t+ 1)−
∑
j
(
dj
t−1∑
v=−1
χj(t− v − 1)uj(t, v)aj(t, v)
+ ρjxj(t)
)
− φ(Z(t))
]
+
∑
j
( t−1∑
v=−1
ϕj(t, v)[σj(1− uj(t, v))aj(t, v)− aj(t+ 1, v)]
+ ϕj(t, t)[εjxj(t)− aj(t+ 1, t)] + βwj(t+ 1)
[
a¯j −
t∑
v=−1
aj(t+ 1, v)
])
+ w(t)G(t)
}
given φ(Z) = Z − A(Z), and G ≥ 0 that collects the resource constraint (2.1), non-
negativity constraints of investment inputs, feasibility constraints of utilization rates in
technologies with positive capital, and nonnegativity constraints of capital. At least one
initial stock is assumed positive among the given aB(0,−1) ≥ 0 and aC(0,−1) ≥ 0.
The constraint (2.2) allows greater investment yj(t) = εjxj(t) than the constraint (2.21)
allows if vintage capital units created more than two periods ago are around and quality
depreciates (0 < γj < 1). Capacity equals
Kj(t) =
t−1∑
v=−1
χj(t− v − 1)aj(t, v)
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for technology j ∈ J . The bound a¯j on capital translates into the upper bound K¯j =
χj(0)a¯j of production capacity measured in output units. The definition of capacity and
the aggregate utilization rate
uj(t) =
[
t−1∑
v=−1
γj
t−v−1uj(t, v)aj(t, v)
/ t−1∑
v=−1
γj
t−v−1aj(t, v)
]
∈ [0, 1]
specific to technology j lead to the transition law (2.3) of capacity. The marginal product
of investing a unit of the final good is
Qj = εjχj(0)
for technology j ∈ J in Section 2.1.1. The following proposition concludes from solutions
here to solutions of the planner problem in this section.
Proposition 2.10 The solutions to the planner problem here and in Section 2.1.1 co-
incide if the productivity of unused capital does not depreciate, γj = 1 all j ∈ J . An
optimal policy such that (i) capital aj(t, v) > 0 of vintage v < t − 1 is fully utilized,
uj(t, v) = 1, or (ii) the constraint (2.21) in the period (t+1) is not binding, if investment
occurs one period before, xj(t) > 0, j ∈ J , solves the planner’s problem in Section 2.1.1,
for γj ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The motions (2.20) of vintage capital and (2.3) of capacity are equivalent because
Kj(t+ 1) =
t∑
v=−1
χj(t− v)aj(t+ 1, v)
= γj
t−1∑
t=−v
χj(t− v − 1)[1− uj(t, v)]aj(t, v) + χj(0)aj(t+ 1, t)
= γj
{
Kj(t)−
t−1∑
t=−v
χj(t− v − 1)uj(t, v)aj(t, v)
}
+Qjxj(t)
given the capacity Kj(t) and utilization rate uj(t) as defined above. In view of the
constraints (2.21) and (2.2) then the conditions in the Proposition deliver the result. The
constraints are identical if γj = 1 or (i) holds. Q.E.D.
83
Suppose that the productivity of unused capital incompletely depreciates, 0 < γj < 1.
Then (ii) does not hold only if the economy both builds new capital and stores existing
capital in some technology at the same date. Either the return from storing capital
is greater than, equal to, or smaller than the return from investing. In the first case
no investment occurs, and in the latter case investing the output from utilized capital
is better than not utilizing capital. Hence the only case in question is indifference. The
first-order necessary optimality conditions do not depend on the investment level and thus
do not help to rule out investing up to the capacity bound and storing other capital.37
But it is conceivable that either all vintages, v < t − 1, are fully utilized latest at t, or
if not then capital is not at its upper bound at (t + 1), in an optimal plan. This yields
a further insight. The same allocations would be optimal if the planner had the option
to scrap unutilized capital units. The planner would not do so if investment does not
exhaust space when capital is underutilized.
2.4.2 Intermediate good in dirty production
This section examines the optimal utilization of capital in converting refined fossil fuel into
energy that is useful for consumption and investment and capital in producing fossil fuels.
Optimal policies map one-to-one to optimal policies in the basic model with underutilized
dirty technology capital if the depreciation rate of unused capital in fuel-based energy
production and in producing fuel are equal and the emission intensities in investing in
these technologies are equal.
Technology and environment.—Production of one unit of good using technology B, for
example, conversion of energy from fossil fuel, requires αB units of an intermediate good
that technology R produces. Fuel input cannot exceed fuel output,
αBmB ≤ mR (2.22)
37One can rule out that old units are underutilized and young units are utilized, because the space
requirement of output is weakly smaller for younger units. Claim. Underutilization of capital aj(t, v
′) > 0
of old vintages, that is, uj(t, v
′) < 1, of technology j ∈ J is Pareto optimal only if capital aj(t, v) > 0 of
young vintages is idle, uj(t, v) = 0 and v
′ < v < t. Proof. If uj(t, v) > 0 and uj(t, v
′) < 1, v′ < v < t,
then lowering uj(t, v) and raising uj(t, v
′) until (1−uj(t, v
′))uj(t, v) = 0, achieves the same consumption
and emissions and (i) keeps aggregate capital of technology j in period (t+1) at same level if γj = 1, or
(ii) lowers capital and thereby relaxes the constraint (2.21) at (t+ 1) if 0 < γj < 1. Q.E.D. Thus young
units are not utilized if old units are not utilized. But young and old units may only coexist when all
units are fully utilized.
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all t ≥ 0. The commitment of resources for fuel production takes the form of investment.
The capital cost of fossil fuel production originates in the extraction of raw fuels, their
transportation, and refinement. Accordingly,
c/B + xB + xC + xR ≤ mB +mC (2.23)
is the resource constraint of energy, and mj = ujKj equals output at chosen utilization
rate uj ∈ [0, 1] of technology j ∈ J = {B,R,C}.
Production of one unit of fuel creates dR emission units (notably from flaring of natural
gas at extraction sites of petroleum, by ventilation of underground coal mines, at transport
of raw fuel, and in refining petroleum). One unit of output of technology B produces
dB emission units (in combustion engines and power plants). Necessary conditions for a
Pareto optimum follow after stating the planner’s problem.
The planner chooses a policy (c, x, u) ∈ R4+ × [0, 1]
τ(t) on {0, 1, . . .} to maximize J
subject to the resource constraints (2.22) and (2.23), the upper bound on capacity (2.2),
and the laws of motion (2.3) and (2.4) for j ∈ J all t ≥ 0. The triple of initial capacity
satisfies 0 ≤ αBKB(0) = KR(0) < K¯R and 0 ≤ KC(0) < K¯C , and contains at least one
positive level.
The following conditions hold in an optimal plan. Let λ∗ be the multiplier on the
constraint (2.22). The discounted marginal benefit of using capital and storing unused
capital at most equals the marginal cost of holding capital at the end of period t,
βuB(t+ 1){λ(t+ 1)− αBλ
∗(t+ 1)− dBǫ(t+ 1)}
+ βγB(1− uB(t+ 1))qB(t+ 1)− βwB(t+ 1) ≤ qB(t), = if KB(t+ 1) > 0,
(2.24)
and
βuR(t+ 1){λ
∗(t+ 1)− dRǫ(t+ 1)}
+ βγR(1− uR(t+ 1))qR(t+ 1)− βwR(t+ 1) ≤ qR(t), = if KR(t+ 1) > 0,
(2.25)
all t ≥ 0. The use of fuel is costly for technology B and beneficial for technology R. This
explains the sign of λ∗ in the net benefits. These conditions demand to balance the values
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of idle and utilized capacity units in the same way as in Section 2.1.1. Therefore
uB(t+ 1)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0


=⇒ β{λ(t+ 1)− αBλ
∗(t+ 1)− dBǫ(t+ 1)}


=
=
≤

 qB(t)


≥
=
=

 βγBqB(t+ 1)
(2.26)
given KB(t+ 1) ∈ (0, K¯B), and
uR(t+ 1)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0


=⇒ β{λ∗(t+ 1)− dRǫ(t+ 1)}


=
=
≤

 qR(t)


≥
=
=

 βγRqR(t+ 1)
(2.27)
given KR(t + 1) ∈ (0, K¯R), for t ≥ 0. Only the outer relations at weak inequalities are
relevant regarding utilization in period t = 0. The following discusses the incentives to
utilize installed dirty and fuel technology capital and to invest in these technologies.
Proposition 2.11 The statements in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 on the timing of invest-
ment and utilization in the dirty technology hold for both the dirty technology B and
the fuel technology R if these technologies have equal emission intensities of investment,
ρB = ρR, and depreciation rates of unused capital, γB = γR, and the assumptions of
Proposition 2.3 hold for both these technologies.
Proof. The fuel constraint (2.23) is binding all t ≥ 0 so that uR(t) = uB(t), if KR(t) =
αBKB(t) all t ≥ 0, which is to be confirmed. The statements in Proposition 2.2 hold
since KR(0) = αBKB(0). Consider Proposition 2.3. (i) Let uj(t) = 1 some j ∈ {B,R}.
Capital of technology j stays zero from (t+ 1) onward by assumption if xj(t) = 0. Then
xj′(t) = 0, j
′ 6= j, since investment in the other technology j′ ∈ {B,R} would be wasteful.
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In the alternative, xj(t) > 0 implies that xj′(t) > 0, so that investment occurs in both
technologies. (ii) In case xB(t) > 0 and xR(t) > 0 the utilization of capital implies that
θ(t) ≤ θ∗ defining θ∗ = (υQB − [υγB + (1− υ)γR])/([υγBρB + (1− υ)γRρR] + [υdBQB +
(1 − υ)dRQR]) for some υ ∈ (0, 1]. Suppose that uj(t + 1) < 1 all j ∈ {B,R}. Then
θ∗ ≤ θ(t + 1). Thus the necessary optimality conditions contradict that θ(t) > θ(t + 1).
Therefore uB(t + 1) = 1 or uR(t + 1) = 1. Suppose that uj(t + 1) = 1 some j ∈ {B,R}.
The reverse inequality to that in Lemma 2.9 results if xj(t+ 1) > 0 and uj(t+ 1) > 0, as
βγj(λ(t+ 1) + ρjǫ(t+ 1)) = βγjQjqj(t+ 1) ≤ Qjqj(t) ≤ λ(t) + ρjǫ(t). Thus uj(t+ 1) = 1
all j ∈ {B,R} by contradiction given ρB = ρR and γB = γR if one of these inequalities
is strict. This choice is optimal if both these inequalities hold at equality. This shows
that following utilization and investment capital of both technologies B and R is fully
utilized or ceases to exist simultaneously. Then underutilization occurs early and capital
is proportional as claimed, because there is at most one period with underutilization and
investment in both these technologies and KR(0) = αBKB(0). Q.E.D.
The timing of investment and utilization is as in Section 2.1.1 if ρB = ρR and γB = γR
because of symmetric incentives. The marginal products determine the ratio of inestment
inputs.
Proposition 2.12 Investment is proportional, xR(t) = ((1 − υ)/υ)xB(t) given constant
υ = QR/(QR + αBQB) ∈ (0, 1], and the utilization rates are equal, uR(t) = uB(t), in the
dirty and fuel technology all t ≥ 0, if the assumptions of Proposition 2.11 hold.
Proof. The proportionality of capital, KR(t) = αBKB(t), and equal utilization rates,
uR(t) = uB(t), all t ≥ 0, in proving Proposition 2.11 deliver the result. Q.E.D.
Aligning the investment expenditures and utilization rates of the dirty and the fuel
technology is optimal if they have same environmental cost of investment inputs and de-
preciation rates of unused capital. This is one case in which redefining the dirty technology
productivity to υQB, and writing the emission intensities b = dB+αBdR of dirty technol-
ogy output and ρ = υρB+(1−υ)ρR of dirty technology investment input xB+xR = xB/υ
allow solving for an optimum without explicit use of the fuel technology.
Investing in the technology with smaller depreciation rate may be relatively delayed
early in an optimal plan with underutilized dirty and fuel technology capital if the de-
preciation rates of unused capital are different for the dirty and the fuel technology. This
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follows from the law of motion (2.3) of capital. The timing of underutilization and invest-
ment in each of these technologies may still be the timing regarding the dirty technology
in the model without a fuel technology. However, the necessary optimality conditions do
not seem to rule out underutilization after full utilization in the technology with smaller
depreciation rate of unused capital or smaller emission intensity of the input in building
new capital.38
In practice γB and γR, and ρB and ρR, likely differ. Empirical studies have to determine
yet how big the discrepancy is and the direction. The distinction between capital in fuel
extraction, transport, and refinement, and of capital in energy conversion, in data will
produce large portions of each of these. Fuel use in automobiles and power plants accounts
for about half of the expenditure on the mobility service from vehicles and electricity
generation, respectively.
2.4.3 Energy-use capital and energy efficiency
The basic model lacks explicit capital that uses energy. Each capital Kj can be written
as a composite of technology-specific energy-production capital (for example, engines,
turbines, and photovoltaic cells) and energy-use capital (for example, building shells,
equipment, roads, and vehicle shells) leading to the same results. For empirical work
it is desirable to account for the fact that the depreciation rates of major portions of
energy-conversion capital and energy-use capital differ. In terms of dollar value the latter
comprises mainly buildings. A building has typically a longer lifespan than solar modules
mounted on its roof. Simultaneous scrapping of energy-production capital and energy-use
capital is limited to bundles such as automobile engine and shell. This section accounts
for different depreciation rates such that energy-use capital is perpetually inventoried and
may use energy produced from dirty and clean technologies. I combine a continuum of
capital types for energy use inspired by Atkeson & Kehoe (1999) with energy production
using capital and an environmental motive to examine utilization of energy-use capital.
Atkeson & Kehoe (1999) posit an exogenous resource cost of energy without environmental
consideration to determine the response of energy efficiency to fuel price movements.
38On a path with some dirty output in every period full utilization of dirty or fuel technology capital
Kj(t) > 0, uj(t) = 1, coincides with investment, xj(t) > 0. Then arguments used in proving Proposition
2.11 show that there is no investment, xj(t+1) = 0, if capital Kj(t+1) > 0 is underutilized, uj(t+1) < 1.
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Capital is putty-clay in terms of its energy intensity v¯ ∈ V = (0, v∗) for some supremum
v∗ ∈ (0,∞). The resource constraint
∫
v¯
e(v¯, t)dv¯ ≤
∑
j∈J
mj (2.28)
of energy replaces (2.1). Energy use e(v¯, t) ∈ [0, K(v¯, t)/v¯] all v¯ ∈ V may be below
the energy requirement of fully utilized capital. This requirement equals capital K(v¯, t)
divided by the energy intensity v¯ that fixes at the date of investment. Capital of each
type v¯ follows the difference equation
K(v¯, t+ 1) = ((1− δ)u(v¯, t) + γ(1− u(v¯, t)))K(v¯, t) + ε(v¯)x(v¯, t) (2.29)
where δ ∈ [1 − γ, 1] and ε(v¯) > 0, and u(v¯, t) ∈ [0, 1] is the utilization rate of K(v¯, t).
Capital depreciates at rate δ = 1 − γ ≥ 0 regardless of its utilization, or utilized units
depreciate at greater rate than nonutilized units, 1− δ < γ. Capital services are defined
as
z(t) =
∫
v¯
min[K(v¯, t)/v¯, e(v¯, t)]f(v¯)dv¯
in period t given increasing and strictly concave function f . Aggregate demand for services
at most equals its supply,
c(t)/B +
∑
j∈J
xj(t) +
∫
v¯
x(v¯, t)dv¯ ≤
∫
v¯
e(v¯, t)f(v¯)dv¯ (2.30)
given e(v¯, t) = u(v¯, t)K(v¯, t)/v¯ all t ≥ 0. Aggregate emissions
E(t) =
∑
j∈J
(djmj(t) + ρjxj(t)) +
∫
v¯
ρ(v¯)x(v¯, t)dv¯ (2.31)
contain the emissions from producing energy-use capital all t ≥ 0. The pollution stock
Z(0) is given. Fully utilized energy-use capital exhausts maximum energy supply in the
initial period,
∫
v¯
[K(v¯, 0)/v¯]dv¯ = KB(0)+KC(0) > 0, because capital units are endowed in
the initial period. A Pareto optimal policy (c, x, u) and (x(v¯, t), u(v¯, t)) : V → R+× [0, 1]
on {0, 1, . . .} maximizes welfare J subject to (2.2)-(2.4) and (2.28)-(2.31). The following
result about the utilization of energy-use capital in the initial period is immediate.
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Proposition 2.13 Some capital K(v¯, 0) > 0 that uses energy is underutilized, u(v¯, 0) <
1 for at least one v¯ with K(v¯, 0) > 0, if capacity Kj(0) > 0 in energy production is
underutilized, uj(0) < 1, for some j ∈ J .
Proof. The initial condition implies that
∫
v¯
e(v¯, 0)dv¯ =
∑
j uj(0)Kj(0) is smaller than∫
v¯
[K(v¯, 0)/v¯]dv¯ at uj(0) < 1 some j ∈ J . Then e(v¯, 0) < K(v¯, 0)/v¯ for at least one v¯.
Q.E.D.
From the viewpoint of stochastic energy prices Atkeson & Kehoe (1999) find that energy
prices in the US 1960-1994 have not varied so much to induce optimal underutilization.
This analysis has excluded emissions from energy production. Given long delay in opti-
mizing pollution some units may be efficiently underutilized. It will be the least-energy
efficient buildings and ports and heaviest automobiles in a class of same use value that
should be permanently or temporarily retired. The retirement is thus not limited to 1/6
of dollar wealth in fuel production and energy conversion but extends to 5/6 of such assets
that use energy.39
2.4.4 Improvement in emission intensity and time-variant return to stor-
age
In practice plants and engines of different age that possess a vintage-dependent emission
intensity of output coexist. An autonomous improvement in the emissions per kilometre
driven should favour underutilization of old vehicles. Capital is useful more than once
albeit it may depreciate over time. The productivity of unused capital diminishes more
rapidly for older plants and engines, because more screws get loose in machines that have
been used more often. The same relationship should hold for temporarily retired capital.
This should instead give incentives to underutilize young vintage capital. This section
studies the roles of vintage-dependent emission intensity and use-dependent depreciation
for the age of underutilized plants, because renewable energy technologies may be insuf-
ficiently productive at large scale or investment in renewable energy technologies may be
carbon-free in the future, both which prevents their exclusive long-term use in energy
production in the realm here. I show the opposite effects as outlined above. Therefore
39Edenhofer et al. (2005) assume 49.2 trillion USD capital stock that produces output, and 5 and 6
trillion USD fossil-fuel extraction and conversion stock, respectively, that produce intermediate goods.
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they may roughly cancel out considering both. Then the underutilization has likely mild
distributional effects among owners of old versus young capital given fossil-fuel using cap-
ital is only temporarily retired. For example, old cars and young cars alike should be
driven less than previously planned.
The following is a representation with capacity. Writing out productivity and physical
capital gives the same results. The vintage capacity K(t, s, v) originates from capital
created in period v that has been utilized in s ≤ S − 1 prior periods. Output is
m(t) =
t−1∑
v=−S
min[S−1,t−v−1]∑
s=0
u(t, s, v)K(t, s, v)
all t ≥ 0. Capital is useful in S ≥ 2 periods. For notational convenience investment
inputs, utilization rates, capacity levels, and emission intensities of multiple technologies
are appropriately stacked in vectors. The constraint of the upper bound on vintage- and
use-dependent capacity,
K¯ ≥
t∑
v=−S
min[S−1,t−v]∑
s=0
K(t+ 1, s, v) (2.32)
extends (2.2). Let γ(t−v, s, v) ∈ [0, 1] be the retained fraction of productivity of unutilized
capital constructed in period v conditional on age (t− v) and use s. The first line in
K(t+ 1, 0, v) =
{
γ(t− v, 0, v)(1− u(t, 0, v))K(t, 0, v)
Qx(t)
if v
{
∈ {−S,−S + 1, . . . , t− 1}
= t
(2.33)
accounts for capacity from unused capital constructed before t. Addition of t-vintages
enhances aggregate (t+1)-capacity by Qx(t). Capital at (t+1) that has been used at least
one period and built before (t− s) consists of pausing capital and used capital in period
t. The pausing capital carried over from period t is used s ∈ {1, . . . ,min[S− 1, t− v− 1]}
times prior to t. The capital used in period t is used (s−1) times prior to t. Used capital
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retains fraction π(t− v, s, v) of productivity. This yields capacity
K(t+ 1, s, v) = γ(t− v, s, v)(1− u(t, s, v))K(t, s, v)
+ π(t− v, s− 1, v)u(t, s− 1, v)K(t, s− 1, v),
v ∈ {−S,−S + 1, . . . , t− s− 1}
(2.34)
all t ≥ 0. For simplicity the history of utilization does not matter for the productivity
of a given vintage capital.40 The production capacity of capital used in all periods from
(v + 1) to t is
K(t+ 1, s, v) = π(t− v, s− 1, v)u(t, s− 1, v)K(t, s− 1, v), v = t− s, (2.35)
one period later all t ≥ 0. The equations (2.33)-(2.35) replace the inventory constraint
(2.3) of Section 2.1.1 for all technologies j = 1, . . . ,M . The law of motion of pollution is
Z(t+ 1) = Z(t) +
t−1∑
v=−S
min[S−1,t−v−1]∑
s=0
E(t, s, v) + ρx(t)− A(Z(t) (2.36)
given emissions E(t, s, v) = d(t − v, s, v)u(t, s, v)K(t, s, v) of using capital all t ≥ 0.
There are τ(t) positive capacity levels at date t. An optimum maximizes J with respect
to (c, x, u) ∈ R1+M+ × [0, 1]
τ(t) subject to c(t)/B + x(t) ≤ m(t) and (2.32)-(2.36) all t ≥ 0
given initial pollution Z(0) and capacity levels, that is, maximizes Lagrange’s function
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
U(c(t), Z(t)) + ǫ(t)
[
Z(t+ 1)−
( t−1∑
v=−S
min[S−1,t−v−1]∑
s=0
E(t, s, v) + ρx(t)
)
− φ(Z(t))
]
+
t−s−1∑
v=−S
min[S−1,t−v]∑
s=0
q(t, s, v)[r¯(t, s, v)−K(t+ 1, s, v)] + λ(t)[m(t)
− x(t)− c(t)/B] + βw(t+ 1)
(
K¯ −
t−1∑
v=−S
min[S−1,t−v]∑
s=0
K(t+ 1, s, v)
)]
+ λ(t)G¯(t)
}
where G¯ collects the inequality constraints of input amounts x(t), utilization rates u(t, s, v),
40The accounting equations of capacity hold for capital with γ and π replaced by unity. Capacity
K(t, s, v) = χ(t−v−1, s, v)a(t, s, v) depends on productivity χ(t−v−1, s, v) and physical capital a(t, s, v)
such that χ(t−v, s, v) = γ(t−v, s, v)χ(t−v−1, s, v) and χ(t−v, s, v) = π(t−v, s−1, v)χ(t−v−1, s−1, v).
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and capital K(t + 1, s, v), that form the admissable set. The term r¯(t, s, v) is the right
side of (2.33) for s = 0, (2.34) for 1 ≤ s ≤ min[S − 1, t − v] and −S ≤ v ≤ t− s− 1,
and (2.35) for 1 ≤ s ≤ min[S − 1, t − v] and v = t − s. The endowment of capacity at
date zero consists of nonnegative stocks {K(0, S − 1,−S), . . . , K(0, 0,−1)}. At least one
of the elements of these vectors of length M is greater than zero. Consider a particular
dirty technology with dropped index.
Improvement in the emission intensity of machine output in the vintage, d(t−v, s, v) >
d(t − v − 1, s, v + 1), is observed in reality. Machines of a given vintage v may become
dirtier when they deteriorate, d(t − v, s − 1, v) < d(t − v, s, v) if γ(t − v, s, v) < 1,
because the use intervals become shorter within a period and fuel is wasted, for example,
during unscheduled ramp-down intervals and following ramp-up intervals in electricity
production. Intuitively, a decrease of the emission intensity d(t − v, s, v) of output in
the vintage v or an increase of d(t − v, s, v) in the number s of periods of past use
yield an incentive to underutilize old plants, which have been used more often than
young plants, to maximize output per unit of emission. Weakly increasing depreciation
in the age (t − v) or the number s of periods used, γ(t − v, s, v) ≥ γ(t + 1 − v, s, v) or
γ(t − v, s − 1, v) ≥ γ(t − v, s, v), seems plausible because scheduled maintenance time
may increase but not decrease in age or use. Increasing depreciation in the age (t − v)
or in the number s of periods used intuitively favours young plants for underutilization,
in order to postpone the use of capital with relatively low depreciation. Convexity or
concavity of the dependencies of d or γ on vintage, use, or age does not matter for these
arguments. The next proposition confirms the above intuition. For simplicity let there
be vintage-dependent emission intensity d(v) and use-dependent depreciation of capital,
γ(s), and durability S = 2. Used capital depreciates at weakly greater rate than unused
capital, π(s) ≤ γ(s).
Proposition 2.14 There is a range of the cost of polluting θ(t) such that (i) vintage
capacities K(t, 0, t − 1) > 0 and K(t + 1, 1, t − 1) > 0, are fully utilized, u(t, 0, t − 1) =
u(t + 1, 1, t − 1) = 1, and (ii) underutilization of vintage capacity K(t, 1, t − 2) > 0,
that is, u(t, 1, t − 2) < 1, can be optimal, and there is no range of θ(t) for the ‘reverse’
statement u(t + j, j, t − 1) < 1 for j ∈ {0, 1} can be optimal when u(t, 1, t − 2) = 1 is
optimal, if the emission intensity of output improves over vintages, d(v − 1) > d(v), and
unused capacity depreciates at constant rate, γ(0) = γ(1). The situation is reversed if
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the emission intensity stays constant, d(v − 1) = d(v), and unused capacity depreciates
at greater rate when used more often, γ(0) > γ(1).
Proof. There is a critical level of θ(t) for underutilization of each vintage v ∈ {t−1, . . . , t−
S} in all periods in which it would be fully utilized without environmental effect and for
utilization of younger vintages for all but the youngest vintage. Comparison of these
critical values yields the results. Nonnegative input in investment at t satisfies
Qq(t, 0, t) ≤ λ(t) + ρǫ(t) (2.37)
and builds capital with emission intensity d(t). A unit of capacity with a lower emission
intensity is worth more, q(t, 0, t − 1) ≤ q(t, 0, t) if d(t − 1) ≥ d(t). Underutilization of
the youngest capital in pristine condition at t, that is, u(t, 0, t − 1) < 1, requires that
λ(t)− d(t− 1)ǫ(t) + π(0)q(t, 1, t− 1) ≤ γ(0)q(t, 0, t− 1) all t ≥ 0. Combination of these
three results leads to θ(t) ≥ θ∗(0, t− 1) given the critical level
θ∗(s, v) = B (Q− γ(s) +Qπ(0)q(v + 1, 1, v)/λ(t)) /(ργ(s) + d(v)Q)
all t ≥ 0. There is capacity K(t+1, 0, t−1) > 0 and K(t+1, 1, t−1) > 0 if K(t, 0, t−1) >
is partially utilized, u(t, 0, t− 1) ∈ (0, 1). Utilization of capacity K(t + 1, 0, t− 1) of yet
unused (t−1)-vintage capital, u(t+1, 0, t−1) > 0, requires that β{λ(t+1)−d(t−1)ǫ(t+
1) + π(0)q(t+ 1, 1, t− 1)} = q(t, 0, t− 1). The utilization of capacity K(t+ 1, 1, t− 1) of
the same vintage regarding the portion of capital used at t, that is, u(t+ 1, 1, t− 1) > 0,
satisfies β{λ(t+ 1)− d(t− 1)ǫ(t+ 1)} = q(t, 1, t− 1). Then
q(t, 1, t− 1) + βπ(0)q(t+ 1, 1, t− 1) = q(t, 0, t− 1)
all t ≥ 0. The valuation principle implies that q(t, 1, t − 2) ≤ q(t, 1, t− 1) if d(t − 2) ≥
d(t− 1). Underutilization of capacity K(t, 1, t−2) > 0, that is, u(t, 1, t−2) < 1, requires
that λ(t) − d(t − 2)ǫ(t) ≤ γ(1)q(t, 1, t − 2) since π(1) = 0. Combination of (2.37), the
comparison q(t, 0, t− 1) ≤ q(t, 0, t) of shadow prices of different vintages, the comparison
q(t, 1, t − 2) ≤ q(t, 1, t− 1) of shadow prices of different vintages, and the necessary
condition for u(t, 1, t−2) < 1, yield θ(t) ≥ θ∗(1, t−2) with βγ(1)q(t+ 1, 1, t− 1) in place
of q(t, 1, t− 1) all t ≥ 0. The necessary condition q(t, 1, t− 1) = βγ(1)q(t+ 1, 1, t− 1) for
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u(t + 1, 1, t− 1) < 1 implies that θ(t) ≥ θ∗(1, t− 2). For θ(t) ∈ [θ∗(1, t− 2), θ∗(0, t− 1))
underutilization of vintage (t − 1) at t and (t + 1) is not optimal while the necessary
conditions for optimal utilization of these vintages at (t+1) and underutilization of vintage
(t− 2) at t hold if d(v − 1) > d(v) and γ(0) = γ(1). For θ(t) ∈ [θ∗(0, t− 1), θ∗(1, t− 2))
the necessary conditions for optimal underutilization of vintage (t − 1) at t and (t + 1)
hold and utilization of those vintages at (t+ 1) and underutilization of vintage (t− 2) at
t is not optimal if d(v − 1) = d(v) and γ(0) > γ(1). Q.E.D.
The improvement in the emission intensity of output favours underutilizing old vin-
tages to use relatively unpolluting technology—in the first case in the proposition. The
increasing depreciation of unused capacity in the number of periods used yields incentives
to underutilize young vintages to forward capital with relatively large productivity—in
the second case in the proposition. At the initial date use and vintage are negatively
correlated, and age and use are positively correlated, if capital was fully utilized before
optimization of pollution. The effects of use or vintage on the emission intensity of output
and of age or use on the retained fraction of productivity of unused capacity thus have
counterveiling effects on the age of underutilized plants.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the optimal and competitive equilibrium retirement of capital
in controlling an environmental stock. Underutilization that postpones the capital use
widens the policy space compared to previous literature in managing an environmental
stock that causes an externality, for example accumulated carbon dioxide that affects the
climate. Pre-installed dirty technology capital, such as fossil-fuel using plants and engines,
may be efficiently underutilized. (i) All or some of it is idle forever because capital in clean
technology, for example, renewable energy technologies, should be growing to increase the
cost of polluting through investment-related emissions, or (ii) the dirty technology capital
is underutilized early until investment in dirty technology becomes worthwhile and both
dirty and clean technology are used in the long-term. The emissions from investing
in clean renewable energy technologies, for example, in steel and cement production,
rationalize the former path in controlling climate change. This path requires that large
renewable energy capacities can be constructed at sufficiently low cost. Technological
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improvement in recent years may have made this feasible or technological progress in
the near future may make it feasible. Otherwise, when clean technology is insufficiently
productive at large scale, the latter path seems relevant from today’s perspective. On
this path at some date the dirty technology capital stock is run down sufficiently so that
its investment becomes worthwhile given the technology is used in the long-term. Dirty
technology capital is idle on a path when clean technology capital decreases toward its
long-term level. This path arises given the same parameters as in (i) and sufficiently large
initial clean technology capacity. Some low-productivity clean technology capital, such as
solar panels and wind turbines in low-harvest areas, are optimally underutilized if there
is much capital in more productive clean technology types, such as high-yield renewable
energy harvests. The reasons are the environmental impact of replacing pre-installed
low-productivity capital and the high cost to construct it relative to its depreciation
when stored unused. The underutilization of clean technology capital is temporary and
occurs only if all pre-existing dirty technology capital is idle forever given the plausible
assumption that unused solar panels and wind turbines depreciate relatively faster than
mothballed coal power plants. This points to the future if governments continue to
push expensive renewable energy technologies and there is sufficient capacity of least-cost
renewable energy technologies. All capital is fully utilized in an equilibrium subject to
no taxes or subsidies. Delayed government policy leads to underutilized dirty technology
capital in an optimal policy because too much of it is built when emissions pricing is
absent. A Pigouvian tax implements an optimum.
Underutilization of fossil-fuel using capital prevents a climate catastrophe when full
utilization would lead to it. This occurs when atmospheric carbon, pollution in the terms
here, is greater than its efficient long-term level. Dirty capacity is optimally underutilized
when pollution is below or above this level. The atmospheric carbon stock may be below
its optimized long-term level. However room for additional emissions may be limited by
past emissions that accumulate with a lag. I refer to an extension in Chapter 1.
Optimal utilization heavily depends on the current capital stock, rather than on the
current environmental stock as found in a fishery model in Clark et al. (1979) and Boyce
(1995). Here storage of unused capital smooths the capital sequence toward its long-
term level since the benefit of consuming is the opportunity cost of investing output or
storing capacity. The fishing vessels are underutilized only if the fish stock is smaller
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than its optimum long-term level because the marginal cost of investment is exogenous.
At sufficiently large installed dirty technology capital no investment in dirty technology
is warranted. Investment in dirty technology is lacking for small and large levels of
environmental quality unlike in the partial equilibrium fishery where investment is efficient
only if the fish stock is greater than or equal to its long-term level, again because here the
marginal cost of investment depends on the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
of consumption and there the marginal cost of investment is constant or depends only
on the level of investment. The present study and their model differ in the regeneration
function of the environment. An analogue to an equilibrium with uncompensated adverse
impacts of pollution is the open-access situation in a fishery. A difference lies in the
motion from such a situation to an optimum. Here underutilization becomes necessary
to attain a social optimum after sufficiently long absence of emissions pricing (delayed
government policy) in the decentralized economy. In contrast, the regeneration function of
biomass usually leads to a rest point in the open-access regime that is efficiently escapable
with full utilization. Optimal underutilization of dirty technology capital is restricted to
a closed early time interval of the planning horizon if this technology is used in the
long-term whereas underutilization can be optimal after full utilization in Clark et al.
(1979). This difference emerges because here storage and utilization are linked so that
capital tomorrow given full utilization today requires investment today while there capital
depreciates less than fully regardless of utilization, and the utilization critically depends
on the environmental stock, so the use of capital given no investment can deplete the fish
stock and underutilization can follow full utilization.
The growth effects of delayed government policy on dirty output before a regime change
to an optimal plan may lend controversy to the debate on climate change. In simulations
I find that (1) emissions first increase from a low level when dirty technology capital
is underutilized and then decrease when dirty technology capital is fully utilized in the
optimum whereas emissions decrease from a high level in the constrained optimum with
assumed full utilization starting at the same pollution and capital stock amounts, (2) the
Pigouvian tax, which is proportional to the cost of polluting, is lower in these early periods
in the optimum than in the constrained optimum, because underutilization mitigates
societal effects of pollution, and (3) expensive clean technologies are not needed when the
utilization of dirty technology capital can be chosen compared to when it is fully utilized
by assumption, because of the mitigation.
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The model has two limitations. The linear production functions that convert a common
factor into new capital units and that use this capital to produce the factor absent effects
of pollution on output lend the closed form solution to a critical level of the cost of pollut-
ing at which both investment and underutilization in the dirty technology are optimal and
its critical level at which dirty technology capital should not be used. These parametric
levels are helpful in proving results about the timing of utilization of dirty technology
capital and finding different regions of underutilized and utilized (dirty or clean) tech-
nology capital in the state space. As a result of the linearity, dirty technology capital is
efficiently underutilized when government policy is sufficiently long delayed given dirty
technology capacity can become sufficiently large. One question for further research is un-
der what conditions does a laissez-faire economy converge in the long-term to a state that
is characterized by efficient underutilization when there are decreasing returns to scale in
using the factor in producing consumption goods and investment goods. In addition this
analysis may be useful to determine if the environmental regeneration function alone is
responsible for the difference to the fishery example regarding the optimal utilization in
a laissez-faire steady state. In the model pollution affects utility. The level of the cost
of polluting for optimal joint investment and underutilization in the dirty technology is
smaller for greater pollution if pollution affects output. This effect retains the importance
of the dirty technology capital stock for its underutilization when pollution is below its
optimal long-term level, when the pollution effect on output is limited from above for
small pollution. Implications of this effect for optimal utilization in a laissez-faire state
in the long-term may be researched in further work.
There is an equivalence in the model between all machines being utilized at some
fraction and this fraction of all machines producing and the remainder of machines being
idle. The latter makes recycling possible. Unused capital may be saved for later use
rather than being decommissioned assuming that pausing is less costly than recycling, for
example from dirty technology to clean technology. Further research may find the margins
of optimal pausing and recycling. Idle dirty technology capital could be recycled.
The analysis assumed equally endowed households. The postponement of use of dirty
technology capital has likely only mild distributional effects in reality, because its im-
provement in the emission intensity over vintages and its greater depreciation of unused
units that are older because they have been used more often have opposite effects on
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the optimal age of underutilized plants and engines. The idling of pre-installed capital
has relative wealth effects between households in reality depending on the endowments of
idle and utilized units if policy that implements the underutilization is not accompanied
by compensating asset owners for foregone revenue. This might be important, because
energy-use capital, such as buildings, equipment, and roads, is underutilized when en-
ergy production capital is underutilized in the initial period in a model with energy-use
capital that is putty-clay in terms of its energy efficiency. Thus a considerable portion
of aggregate wealth may be affected. Further research should examine if some types of
energy-use capital are optimally idle forever if some fossil-fuel using capital is optimally
idle forever.
The efficient stranding of assets suggests a political economy dimension to the climate
problem worth studying. In some environmental problems capital can be modified at low
cost to reduce negative environmental effects of capital use—through catalyst in vehicles
whose use pollutes air locally, scrubbers in coal power plants that emit sulfur dioxide,
and equipment in plants that produce refrigerants responsible for ozone depletion in the
atmosphere, or replaced at low cost—lead-containing water pipes. In a fishery capital
that is efficiently underutilized may have little value if it was fully utilized—old fishing
boats. In contrast, fossil-fuel using plants and engines likely cannot be converted into
zero-emissions capital at low cost (but there is a call for research on determining the
cost), alternative renewable energy technology is more expensive at large scale, and re-
cently constructed buildings, coal power plants and vehicles have a high market use value.
While ownership and use of capital span globally, the stranding of installed capital is ef-
ficient with or without effects of carbon on households in different regions that have own
governments. Because of these characteristics an international agreement among the main
emitters on emissions plans may be slower for climate change than for the transboundary
problem of acid rain and global problem of ozone-depleting substances. Compensation of
foregone revenue to implement an optimum is an avenue for future research to explain
the lack of government policy that excludes it and improve upon it. Second government
policy that implements underutilization of fossil-fuel capital may motivate the observed
lobbying interest in carbon storage and air capturing. The efficiency of investment in
such technologies to prolong the use of pre-installed capital or perpetuate investment in
fossil-fuel technology in the realm presented here is a topic for further research.
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There are two cases of stranded assets though the environment can fully revert to
non-hazardous levels. In the first case, capital of dirty technology is underutilized at all
dates and does not receive additions through investment. The same rationale may hold
given uncertain clean technology improvements as a topic for future research. In the
second case capital depreciates regardless of its utilization and is efficiently underutilized
in the initial period. In contrast, some climate-policy discussants argue in favour of
retiring (expected future) rents from extracting fossil fuels to prepare for uncompensated
Pigouvian climate policy because more carbon may be valued in assets today than should
be used in the future since the effects of carbon may become irreversible beyond some
carbon level (Carbon Tracker & Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment 2013), or to make efficient climate policy with compensation under spillovers
(Bo¨hm 1993, Hoel 1994, Harstad 2012).
Empirical work is needed to find if underutilization of capital in energy production
or energy use is currently optimal, or when it will be optimal under given courses of
government policy. Such work may use several extensions of the present chapter.
2.6 Appendix A: Properties of Pareto optimal allocation
Multiple technologies. The following provides a composition of the vector G of in-
equality constraints and derives the transversality conditions which are helpful in prov-
ing the uniqueness of an optimal plan. Let u be the matrix with utilization rates
of technologies with positive capital on the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere, de-
note e as the column vector of ones, and let I be the identity matrix. Then G =
[
∑
j(ujKj−xj)−c/B; x; ue; (I−u)e;K] using vectorsK of capital and x of input in invest-
ment. A planner chooses a sequence of control variables to maximize J = limT→∞ J(T )
given values of inherited pollution and capital stocks at date zero, where
J(T ) =
T−1∑
t=0
βt{H (t)− ǫ(t)[Z(t)− Z(t+ 1)] +
∑
j
qj(t)[Kj(t)−Kj(t+ 1)]
+ βwj(t+ 1)[K¯j −Kj(t+ 1)] + w(t)G(t)}+ β
T [v(T ) + w(T )G(T )]
contains the current value Hamiltonian function H (t) = U(c(t), Z(t)) − ǫ(t)rZ(t) +∑
j qj(t)rKj(t), all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Here v(T ) is some function of (Z(T ), K(T )). Then an
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optimal plan satisfies the transversality conditions limt→∞ β
tǫ(t) = 0 and
lim
t→∞
βt[qj(t) + βwj(t+ 1)] ≥ 0, lim
t→∞
βt[qj(t) + βwj(t+ 1)]Kj(t+ 1) = 0 (A-3)
based on the following arguments. 1. Pollution. Define λZ and λKj as the multipliers on
the nonnegativity constraints Z ≥ 0 (if one imposes it, to show that it does not matter)
andKj ≥ 0, respectively. The differential of the limit of the present value function β
Tv(T )
as T tends to infinity with respect to economic state variables Z(T ) and Kj(T ) is zero if
β < 1. Then λZ ≥ 0, ǫ ≥ 0, and the differential
∂
∂Z(T )
lim
T→∞
J(T ) = lim
T→∞
βT−1{βλZ(T ) + ǫ(T − 1)} = 0,
imply that the present value shadow price of pollution is zero in the long-term. 2. Avail-
able capital. The nonnegativity of λKj , the differential
∂
∂Kj(T )
lim
T→∞
J(T ) = lim
T→∞
βT−1{βλKj(T )− qj(T − 1)− βwj(T )} = 0,
and the nonnegativity constraints on capital, imply (A-3). The sum of the discounted
shadow price of capital and discounted land rental rate is nonnegative.
In the Section 2.4.2 the constraint uRKR − αBuBKB ≥ 0 is added to G all t ≥ 0.
The following lemma establishes the sufficiency of necessary optimality conditions, and
conditions for uniqueness of an optimal plan. This lemma was written earlier for a
version with delay τ of emissions on pollution. (i)-(iv) refers to the necessary optimality
conditions (2.6)-(2.8).
Lemma 2.7 A plan that satisfies the necessary conditions (i)-(iv) and the transversality
conditions (A-3) maximizes J . A unique plan maximizes J if U or A is strictly concave
in Z at any Z.
Proof. Any feasible control v(t) = (c(t), x(t), u(t)) uniquely maps feasible (Z(t+τ), K(t))
into feasible (Z(t+ τ + 1), K(t+ 1)). Thus an admissable sequence {v(t)}∞t=0 determines
a unique sequence of state variables, in each period on R× [0, K¯B]× [0, K¯C], given initial
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values (Z(τ), K(0)). The choice v˜(0) maximizes
L (0) = U(c(0), Z(0))− ǫ(0)rZ(Z(0), K(0), v(0))
+ q(0)rK(K(0), v(0)) + w(0)G(K(0), v(0))
at given costate variable values ǫ(0) and q(0) and Lagrange multpliers w(0) if v˜(0) satisfies
(i) of the maximum principle for t = 0. Thus
U(c(0), Z(0))− U(c˜(0), Z(0)) ≤ ǫ(0)[Z(1)− Z˜(1)]− q(0)[K(1)− K˜(1)]
follows from definition of rZ , rK , and ǫ(0) = β
τ ǫ∗(τ). Let the state variables Zτ (t) =
(Z(t), Z(t+1), . . . , Z(t+ τ)) and Kτ (t) = (K(t− τ), K(t− τ +1), . . . , K(t)) for t ≥ τ + 1
arise from a particular choice (v(0), v(1), . . .). The function
Lτ (t) =
t+τ∑
s=t
βs−t
{
U(c(s), Z(s))− ǫ∗(s)rZ(Z(s), K(s− τ), v(s− τ))
+ β−τq(s− τ)rK(K(s− τ), v(s− τ)) + β
−τw(s− τ)G(K(s− τ), v(s− τ))
}
is jointly concave with respect to all state variables that are its arguments in (Z˜τ (t), K˜τ (t))
if one of these state variable values is interior because U and A are concave in Z. Thus
interior pollution all t ≥ τ + 1 implies concavity. Furthermore strict concavity follows if
U or A is strictly concave in Z. The function Lτ (t) is differentiable with respect to state
variables since U and A are differentiable with respect to pollution. Then
Lτ (Zτ (t), Kτ (t), . . .) ≤ Lτ (Z˜τ (t), K˜τ (t), . . .)
+
t+τ∑
s=t
∂L
∂Z(s)
(Z˜τ (t), K˜τ (t), . . .)[Z(s)− Z˜(s)]
+
∂L
∂K(s− τ)
(Z˜τ (t), K˜τ (t), . . .)[K(s− τ)− K˜(s− τ)]
given (ǫ∗(t), ǫ∗(t + 1), . . . , ǫ∗(t + τ), q(t − τ), q(t − τ + 1), . . . , q(t)), holds at strict in-
equality if U or A is strictly concave in Z. The classic proof of Arrow’s Theorem in a
(continuous time) setting without delay defines L0(t) as a Lagrange function that con-
temporaneous control variables maximize, and invokes an envelope condition to show
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that the partial differential of L0(t) with respect to a contemporaneous state variable
involves a necessary adjoint equation from the maximum principle. The necessary con-
dition with respect to v(t) does not seem to be a prerequisite for construction of some
function that is concave in state variables and whose differential with respect to any such
state variable involves a necessary condition at given values of control variables. Here
consumption (c(t), c(t + 1), . . . , c(t + τ)) does not maximize Lτ (t) if τ ≥ 1, so that the
necessary condition of maximization of some function with respect to v(t) is not used,
except at t = 0. The differentials ∂Lτ (Z˜τ (t), K˜τ (t), . . .)/∂Z(s) = ǫ
∗(s) − β−1ǫ∗(s − 1)
and ∂Lτ (Z˜τ (t), K˜τ (t), . . .)/∂K(s− τ) = β
−τ [β−1q(s− τ − 1)− q(s− τ)] for t ≤ s ≤ t+ τ
evaluated at (Z˜τ (t), K˜τ (t)) represent conditions (ii) of the maximum principle. (If U is
additively separable in functions of each c and Z then a function Lτ (t) of (Z(t+τ), K(t))
is definable that v(t) maximizes). Rearranging and simplifying terms yields
t+τ∑
s=t
βs−t[U(c(s), Z(s))− U(c˜(s), Z˜(s))]
≤ ǫ(t)[Z(t+ τ + 1)− Z˜(t+ τ + 1)]− β−1ǫ∗(t− 1)[Z(t)− Z˜(t)]
−q(t)[K(t+ 1)− K˜(t+ 1)] + β−τ−1q(t− τ − 1)[K(t− τ)− K˜(t− τ)]
for t = τ +1, 2τ +2, 3τ +3, . . .. Then summation of these discounted terms over t implies
that
∞∑
t=τ+1
βt[U(c˜(t), Z˜(t))− U(c(t), Z(t))]
≥ lim
t→∞
βt{−ǫ(t)[Z(t+ τ + 1)− Z˜(t+ τ + 1)] + q(t)[K(t+ 1)− K˜(t+ 1)]}
+βτ ǫ∗(τ)[Z(τ + 1)− Z˜(τ + 1)]− q(0)[K(1)− K˜(1)]
where ǫ(t) = βtǫ∗(t + τ). The limit of the product of the respective discounted shadow
price ǫ(t) and pollution Z˜(t+ τ + 1) vanishes if the transversality condition with respect
to pollution holds given policy indexed by tilde. The limit term limt→∞[−β
tq(t)K˜(t+1)]
can be replaced by limt→∞ β
t+1w(t+ 1)K˜(t+1) ≥ 0 if the transversality conditions (A-3)
hold for the policy v˜(t), t = 0, 1, . . .. Then addition to the difference of utility at t = 0
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yields
U(c˜(0), Z˜(0))− U(c(0), Z(0)) +
∞∑
t=τ+1
βt[U(c˜(t), Z˜(t))− U(c(t), Z(t))]
≥ lim
t→∞
βt{−ǫ(t)Z(t+ τ + 1) + q(t)K(t+ 1) + βw(t+ 1)K˜(t+ 1)}
at strict inequality if U or A is strictly concave in Z. The results follow if the limit of the
discounted value of pollution is zero, because then the latter line is nonnegative. The limit
is nonnegative if Z is bounded from above since the limit of the shadow price of pollution
is zero. Now Z is bounded from above on any feasible plan because the capacities to
produce output are bounded from above. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. (i) Existence. A plan satisfies feasibility conditions and
yields finite welfare J . The policy c(t) = B(1− 1/QB)min(KB(0)+KC(0), K¯B), xB(t) =
(1/QB)min(KB(0) + KC(0), K¯B), xC(t) = 0, uB(t) = 1 for t ≥ 0, and uC(0) = 1 if
KC(0) > 0, is feasible, and yields finite J . Thus not all policies yield welfare −∞. There
is at least one plan that cannot be improved upon because the compact state space,
feasible choices of control variables (c, x, u) in closed and bounded sets, and discounting
imply that J is bounded from above, the utility function U is continuous in c and Z. (ii)
Uniqueness. By Lemma 2.7 a plan that satisfies the necessary conditions (i)-(iv) and the
transversality conditions maximizes J , and uniquely so if U or A is strictly concave in Z
at any Z. This follows because emissions have immediate impacts on pollution. For any
state (Z,KB, KC)(t) a policy at t maps one-to-one into the state (Z,KB, KC) at (t+ 1).
Thus, the optimal state trajectory is unique. Q.E.D.
The convexity of the correspondence of current states that describes the feasible set of
successor states, and the strict concavity of utility in consumption, are not sufficient for
a unique optimal plan with an interval of underutilization, when proposing two policies
and examining a convex combination. The reason is that technology j’s output in period
(t + 1) is proportional to uj(t + 1)(1 − uj(t)). Chow (1997) uses a perturbation of J
evaluated at a given policy that satisfies necessary optimality conditions to argue that
the optimal plan is unique given convex transition laws and concave return function both
in controls and states. This method does not apply at corner solutions, for example, with
idle capital, fully utilized capital, or no investment.
Depreciation and clean technology productivity. Condition 2.1 or 2.2 can be
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used to prove full utilization of dirty technology capital after investment in the dirty
technology. The next lemma shows the result R(t+1) > γB that is useful given emission-
free investment.
Lemma 2.8 The shadow return exceeds the retained portion of unused dirty capacity,
R(t + 1) > γB, if Condition 2.1 holds, dirty capacity KB(t) > 0 is utilized, uB(t) > 0,
and dirty capacity KB(t+ 1) is smaller than its upper bound K¯B.
Proof. Pollution Z(t+1) is free. Thus (2.5) and Condition 2.1 imply that ǫ(t) > βγBǫ(t+
1). Then uB(t) > 0 in (2.8) shows that βγB(λ(t+1)−bǫ(t+1))−βwB(t+ 1) ≤ γBqB(t) ≤
λ(t)−bǫ(t) given wB(t+1) = 0. Thus (B/b)(R(t+1)−γB) ≥ (ǫ(t)/βǫ(t+ 1)− γB)θ(t+ 1)
implies the result. Q.E.D.
This lemma implies an upper bound on the growth of the cost of polluting, that the
path in Proposition 2.2 with increasing cost of polluting satisfies. The inverse of the
growth rate of the discounted willingness to pay to reduce pollution, (βǫ(t+1)/ǫ(t))−1, is
bounded from below by a greater amount γB, provided that pollution is persistent relative
to capital, if postponing the use of capital is more attractive to mitigate this cost, γB is
greater.
Lemma 2.9 The relation γj(B+ ρjθ(t+1)) ≥ R(t+ 1)(B + ρjθ(t)) holds if investment,
xj(t) > 0, preceded underutilization of capital Kj(t+ 1) > 0, uj(t+ 1) < 1.
Proof. Investment in period t implies that Kj(t + 1) > 0. Underutilizing Kj(t + 1) > 0
requires that βγjqj(t + 1) = qj(t) from (2.8). Then investment satisfies βγj(λ(t + 1) +
ρjǫ(t+ 1)) ≥ βγjQjqj(t+ 1) = Qjqj(t) = λ(t) + ρjǫ(t) by (2.7). Q.E.D.
Then Condition 2.1 can be used in an economy without emissions from investment in
the dirty technology to derive full utilization after investment in the dirty technology.
The following interprets Condition 2.2 and examines its plausibility within the model.
This assumption means that large investment in clean technology is feasible at suffi-
ciently large productivity so that the return on investment in clean technology, QC/(1 +
(ρC/B)θ(t)) does not exceed the marginal rate of substitution of consumption R(t + 1).
The first inequality in Condition 2.2 tells that this rate of return on investing in clean
technology at t is greater than the rate of return from storing dirty technology capi-
tal, γB, when θ(t) ≤ θB. This relation is needed if dirty technology is relatively less
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emission-intensive in investment. The second inequality in Condition 2.2 implies that
investing in clean technology is preferable to investing in dirty technology at a date
(t− 1), QC/(1 + (ρC/B)θ(t− 1)) > QB(1− (b/B)θ(t))/(1 + (ρB/B)θ(t− 1)), if θ(t) ≥ θB
and dirty technology is relatively more emission-intensive in investment. These condi-
tions coincide if ρC = ρB by definition of θB. If QC < QB then the first inequality
QC > γB(1 + (ρC/B)θB) requires that γB(ρC − ρB) < QBdB, which is consistent with
ρC − ρB < βdBQB. This plausible relation means that clean technology is less polluting
than dirty technology. The second inequality QC > QB(1− (dB/B)θB) is consistent with
ρB ≥ 0 and QB > γB.
Lemma 2.10 Pollution increases on {t′, t′ + 1, . . . , t′′} if Z(t′ − 1) < Z(t′), and (i)
emissions strictly increase, E(t − 1) < E(t), and A(Z) = Z or (ii) emissions weakly
increase, E(t− 1) ≤ E(t), and A(Z) < Z.
Proof. (i) A(Z) = Z. The result is obvious. (ii) A(Z) < Z. Then (Z − A(Z)) strictly
increases in Z. Thus Z(t′) − A(Z(t′)) > Z(t′ − 1) − A(Z(t′ − 1)). Put this to use in
Z(t′) + [E(t′ − 1) − A(Z(t′))] > E(t′ − 1) + Z(t′ − 1) − A(Z(t′ − 1)) = Z(t′) so that
A(Z(t′)) < E(t′ − 1) ≤ E(t′) yields that Z(t′) < Z(t′ + 1). Induction implies the result.
Q.E.D.
2.7 Appendix B: Algorithms
(i) Strictly concave utility in pollution and one clean technology. Values for θB range from
about 10 to 30 for γB ∈ [0, 1]. The number 15.46 results from the assumed γB = 0.72.
States with the cost of polluting θ(t) ≤ θB in constrained optimum are those in the region
R1 of investment and full utilization in the dirty technology in Figure 2.2. The stationary
point to which the trajectories converge is in this region because the cost of polluting at
a stationary point with investment in the dirty technology is less than θB. A corollary to
the first result in Lemma 2.1 is that dirty technology capital KB > 0 is fully utilized if
θ(t) < θB.
Now consider states with greater dirty capacity than in R1. A contraposition to the
second result in Lemma 2.1 is that either investment occurs and capital is idle, or no
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investment occurs, if θ(t) > θB.
41 Investment and idle capital, xB > 0 and uB = 0, for
KB close to its long-term level would yield a large change in the savings rate between
states that are close to each other—states for which full utilization is optimal and states
debated here, since clean technology capital is small in the example. This cannot be
optimal. One can disregard no investment and full utilization, xB = 0 and uB = 1,
because lower positive available investment levels were not chosen by the program in
solving the constrained problem. Then for θ(0) > θB at the solution to the constrained
problem capital is underutilized, uB(0) ∈ [0, 1), in the Pareto optimum. Thus the curve
for θB forms the boundary of the regions R1 of full utilization and investment (that
includes this curve) and R2 of partial utilization and investment.
Let S be a set of triples of pollution, dirty capacity, and clean capacity numbered
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , and denote by Si the feasible subset of states immediately following
state (Z(i), KB(i), KC(i)) ∈ S. The set of Si all i is a state correspondence. This set is
found by first computing emission levels from transitions Z = E(i)+(1−ϕ)Z(i) between
levels of pollution in a given set, building the corresponding set of dirty capacity levels
at full utilization, E(i) = buBKB(i) at uB = 1, and by blocking all transitions subject
to the resource constraint c/B + xB + xC = uBKB(i) + uCKC(i), and the transition law
Kj = γj(1− uj)Kj(i) +Qjxj for j ∈ J , but those with uB ∈ [0, 1], uC ∈ [0, 1], xB ≥ 0,
xC ≥ 0, and c > 0. Let v0 be some initial function of states. The algorithm for finding
an optimum is iterating on the problem
vs+1(Z(i), KB(i), KC(i))
= max
c,xB ,xC ,uB ,uC
{U(c, Z(i)) + βvs(Z,KB, KC)}
for (Z,KB, KC) ∈ Si all i increasing s ∈ N until the norm {
∑M
i=1(vs+1(i) − vs(i))
2}1/2
is smaller than the tolerance level 10−7. The constrained optimum results by setting
uB = uC = 1 to attain the state correspondence.
The optimum level θ(t) at a date before joint underutilization and investment results
from backward calculation using (2.9), while the optimum level θ(t) afterwards comes
from forward solving (2.10). The constrained optimal θ(t) for t ≥ 1 is the series that
solves (2.10) forward. The backward calculation using (2.11) yields very similar values.
41Closed orbits of pollution and capital with such idleness may satisfy some necessary optimality
conditions but violate the transversality condition of the shadow price of pollution.
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In the constrained optimum the initial level is unknown, so that comes from backward
solving (2.11) using a terminal date after plans have converged on the grid. The boundary
curves are obtained using the results in proving Proposition 2.5 by fitting state values to
the function KB = r1+(r2−Z)/(r3+Z) with the Gauss-Newton method. This function
yields a high coefficient of determination 0.90 (R1-R2) and 0.72 (R2-R3).
1. Compute θ(0) for all states and minimize the distance to θB for given Z to find states
with θ close to θB from constrained optimization.
2. Estimate the boundary of R1 and R2 using these states.
3. Find their successors. Set xB = 0 to compute the predecessors and use them to
estimate the boundary of R2 and R3.
Zero investment, xB = 0, is not feasible on the grid in the unconstrained optimization.
Inclusion of this value would increase the grid space enormously because only one control
governs the transitions of two states Z and KB when xB = 0 and uB ∈ (0, 1), so it is
better avoided. Instead the solution with xB = 0 is approximated by small positive xB.
The same problem with the grid space would arise if capital is fully utilized and there are
emissions of investment. This problem can be circumvented by the second specification.
(ii) Constant marginal utility of pollution and multiple clean technologies. Both utility
U and absorption A are linear in pollution. The environmental shadow cost ǫ(t) =
βd/(1 − β(1 − ϕ)) all t ≥ 0 uniquely solves the unstable difference equation (2.5) and
satisfies both ǫ(t) ≥ 0 and the transversality condition limt→∞ β
t−1ǫ˜(t) = 0 given ǫ = βǫ˜.
Let K = (KB,
∫
C
KCdC) collect the states dirty technology capital and aggregate clean
technology capital. The value function has the form v(Z,K) = v˜(K) − ǫ˜Z and satisfies
the Bellman equation
v˜(K) = max
c,x,u
{c1−ψ/(1− ψ)− ǫE + βv˜(K ′)}
subject to utility function c1−ψ/(1 − ψ) − ǫE and the same laws of motion of the states
where prime denotes next period. In this reduced problem the current utility depends on
consumption c and emissions E.
The laissez-faire trajectories solve the necessary equilibrium conditions. I deploy the
following method given the sum of the equation c/B + xB +
∫
C
xCdC = mB +
∫
C
mCdC
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from t = 0 to t = tB − 1 weighted by σt = (1/QB)
t.
1. Choose the least tB such that c(tB) = (βQB)
tB/ψc(0), using c(0) from
tB−1∑
t=0
σtc(t) + σtBK¯B = KB(0) +
tB−1∑
t=0
σt[KC(0)− xC(0)] + σtB−1i(tB − 1)
at i(tB − 1) =
∫
C
(xC(tB − 1)− xC(0))dC = 0, is greater than c(tB) from the policy
on {tB, tB + 1, . . .} given i(tB − 1) = 0 that grid search yields. Then increase tB to
the greatest number that satisfies KB(tB − 1) ≤ K¯B. The resulting consumption
amount exceeds c(tB) in the future-looking policy.
2. Find
∫
C
xC(tB − 1)dC and the future-looking policy including some grid points∫
C
xCdC ∈ [xℓ, xh]. Iterate on xℓ and xh until c(tB) = (βQB)
(tB−1)/ψ(βR(tB))
1/ψ
and c(tB) from the policy on {tB, tB+1, . . .} have sufficiently converged. The shadow
return R(tB) = Q(
∫
C
xC(tB − 1)dC)/(1+ (ρC/B)θ(tB)) is evaluated at the updated
policy
∫
C
xC(tB − 1)dC.
The constrained optimal resource policies result from a grid search as described in the
previous example to find v˜. The grid contains dirty capacity and aggregate clean ca-
pacity levels. Optimal policies that involve underutilization are computed using first-
order optimality conditions. The value of θB = ǫ/B(∂U/∂c) yields consumption c
∗ in
R2. Then consumption, input in investment of clean technologies, and the cost of pol-
luting can be solved backwards, for paths starting in R2 or R3, using the condition
βγB(B∂U/∂c(t + 1) − bǫ) = B∂U/∂c(t) − bǫ that is equivalent to (2.9). They can be
solved forward in R1 on these paths using (2.10). The boundary of R1 and R2 approxi-
mates grid points with consumption policy c∗ in the constrained optimization. Here states
with θ(0) close to θB are those with squared distance up to 0.1. The boundary of R2 and
R3 is found using the method in proving Proposition 2.5 given the successors KB(t + 1)
and
∫
C
KC(t+ 1)dC to the grid points with consumption policy c
∗. The utilization rates
on paths that start in R3 follow by examining the time span τ to the date of R2 and
successively raising τ until xB(τ) > 0 knowing the backward solution of consumption c
and input
∫
C
xCdC in clean technology investment, and the state
∫
C
KCdC.
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3Capacity planning with supply uncertainty
of clean technology
This chapter examines implications of daily average fluctuation of clean production for
the Pareto optimal distribution of consumption and investment and analyses government
policies that may or may not implement a Pareto optimum. The productivity of wind
and solar energy conversion into electricity varies over the course of a day, on average
daily within a season, and across seasons of the year. This production does not create
carbon dioxide emissions or fuel waste. Electricity production using fossil fuel or nuclear
material can be stable yet polluting. Using fossil fuels creates carbon dioxide emissions.
The use of nuclear fission technologies leaves radioactive spent fuel.
There are five major findings. (i) Consumption can be equalized across days because
investment absorbs the fluctuation in clean technology productivity in days in which con-
sumption is maximized. Dirty technology backs up production in days when the produc-
tivity of clean technology is low which leads to low consumption, yet the underutilization
of dirty technology capital in days when the clean technology’s productivity is high re-
quires optimally dissipating profit that implies maximum consumption and thus may not
smooth consumption across all days with different wind strengths in a long period in which
capital is built. (ii) I show the need of an excise tax or a contingent ad valorem tax rather
than a noncontingent ad valorem tax to implement contingent underutilization through
indirect taxes. These tax rates can be expressed in terms of the Pigouvian emissions
tax. (iii) A clean output subsidy can implement a Pareto optimum. This subsidy may
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rebate a uniform output tax or equipment tax, or be funded by a discriminatory surcharge
between households. In the former two systems a tax on capital purchases accounts for
the societal effects of emissions in building capital. Differentiating the surcharge between
households moves clean technology unit revenue closer to the price of its output than
under a uniform surcharge and does not affect the relative price of consumption goods
and investment goods. The system with output tax is preferred among these variants of
a tax-rebate system if dirty technology capital is unequally utilized across states of clean
technology productivity in optimum, because it induces the efficient utilization of capital.
The system with taxed investment to internalize both the marginal effects of emissions
in using and building capital does not induce underutilized capital. The system with sur-
charge and emissions tax that internalizes the externality in the investment sector does
not induce underutilized capital. (iv) Clean technology users may not know the state,
for example, cannot access wind forecasts, and clean output buyers that use equipment
may direct their demand to contingent prices. This information asymmetry does not
substantiate government intervention. Competitive distributors can stream contingent
payments into a stable price. (v) A clean technology output subsidy fully-funded with
uniform surcharges leads to overinvestment in both dirty and clean technology relative to
an optimum when the optimal marginal real rate of return on investment and a weakly
smaller portion of clean technology output relative to its optimal level are implemented.
Clean technology earnings are too large relative to the price of output, so that there is an
overinvestment in clean technologies. Then dirty technology output is too large given the
relation of relative output of dirty and clean technologies. Exempting investment goods
producers from the surcharge as practiced in Germany cannot implement the optimal real
rate of return on investment unless emissions in the investment sector are priced.
The desirable scale of clean energy depends on the relative cost of installing dirty and
clean technology capital and their available production capacities (Heal 2009). In partic-
ular, electricity can provide heating and cooling, light, and mechanical energy. Energy
from fluctuating renewables supply can be stored only expensively for later transforma-
tion into electrical energy. I do not consider storage (for example, in pumped water,
battery, or hydrogen) because it is currently expensive over many days independent on
the location. Therefore, the availability of clean energy harvests affects optimal policy.
I use an extension of Chapter 2’s model to multiple subperiods to analyse technology-
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specific investment and dispatch of capital use. The sequence of states is uncertain. A
given period is segmented into subperiods of which each exhibits a particular productivity
of clean technology capital. Users of dirty or clean technology output learn the clean
technology productivity before the capital utilization can be chosen.
Relation to literature. The paper relates to previous studies of the capacity uti-
lization of electricity generators, indirect taxation to internalize an externality, and fully-
funded subsidies to clean technology. The peak-load pricing literature reviewed by Crew
et al. (1995) uses models with efficient underutilization of capital motivated by time-
varying demand. This variation may be within each day. Capital is underutilized when
consumption is small. In Ambec & Crampes (2012) and the present paper varying success
of one technology, for example, across days, induces underutilization of capital of another
technology. Then capital is underutilized when consumption is large. Ambec & Crampes
(2012) view a technology with constant flow cost and fixed productivity and a technol-
ogy without flow cost and with uncertain productivity.1 There output is only consumed.
Here the use of output for consumption and investment implies that investment using
dirty technology output caps consumption in states in which otherwise dirty technology
capital was idle to smooth consumption across all states. Capital is underutilized in Am-
bec & Crampes (2012) because the flow cost (price of an input fuel) does not change in
response to a change in the price of the output. The latter change is induced by a change
in marginal utility of consumption when the productivity of installed clean technology
capital changes. In the present paper the general equilibrium relaxes the price rigidity so
that the environmental motive is the unique reason for underutilization.2 The necessary
equilibrium conditions provide a similar mechanism for underutilization to that under
constant input price. Marginal utility of consumption induces a price change while the
environmental cost is constant in a given period.
Garcia, Alzate & Barrera (2012) analyse capacity planning with uncertain positively
correlated supply in locations. A subsidy to clean technology output such as a feed-in tar-
1The flow cost of the reliable technology can be interpreted as the sum of fuel cost and environmental
cost. The competetive equilibrium allocation subject to no taxes and subsidies is not Pareto optimal if
there is an environmental cost. An earlier version of this paper extended Ambec & Crampes (2012) to
general convex environmental cost and analysed the planner problem.
2Capital is fully utilized if the environmental effect is not priced and dirty production uses comple-
mentary fuel, as in Ambec & Crampes (2012). I consider a fuel technology in an extension to make this
point.
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iff for grid-distributed electricity does not induce efficient investment in low-quality sites
because of rationing of the sites and variable capital per site.3 I find that a feed-in tariff
leads to investment in low-quality sites which is not efficient given production capacity
in high-quality sites is limited, which is plausible. In addition there is greater invest-
ment in dirty technology than in an optimum when trivially there is overinvestment in
clean technology and clean technology does not provide too much output relative to dirty
technology compared to an optimum. Garcia et al. (2012) conclude that a renewable
portfolio standard induces underinvestment in the constant-available technology disre-
garding the funding through government policy, whereas I find overinvestment because I
show that renewable portfolio standards with levies comprise a form of feed-in premiums
with equivalent effects as feed-in tariffs.
In the literature on tax-subsidy schemes to indirectly internalize an externality, a gen-
eral input or a specific output is taxed, which differs from how we shall see it done here.
A general output is taxed and a subsidy accrues to specific clean output generating an
offset because of the perfect substitutability of dirty and clean output. The dirty and
clean outputs can be viewed as specific inputs which are perfect substitutes in producing
the general output. In the model with a dirty and a clean good in Fullerton & Wolverton
(1999, 2000) the provision of the general factor is taxed and the clean good purchase
is subsidized. Curiously, Fullerton & Wolverton (2000) call this tax an output tax. In
the model with production externality in Fullerton & Wolverton (1999) there is a sales
tax of the good and a subsidy of the general (so-called clean) input that is an imperfect
substitute for waste in production.4 Walls & Palmer (2002) use a tax-subsidy system
to implement an optimum. Eskeland (1994) proposes combining a dirty goods tax and
a standard in controlling pollution. The tax literature lacks capital utilization which I
introduce to tax-rebate systems. This literature is informally motivated by costly moni-
toring of emissions when invoives for goods exist. The motivation here is an interest in
efficient tax-rebate systems with multiple technologies whose use requires an investment.
3A feed-in tariff is a price that a producer receives, for example, from a government, per unit of output
that is fed to a physical network, for example, an electricity grid.
4In their first model Fullerton & Wolverton (1999) assume equal productivities and thus miss that
the clean good may be taxed if clean technology is more productive than dirty technology provided
that the dirty and the clean good are imperfect substitutes in the utility function. The general results
of Wijkander (1985) apply using substitutability and complementarity defined in terms of cross price
elasticities of demand, which depend on the relative productivity.
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Bo¨hringer, Hoffmann & Rutherford (2007) document the effectiveness of feed-in tar-
iffs and renewable energy certificates in promoting renewable energy investments in the
European Union (EU). The present paper sheds light on the efficiency of these output
subsidies in a dynamic general equilibrium. In contrast to previous literature, a subsidy
can implement an optimum: coupled with a general output tax, or through discrimination
of the surcharge used to fund the subsidy. Canton & Johannesson Linde´n (2010) acknowl-
edge that a fully-funded feed-in tariff (FIT) distorts the price of renewable electricity, yet
do not derive outcomes. I characterize the distorted investment in a fully-funded system.
Canton & Johannesson Linde´n (2010) assert that premia and tariffs affect wholesale mar-
ket liquidity differently. Though this appears by definition I find that premia and tariffs
lead to the same outcomes, because they attain the same balancing rule of unit earnings
of the dirty and clean technology users. While I do not analyse tradeable emission per-
mits, the renewable portfolio standard motivates trade in renewable production credits.
In line with Bo¨hringer & Rosendahl (2010), these certificates and a uniform FIT financed
by consumer tax are equally effective in targeting a renewable energy output share.
Wind and solar power fluctuation. MacKay (2008) shows that wind turbines’
output in Ireland varies up to a factor of seven from one day to the next, which is
to say greatly. Availability of wind energy and solar energy is roughly certain in the
aggregate over many days. This motivates the following structure of uncertainty. A
given period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} has a constant number of subperiods equal to the positive
integer W . A state measures wind speed or solar radiation and maps one-to-one to the
set of productivity of technologies. Dirty technology productivity depends on the state
for notational convenience. Let s = {s1, s2, . . . , sW} be a sequence of states s ∈ S. The
union of all sequences s is sˆ = ∪isi. The order of states is uncertain yet there is certainty
regarding the frequency of states. Different sequences of the list S of all states with their
multiplicity can occur. Any state s appears at the same number in all s.
The next section characterizes planning of capacity and its utilization in dirty and clean
technologies subject to tax policy, presents government policy that implements a Pareto
optimum, and discusses the potential of feed-in premiums and feed-in tariffs to attain
an optimum. Section 3.2 extends the basic model to extraction costs, before Section 3.3
concludes with a discussion of results and usefulness of several government policies.
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3.1 The economy
Firms own productive capital, and households own claims to the profits of firms. There
are financial assets specific to firms, because firms may use capital in dirty and clean
technologies at different proportions, so that a differential rent of clean production can
create unequal profit across firms. Clean technology requires land which is not owned
and thus creates a rent. This land is a complementary production factor to capital that
is implicit through an upper bound on capital. Such land is not divisible by a large
number of firms. In particular, this is relevant when there are multiple clean technology
types, which I assume in discussing fully-funded subsidies to clean output. Consumption
goods that are produced in one subperiod cannot be stored. To begin with each one dirty
technology and one clean technology produce a good that is input in consumption and
investment. Definition of an equilibrium follows the description of the agents’ objectives
and constraints.
Households.—A unit mass of infinitely-lived households populates the economy. Let
c(t) = {c(s1, t), c(s2, t), . . . , c(sW , t)}∀s be the list of consumption of one household in
subperiods 1, 2, . . . ,W for all sequences s of states in period t. The welfare function
J =
∞∑
t=0
βtE
[
W∑
w=1
U(c(sw, t))−Ψ(Z(t))
]
represents preferences of each household over c(t) and pollution Z(t) for all periods t. The
period-utility function is an expected utility given beliefs over sˆ that the mathematical
expectation operator E expresses. There is no discounting across subperiods within a
given period. The discount factor regarding the periods is β ∈ (0, 1). The function U
is twice-differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave for positive consumption
c ∈ R+, ∂U/∂c > 0 > ∂
2U/∂c2 for c > 0. The function Ψ is twice-differentiable, strictly
increasing, and convex in pollution Z ∈ R+, thus ∂U/∂Z > 0 and ∂
2U/∂Z2 ≥ 0. Marginal
utility of consumption ∂U/∂c approaches a large positive value M as consumption tends
to zero, limc→0 ∂U/∂c = M ≤ ∞. Then consumption c of at least one household is
positive in a Pareto optimum in all periods.
All households have an equal endowment αi(0) of equity of each firm i for simplicity.
The ex-dividend price of firm i’s tradeable claim is qi(t) in period t. One claim pays di(t)
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units of account in period t. The contingent price of the consumption good is pˆ(sw, t).
The household chooses consumption {c(sw, t)}w=1,2,...,W and asset holdings αi(t + 1) all
t ≥ 0 to maximize welfare J subject to the sequence of budget constraints
W∑
w=1
pˆ(sw, t)c(sw, t) +
∑
i
qi(t)αi(t+ 1) ≤
∑
i
(qi(t) + di(t))αi(t) + tr(t) (3.1)
all s on {0, 1, . . .}, taking all prices, dividends, the government transfer tr, and pollution
as given. A household first learns the state. Then contracts about delivery of consumption
goods in each subperiod can be made contingent on the state. I assume markets in each
subperiod, and later use a contract to discuss an information asymmetry. Distributors
receive contingent payments and make contingent deliveries in such a contract.
Energy sector.—All firms have access to the same technologies J = {B,C} to produce
the factor energy, technologies to create investment goods for these technologies, and
one technology to produce consumption goods. First I describe the profits from using
the technologies to produce energy. Firm i demands yij(t) new equipment units at unit
cost pj(t) in period t. Production capacity of energy using technology j ∈ J is the
productivity χj(sw) times capital amount aij(t) ≥ 0 in subperiod w of period t. Energy
output mij(sw, t) ∈ [0, χj(sw)aij(t)] is lower than this capacity if the utilization rate
uij(sw, t) = mij(sw, t)/χj(sw)aij(t) ∈ [0, 1] is less than one.
5 Firm i’s physical capital in
technology j ∈ J follows the law of motion
aij(t+ 1) = γj(1−max
sw
uij(sw, t))aij(t) + yij(t) (3.2)
that depends on the maximum utilization rate maxw uij(sw, t) ∈ [0, 1] given that capital
is storable, γj > 0, which is assumed in the following. The capacity χj(sw)aij(t) was de-
noted capital Kij(t) in Chapter 2 where χj is constant. A firm can shift capital across its
own plants to accommodate any interior firm-wide utilization rate for simplicity.6 Some
5The United States Department of Energy (2010) uses a capacity factor in calculations of the levelized
cost of electricity. The technology-specific capacity factor here is χj(sw)/△ if the length of each subperiod
is △ and technology-specific capacity equals △aij(t). Such a factor is founded by the convention of
measuring capital under some technology-specific norm conditions of (fossil fuel or renewable energy)
input.
6The planner problem would be representable at the firm level rather than at the aggregate level
though all plants are built under constant returns to scale if capital in a firm was storable only if it was
idle, aij(t+ 1) = Iij(t)γjaij(t) + (1− Iij(t))yij(t) where Iij ∈ {0, 1} equals zero if and only if uij(t) > 0.
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production capacity is forwarded if capital aij(t) > 0 is underutilized in all subperiods,
uij(sw, t) < 1 all sw. In an equilibrium dirty technology capital may be efficiently un-
derutilized if its current level is larger than its long-term level, see Chapter 2. This is
expressed as a maximum utilization rate of dirty technology capital less than unity. There
is an additional incentive to underutilize dirty technology capital—to utilize it below the
maximum utilization rate, from the fluctuation of clean technology productivity, which
the present chapter addresses. In an equilibrium with constant investment over time only
the fluctuation of clean technology output yields incentives to underutilize dirty technol-
ogy capital. I focus on allocations in which dirty capacity is used in at least some state
in any period or or in the long-term. This rules out that some preinstalled dirty technol-
ogy capital is permanently idle and there is no investment in dirty technology such as in
Chapter 2. Dirty technology investment can be motivated as an insurance by sufficiently
low productivity of clean technology in some state. The industry capital constraint is
∞ > a¯j ≥
∑
i
aij(t+ 1) (3.3)
all t ≥ 0 for technology j ∈ J . The bound yields simultaneous use of multiple clean
technologies when otherwise investment in one clean technology would be preferred. Dirty
capacity utilization can be characterized assuming one clean technology. Analysis of fully-
funded subsidies to clean technology is conveniently done with multiple clean technology
types. The economy starts with positive capital,
∑
j
∑
i aij(0) > 0.
After accounting for taxes and subsidies the sale of an energy unit produced with tech-
nology j earns πj(sw, t). The composition of this unit net revenue depends on thegovern-
ment policy regime. Profit from using and investing in the dirty and clean technologies
is
Πij(t) =
W∑
w=1
πj(sw, t)mij(sw, t)− pj(t)yij(t), j ∈ J , (3.4)
for any realized sequence {s1, s2, . . . , sW} of states in period t ≥ 0.
Investment and consumption sectors.—Firm i demands xi(sw, t) ≥ 0 energy units,
chooses the proportion ηij(sw, t) ∈ [0, 1] of its use in the production of capital of technology
j, and produces consumption goods and investment goods under constant returns to scale.
The firm sells the consumption goods amount ci(sw, t) = B(1 −
∑
j ηij(sw, t))xi(sw, t)
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in subperiod w when the state is s and sells the investment goods amount yˆij(t) =
εj
∑W
w=1 ηij(sw, t)xi(sw, t) in period t. Then the consumption sector and the investment
sector yield profit
Πˆi(t) =
W∑
w=1
(pˆ(sw, t)ci(sw, t)− p(sw, t)xi(sw, t)) +
∑
j
ϕj(t)yˆij(t) (3.5)
for firm i in period t ≥ 0 given the unit price of energy p(sw, t) and the net revenue
for technology-specific capital units ϕj(t). There is no adjustment cost for varying the
input amounts in producing investment goods across subperiods. Such cost seems to
make optimal allocations dependent on the sequence of productivity, that is, the history
of states.
Problem of firms.—Firm i’s expected profit gross of equity trade
Πi(t) = E
[∑
j∈J
Πij(t) + Πˆi(t)
]
(3.6)
in any period t ≥ 0 sums profits from the sectors for energy, consumption, and investment
goods. Decision-making by firms is subject to the same belief that households have about
the distribution of states. The number of equity that firm i has issued is αˆi. Firm i
chooses input demands and output supplies, and issued equity αˆi(t+1), all t ∈ {0, 1, . . .},
to maximize the present discounted value of expected ex-dividend profits
vi =
∞∑
t=0
1∏t
v=0 Rˆ(v)
{Πi(t) + qi(t)αˆi(t+ 1)− (qi(t) + di(t))αˆi(t)}
subject to (3.2) and (3.3) all t ≥ 0 taking prices, dividends, governmnent policy rates,
and the endogenous nominal interest rate sequence {Rˆ(1), Rˆ(2), . . .} as given, where Rˆ(0)
is some given positive number.
Emissions and pollution.—The emissions in the use of technology B are proportional
to output at rate dB > 0. The use of technology C does not create emissions, dC = 0.
The production of capital may create emissions, which are proportional to the input
use xij(sw, t) = ηij(sw, t)xi(sw, t) in investment at rate ρj. This saves introducing another
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sector that produces material or uses capital.7 Let Z be pollution and A(Z) ≤ Z measure
absorption of pollution by the natural environment. Then the pollution stock Z evolves
according to
Z(t+ 1) = Z(t) + E(t)− A(Z(t)) (3.7)
all t ≥ 0 given Z(0). Aggregate emissions E(sw, t) =
∑
i
∑
j [djmij(sw, t) + ρjxij(sw, t)]
occur in state s in subperiod w. Following the definition of emissions E(t) =
∑W
w=1E(sw, t)
government policy can be described that implies certain net revenue streams. The role of
government policy is to internalize the production externality.
Government.—There are three regimes of government policy. (i) Producers of energy
using dirty technology and producers of investment goods pay the dollar tax τˆ per unit of
emissions. Then the net revenue of energy producers and investment goods producers is
πj(sw, t) = p(sw, t)−dj τˆ(t) and ϕj(t) = pj(t)−(ρj/εj)τˆ(t), respectively. An emissions tax
at the source is based on the principles of Pigou (1920). In the other two regimes I examine
the role of subsidies to clean technology output. (ii) Energy producers retain (p(sw, t)−
τ(t)) per unit of energy sold to users. Setting a dollar goods tax τ may be compared to
setting an ad valorem tax rate ν given by (1+ν(sw, t))(p(sw, t)− τ(t)) = p(sw, t). Energy
producers collect the unit dollar subsidy τ ∗j (t). Then πj(sw, t) = p(sw, t)/(1 + ν(sw, t)) +
τ ∗j (t). In contrast to Fullerton & Wolverton (1999) output that is produced using clean
and dirty inputs is taxed. There a good that is input in producing the dirty and the
clean good is taxed.8 Investment goods producers bill pj(t) = (1 + νˆj(t))ϕj(t) to energy
producers. The role of the dollar tax τˆj or ad valorem tax rate νˆj = τˆj/ϕj is to internalize
the externality from emissions in the investment sector. (iii) In the system with a tax
on investment goods and output subsidy the unit net revenue in energy production is
πj(sw, t) = p(sw, t) + τ
∗
j (t) and the unit cost of investment is pj(t) = (1 + νˆj(t))ϕj(t).
The output subsidy τ ∗j provides a rebate to users of clean technology for tax they have
paid when buying newly produced capital. The role of the ad valorem tax rate νˆj for
7Such material or capital may motivate a material goods tax or a tax on investment goods that are
used in the investment sector, respectively, to implement an optimum.
8Eskeland & Devarajan (1996) implement a social optimum through a dirty goods tax and no subsidies.
Extending their argument to multiple goods buyers pay a differentiated tax rate νj per portion of the
retained revenue of sellers. To have differentiated prices for perfect substitutes I would need to make the
assumption that buyers can distinguish perfectly substitutable goods by their production method. This
assumption is not necessary to implement an optimum through a tax collected from buyers if there is
one dirty good, because an equal tax rate for dirty and clean goods implements an optimum, and needed
if there are multiple dirty goods.
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investment goods is to internalize the externality of both emissions from using capital
and building capital.
The government sets tax rates and lump-sum transfers on {0, 1, . . .} before private
agents make decisions about demands and supplies. Policy satisfies the budget constraint
(i) tr(t) ≤
∑
w
τˆ(t)E(sw, t), (ii) tr(t) ≤
∑
j
τˆj(t)
∑
i
yˆij(t)
+
∑
j
(τ(t)− τ ∗j (t))
∑
w
∑
i
mij(sw, t) or
(iii) tr(t) +
∑
j
τ ∗j (t)
∑
w
∑
i
mij(sw, t) ≤
∑
j
τˆj(t)
∑
i
yˆij(t)
in the corresponding case all t ≥ 0. The dollar tax and subsidy rates vary only with
time t. The assumption of aggregate certainty implies that these government policy
variables, when implementing a Pareto optimum, are deterministic rather than a complete
contingent plan of policy rates.
Equilibrium.—Allocations are feasible if aggregate demand for each good at most equals
aggregate supply of each good, and securities holdings αi(t) of households equals the
number αˆi(t) of outstanding shares of firm i, all t ≥ 0. The feasibility conditions for
goods quantities are ∑
i
xi(sw, t) ≤
∑
i
∑
j∈J
mij(sw, t) ∀sw, (3.8)
for energy, and
∑
i
yij(t) ≤
∑
i
yˆij(t), j ∈ J , c(sw, t) ≤
∑
i
ci(sw, t) ∀sw, (3.9)
for the investment goods and the consumption good. An equilibrium is a system of prices
(p(sw, t), pˆ(sw, t), pB(t), pC(t), {qi(t)}∀ i, Rˆ) and quantities of goods demands and supplies,
and financial assets αi and αˆi, on {1, 2, . . . , N} × {0, 1, . . .} such that (i) the representa-
tive household and all firms solve their problems taking prices, dividends, interest rate,
government policy variables, and pollution as given, (ii) the government makes policy as
described above and satisfies the budget constraint at equality all ≥ 0, (iii) the law of
motion of pollution is (3.7), and (iv) demand equals supply on the goods markets and
αi(t) = αˆi(t) all i, all t ≥ 0. The remainder of this section is devoted to characterizing
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the distribution of consumption, investment, and capital utilization in an equilibrium,
and finding government policy that implements a Pareto optimum.
3.1.1 Equilibrium allocation
The subperiod in which a state occurs is irrelevant for decisions of households and firms.
Hence the index of the subperiod can be omitted when writing prices and quantities as
functions of the state. The second insight is the following. An equilibrium allocation can
be characterized in terms of utilized aggregate capital if all firms simultaneously maximize
the utilization rate of capital in at least one state. Then the firms do not necessarily fully
utilize capital in any subperiod. Let the set of states at t in which firm i’s utilization
is maximized be Sij(t) and the set of their occurrences be Sij(t). Firms may choose a
different maximum rate so that aggregate output is optimal given individual capital is
indeterminate. The necessary condition for profit-maximizing choice of capital aij(t+ 1)
of technology j ∈ J is
(1/Rˆ(t+ 1))
[∑
s∈S
χj(s)uij(s, t+ 1)πj(s, t+ 1)
+ γj(1−max
s
uij(s, t+ 1))υij(t+ 1)− wˆj(t+ 1)
]
≤ υij(t)
(3.10)
at shadow prices υij(t) of (3.2) and wˆj(t + 1) of (3.3). The marginal net benefit from
utilizing capital and forwarding unutilized capital at most equals the marginal cost of
holding capital. Using this the following lemma assures that firms maximize individual
output of any given technology in at least one common state. This may occur in multiple
states, for example, if capital is fully utilized in all states.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that there is output, uij(s, t) > 0 some i with aij(t) > 0 and some
s, in technology j ∈ J . Each firm i maximizes the utilization rate of capital aij(t) > 0
in at least one common state, that is, ∩iSij(t) 6= ∅ where Sij(t) = {s
∗ ∈ S : uij(s
∗, t) ≥
uij(s, t), ∀s ∈ S}.
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Proof. The condition (3.10) holds at equality if the respective capital is positive. The
utilization of firm i’s capital in state s satisfies
uij(s, t)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0

 =⇒ χj(s)πj(s, t)


≥
≥
T

 0, s ∈ Sij(t);
χj(s)πj(s, t)


not defined
=
≤

 0, s ∈ S \ Sij(t),
(3.11)
at date t ≥ 0. In addition,
max
s
uij(s, t)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0

 =⇒
∑
s∈Sij(t)
χj(s)πj(s, t)


≥
=
≤

 γjυij(t), (3.12)
holds in an equilibrium. Hence in at least one state s ∈ Sij(t) the net benefit wj(s, t) ≡
χj(s)πj(s, t) is strictly positive if some i’s maximum utilization rate at t is positive.
Suppose that maxs ukj(s, t) > 0 some k. Then wj(s, t) > 0 in at least some state s ∈ Skj(t)
implies that Akj = {wj(s, t) ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ Skj(t)} does not hold. However Akj is necessary if
any firm i with positive capital in technology j does not maximize its utilization rate in
any of the states in set Skj(t). Q.E.D.
The proof used vij(t) > 0. Thus I have ignored tax policy which makes utilization
unprofitable all time, implicitly by abstracting from such allocations in optimum. The
shadow price vij(t) of capital in technology j is identical for all producers i in equilibrium.
9
The following lemma helps to find the states in which investment occurs. The input
choice xij(s, t) in investment of technology j satisfies
εjϕj(t) ≤ p(s, t), (3.13)
9Equilibrium investment yij(t) ≥ 0 in technology j ∈ J satisfies υij(t) ≤ pj(t) at equality if yij(t) > 0
for some firm i. Thus the shadow prices υij(t) are identical for all firms i that use the technology
j ∈ J , if investment occurs at t. The choice of capital in period t ≥ 1, and the result that periods of
underutilization precede periods with full utilization, imply that the shadow prices υij(t) are idential if
no investment in technology j occurs at t.
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at equality if xij(s, t) > 0, all j ∈ J . Thus the unit price p(s, t) of energy must be
minimized in a state when investment occurs. Let ψ(t) be the marginal utility of income,
the Lagrangean multiplier of the budget constraint (3.1). The household equates marginal
utility of consumption and the marginal utility cost of spending income on an additional
unit of consumption,
∂U/∂c(s, t) = pˆ(s, t)ψ(t), (3.14)
all t ≥ 0. The firms’ choice of producing the consumption good implies that Bpˆ(s, t) =
p(s, t) because consumption is positive in each state. This leads to the following lemma
that the proof of the next proposition uses.
Lemma 3.2 Investment occurs in any technology, xij(s, t) > 0 some i and j ∈ J , only
in a state s in which consumption is maximized, c(s, t) ≥ c(t, s′), s 6= s′.
Proof. Combining the latter two results implies that B∂U/∂c(s, t) = p(s, t)ψ(t) all s ∈
S. Then the equilibrium condition (3.13) delivers the result since marginal utility of
consumption ∂U/∂c(s, t) strictly decreases in consumption. Q.E.D.
The household weighs utility from consuming in subperiods of the same period equally.
This yields a state-invariant relationship between the marginal utility of consumption and
the price of the consumption good. The opportunity cost of investment is minimized only
if consumption is maximized given adjustment costs are lacking. Thus investment occurs
only in states in which consumption is at its maximum level. I conjecture that investment
requires sufficiently large consumption if adjusting production inputs in investment across
subperiods is costly.
The previous lemmata on utilization and on investment, and the next proposition on
the utilization of capital, help to determine when consumption fluctuates. The maximum
utilization rate maxs uij(s, t) is less than one in some firm i only if the distributions of
consumption and investment over states are not constant over time t. Clearly, perma-
nent underutilization would mean excess investment which is not profit-maximizing if
consumption and investment did not vary across periods. The next proposition focuses
on the long-term as it is valid in an equilibrium with constant distribution of consump-
tion and investment, and possibly on other trajectories. Full utilization of capital
∑
i aiC
in some state rules out underutilization of clean technology capital in any state because
it was emission-intensive or currently installed with an average productivity less than
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γC ≤ γB, see Chapter 2. Let aggregate capital in technology j be aj =
∑
i aij and
consider regime (i) in which πj(s, t) = p(s, t)− dj τˆ(t).
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that each firm i fully utilizes capital aij(t) > 0 in some state,
maxs uij(s, t) = 1 all i and j ∈ {B,C}. Capital aj(t) > 0 is fully utilized in all states,
uij(s, t) = 1 all i and s ∈ S, j ∈ {B,C}, if the emissions tax rate is zero, τˆ(t) = 0.
Either (I) capital aj(t) > 0 is fully utilized in each state s all j ∈ {B,C}, or (II) this
holds for clean technology j = C, and dirty technology capital aB(t) > 0 is fully utilized,
uiB(s, t) = 1, all i for χC(s) ≤ χ
∗, and is underutilized, uiB(s, t) < 1, some i only if
χC(s) > χ
∗, for some χ∗ > 0, if the emssions tax rate is positive, τˆ(t) > 0.
Proof. Condition (3.11) implies that in absence of emissions pricing all firms fully utilize
capital, and under emissions pricing they fully utilize clean technology capital in all states.
Given full utilization in some state, the set S\SC(t) is empty since production using clean
technology does not create emissions, dC = 0. A utilization rate may be defined as unity,
uij(s, t) = 1, if capital is unproductive, χj(s) = 0. By Lemma 3.1 all firms fully utilize
capital in at least one common state. Then either (I) they do this in all states regarding
dirty technology so that its aggregate capital is fully utilized in all states and the first
result follows, or (II) in some states some firms underutilize dirty technology capital so
that its aggregate capital is underutilized. What remains to be shown is the nature of
the states with underutilization in (II). The individual utilization rate satisfies (3.11) and
(3.12) given wj(s, t) = χj(s) {B∂U/∂c(s, t)/ψ(t)− dj τˆ(t)} all j ∈ {B,C} for t ≥ 0 using
the firms’ optimality condition Bpˆ = p and the households’ optimality condition (3.14).
The net benefit of dirty technology use is positive, wB(s, t) > 0, for at least one s ∈ SiB(t)
if dirty technology capital aiB(t) > 0 is fully utilized in some state—in all states in SiB(t).
Thus wB(s
′′, t) ≤ 0 for some s′′, and thereby c(s, t) < c(s′′, t) if dirty technology capital
is underutilized in state s′′. By Lemma 3.2 investment does not occur in state s, that
is, xij(s, t) = 0 all i and j. Investment input xij(s, t) remains zero and consumption
c(s, t) = χBaB(t) + χC(s)aC(t) increases if χC(s) increases by a small amount. A unique
consumption amount c(s′, t) = ϕ(τˆ(t)) solves w(s′, t) = 0. The productivity χC(s) takes
the critical level such that the consumption amount in the state s is c(s′, t). Q.E.D.
Consumption may be the same in all subperiods (I-1) or fluctuate (I-2) when capital
is fully utilized in all states. In the subcase (I-1) investment may or may not occur
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Note: Capacity χ(s)a is depicted by points on solid curve, consumption c(s) is
minimum distance between dashed line and solid curve, and investment x(s) is
measured by length of dotted line.
Figure 3.1: Allocations with some variation in consumption.
in all states. In (I-2) investment does not occur in all states. Investment absorbs the
fluctuation in clean technology output in states in which consumption is equal.10 The left
panel in Figure 3.1 shows the pattern of consumption and investment in the case (I-2)
when consumption varies over states. Let χ(s) = (χB(s)χC(s)) and a = (aB; aC). The
aggregate capacity χ(s)a connected by the solid lines increases in the productivity of clean
technology capital. Consumption is the minimum distance between the horizontal axis
and the dashed line and the aggregate capacity. The dashed line designates maximum
consumption. The dotted lines measure investment x = xB+xC . Firms earn a positive net
revenue from using dirty technology in each state. Note that states can occur in any order
and multiplicity over time. Consumption is low in states with low productivity of clean
technology. This follows from the fact that investment does not occur if consumption is
not maximized and the property that dirty technology capital is fully utilized in all states.
In the right panel in Figure 3.1 dirty technology use earns its normal profit only in states
10Instead, consumption cannot be equal across subperiods if capital is fully utilized in all subperiods,
storage of output is infeasible, and output were only used for consumption, for example, in a partial
equilibrium setup with environmental motive, that abstracts from the source of new capital, or in a
general equilibrium model in which output cannot be feasibly used for investment. Firms only invest in
dirty technology if utilization of dirty technology capital is profitable in at least one state. Thus in such
an economy either dirty technology capital is fully utilized in all states so that consumption comoves with
clean technology output, or dirty technology capital is underutilized in some states and consumption is
not maximized when dirty technology capital is fully utilized.
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when there is no investment, because dirty technology capital is underutilized in some
states. This is an example of case (II) of Proposition 3.1. Insurance through excess supply
of dirty capacity in a state of high productivity of clean technology can be desirable if
clean technology is risky in terms of productivity. The right panel in Figure 3.1 shows
such a case. Consumption c(s, t) varies positively with clean technology productivity
χC(s) ≤ χ
∗. Output is not used for investment in these states. Consumption is at unique
maximum level in the other states. The input use for investment is arbitrarily distributed
over the subperiods of these states. In two states dirty technology capital is underutilized.
Dirty technology capital could be underutilized in all of the states in which capacity is
greater than maximum consumption, because the profit of using dirty technology capital is
zero in all these states. In Figure 3.1 investment absorbs the fluctuation in all subperiods
with maximum consumption except if this consumption level equals aggregate capacity,
because investment occurs when the opportunity cost of investing, which is proportional
to ∂U/∂c(s, t), is smallest.
One may ask whether consumption varies discontinuously with the state when there is
a continuous time span in each period. Suppose that consumption is maximized at the
smallest productivity χ∗ such that the net benefit is zero. If there was a continuum of
states then the net benefit does not need to jump to a strictly positive level as χC(s)
and consumption decrease. Condition (3.11) tells that the sum of net benefits in states
of maximized utilization, yet not the net benefit in all of these states, is strictly positive.
Consumption would vary continuously with clean technology productivity. If there is a
discrete number of states, then there may be only one state with positive net benefit.
The following section shows that contingent utilization can be optimal, and derives
the emissions price that implements a Pareto optimum with contingent or noncontingent
utilization, and policies in the other regimes that implement Pareto optimal allocations
in which dirty technology capital is equally utilized in all states. One further equilibrium
condition is useful for this. The household sets the intertemporal rate of substitution
equal to the marginal rate of return on investment, expressed in nominal terms as
ψ(t) = βψ(t+ 1)Rˆ(t+ 1), (3.15)
where Rˆ(t + 1) = (qi(t + 1) + di(t + 1))/qi(t) is the nominal gross return to savings in
period (t+ 1) all i of which households hold positive assets, αi(t+ 1) > 0.
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3.1.2 Welfare
A planner maximizes J =
∑∞
t=0 β
t[
∑
s∈S U(c(s, t)) − Ψ(Z(t))] subject to feasibility con-
straints. By Lemma 3.1 the planner can view the aggregation of the law of motion (3.2)
of capital over firms. Then the feasibility constraints are the laws of motion
aj(t+ 1) = γj(1−max
s
uj(s, t))aj(t) + εj
∑
s∈S
xj(s, t) (3.16)
of aggregate capital all j ∈ J and (3.7) of pollution subject to emissions amount E(t) =∑
j
∑
s∈S(djχj(s)uj(s, t)aj(t) + ρjxj(s, t)) all t ≥ 0, the constraint
a¯j ≥ aj(t+ 1) (3.17)
all t ≥ 0, and the resource constraint
c(s, t)/B +
∑
j
xj(s, t) ≤
∑
j
χj(s)uj(s, t)aj(t) ∀s ∈ S (3.18)
all t ≥ 0. The planner selects a policy of consumption, investment, and utilization rates
(c(s, t), x(s, t), u(s, t)) ∈ R3+ × [0, 1]
v all s ∈ S and t ≥ 0, where v is the number of
positive capital values at t. At least one of the stocks aB(0) and aC(0) in the given triple
(aB(0), aC(0), Z(0)) is positive. In a Pareto optimum the shadow price ǫ of the constraint
(3.7), the marginal welfare benefit of pollution reduction, takes a specific value in each
period that follows the difference equation ǫ(t) = β∂Ψ/∂Z(t + 1) + β(1 − ∂A/∂Z(t +
1))ǫ(t+1) all t ≥ 0.11 The necessary optimality condition with respect to capital aj(t+1)
is
β
[∑
s∈S
χj(s)uj(t+ 1) {B∂U/∂c(s, t+ 1)− djǫ(t+ 1)}
+ γj(1−max
s
uj(s, t+ 1))φj(t+ 1)− wj(t+ 1)
]
≤ φj(t),
(3.19)
11The term ∂Ψ/∂Z(t + 1) is replaced by the sum of marginal utility effects in these subperiods and
the shadow price ǫ is noncontingent if the period-utility function specified utility effects of pollution in
multiple subperiods of given productivity.
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at equality if aj(t + 1) > 0, given shadow prices φj(t) of (3.16) and wj(t + 1) of (3.17).
Let Sˆj(t) be the set of states in which the utilization of capital aj(t) > 0 is maximized.
Denote by Sˆj(t) the corresponding list of occurrences. Then capital utilization satisfies
uj(s, t)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0

 =⇒ χj(s){B∂U/∂c(s, t)− djǫ(t)}


≥
≥
T

 0, s ∈ Sˆj(t);
χj(s){B∂U/∂c(s, t)− djǫ(t)}


not defined
=
≤

 0, s ∈ S \ Sˆj(t),
(3.20)
at date t ≥ 0. In addition,
max
s
uij(s, t)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0

 =⇒
∑
s∈Sˆj(t)
χj(s){B∂U/∂c(s, t)− djǫ(t)}


≥
=
≤

 γjφj(t),
(3.21)
holds in a Pareto optimum. The investment satisfies
εjφj(t) ≤ B∂U/∂c(s, t) + ρjǫ(t), (3.22)
at equality if xj(s, t) > 0. The types (I-1), (I-2), and (II) of equilibrium allocations
in Section 2.1 characterize an optimal allocation if the emissions tax internalizes the
externality.
Noncontingent policy.—Consumption and the utilization rates of capital are equal in
each state, c(s, t) = c(s′, t) and uj(s, t) = uj(s
′, t) all s 6= s′, as a constraint. There
may be no contingent markets or contracts because electricity use is metered only once
per period.12 Clean technology capital aC(t) > 0 is fully utilized in all states in period
t. Capital aB(t) > 0 is fully utilized for t ≥ 0 if dirty capacity χBaB(t) is not too
large. Otherwise a Pareto improvement is possible through less investment. Thus a
12Consistently, government policy cannot be contingent. Then only allocations with equal utilization
rates in a given period are implementable. The planner finds these allocations in constrained optimum.
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noncontingent policy maximizes welfare in the case when (I-1) describes an optimum,
and the constrained optimal noncontingent policy does not maximize welfare in the cases
when (I-2) or (II) characterize an optimum.
The next section shows that a uniform emissions tax for all sources implements a Pareto
optimum.
3.1.3 Emissions tax
A government policy implements a Pareto optimum if equilibrium conditions subject to
this policy satisfy all necessary optimality conditions of the planner problem.
Proposition 3.2 The emissions tax τˆ = ǫ/ψ and lump-sum transfer tr equal for all
households implement a Pareto optimum.
Proof. The marginal welfare of the industry constraint (3.3) is its dollar value mul-
tiplied by the marginal value of income: wj(t) = ψ(t)wˆj(t). This value wj(t) equals
the shadow price of the planner’s constraint (3.17) at a solution to the planner’s prob-
lem when the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. The marginal welfare of ag-
gregate capital, φj(t) = ψ(t)υij(t), is the marginal value of income multiplied by the
dollar value of individual capital. An additional unit capital is worth φj(t) to the plan-
ner in current terms at a maximum of J when the equilibrium allocation is Pareto
optimal. Let λ(s, t) be the shadow price of constraint (3.18). In a Pareto optimum
B∂U/∂c(s, t) = λ(s, t). The firms’ condition Bpˆ(s, t) = p(s, t) and the households’ condi-
tion (3.14) yield B∂U/∂c(s, t)/ψ(t) = p(s, t) all s ∈ S. To obtain (3.19) substitute qj(t),
qj(t+ 1), wj(t+ 1), and ǫ(t+ 1) into (3.10). Then
1
Rˆ(t+ 1)
[∑
s∈S
χ(s)uij(s, t+ 1)
{
B
∂U/∂c(s, t+ 1)
ψ(t+ 1)
− dj
ǫ(t+ 1)
ψ(t+ 1)
}
+
∑
s∈Sˆj(t+1)
γj(1− uij(s, t+ 1))
qj(t+ 1)
ψ(t+ 1)
−
wj(t+ 1)
ψ(t+ 1)
]
≤
qj(t)
ψ(t)
(3.23)
at equality if aij(t + 1) > 0 some i all j ∈ J . Utilization of (3.15) and τˆ = ǫ/ψ delivers
(3.19). Conditions (3.20)-(3.22) follow analogously. Q.E.D.
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The marginal welfare of pollution, ψ(t)τˆ(t), that society incurs is the marginal value
of income multiplied by the dollar value of emissions, because emissions are measured
in the same units as pollution. Thus, avoiding an additional pollution unit is worth
ǫ(t) = ψ(t)τˆ(t) to the planner in current terms at a maximum of J when the equilibrium
allocation subject to the dollar price τˆ(t) of emissions is Pareto optimal. The emissions
tax rate τˆ(t) is the product of the contingent price pˆ(s, t) of the consumption good and
the cost of polluting θ(s, t) = ǫ(t)/(∂U/∂c(s, t)). The marginal value of income ψ(t)
is determined by normalizing the contingent price p(s′, t) in some state s′. All other
prices p(s, t), s 6= s′, are then determined through the allocation. The assumption of
aggregate certainty implies that the emissions tax rate that implements a Pareto optimum
is deterministic.
The following section examines noncontingent subsidies.
3.1.4 A role of clean output subsidy?
The price of energy fluctuates in allocations of the types (I-2) and (II) because consump-
tion fluctuates. Proponents of a subsidy to clean renewable electricity production reason
the usefulness of this policy instrument in stabilizing the price and thereby inducing in-
vestment that is efficient yet would otherwise not occur. This section shows that there is a
contract with a stable price given an information asymmetry but government intervention
is not needed to stabilize the price. The asymmetry is between clean energy producers
that do not know the state and clean energy users that know the state. For example, en-
ergy producers do not have access to techniques that predict wind speed or solar radiation
while energy users have equipment that responds to the price of energy in each subperiod.
The role of the government is to internalize the externality. Second the government can
internalize the externality through a subsidy to clean energy output (for example, in the
form of a feed-in premium for grid-distributed electricity) in combination with an energy
tax at the date of energy sale or in combination with a tax on the purchase of capital
that in the future produces energy. Then clean technology users receive a rebate through
the subsidy that compensates the increase in the cost of energy related to using capital,
which dirty technology users fully bear. The tax on investment goods accounts for the
emissions in the investment sector. Thus, a system with an energy tax has an investment
goods tax given that there are emissions in the production of investment goods.
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Price stabilization.—The marginal real rate of return on investment is equal for all
agents in the economy and agents are not credit-constrained. Thus it makes no difference
if a user of physical capital buys or leases this capital. I assume that users buy capital.
In an equilibrium in which producers know the state and acquisition of investment goods
is not taxed, the necessary conditions (3.10)-(3.13) imply that
1
Rˆ(t+ 1)
εC
∑
s∈S
χC(s)πC(s, t+ 1)
{
≥
=
}
min
s
p(s, t) + ρC τˆ(t)
if
∑
i
aiC(t+ 1)
{
= a¯C
∈ (0, a¯C)
(3.24)
for t ≥ 0. A competitive industry can develop contracts that yield a certain rate of
return from renewable energy investments when their productivity fluctuates. There
are competitive distributors that buy energy from energy producers and sell energy to
energy users. Clean technology users fully utilize capital, uiC(s, t + 1) = 1 all s. Define
Qj = εj
∑
s∈S χj(s). an equilibrium in which users of technology C do not know the state
the term εC
∑
s∈S χC(s)πC(s, t+1) is replaced by QCπC(s, t+1) where πC(s, t+1) is the
same in all states. For example, in policy regime (i) distributors make zero profit paying
πC(s, t) =
[∑
s∈S
p(s, t)χC(s)
]/∑
s∈S
χC(s)
per unit of output all s agreed upon in a contract with each energy producer using
technology C. Distributors may pay a stable price to any producer i that utilizes capital
aij(t) > 0 of technology j ∈ J equally in all states in t. This holds in an equilibrium
with a Pareto optimal allocation. There is a stable price that meets expectations of
private agents and induces investment in clean technology, in the same vein as here under
aggregate certainty, if the states differed over the possible sequences of productivity in
a given period. The information symmetry does not bring about a role of stable clean
technology subsidies. A prerequisite for Pareto optimal investment in clean technologies
is that the government sets incentives for private agents to internalize the externality.
In the regimes (ii) and (iii) clean technology subsidies implement Pareto efficient in-
vestment. Policy instruments not mentioned are zero in what follows.
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Energy tax and subsidy.—The excise subsidy may be interpreted as a premium that
makes it viable for producers to invest in clean technology and then feed its output to the
market. The following proposition shows the energy tax and subsidy rates in the regime
(ii) that do this efficiently.
Proposition 3.3 The dirty and clean energy tax τ = dB τˆ , investment goods tax τˆj =
(ρj/εj)τˆ all j ∈ J , and clean energy subsidy τ
∗
C = τ implement a Pareto optimum.
Proof. The net revenue πj(t, s) = p(s, t)− τ(t)+ τ
∗
j for an energy producer equals πj(t, s)
under the emissions tax for τ(t)−τ ∗j = dj τˆ(t) all t ≥ 0. The investment goods tax follows
analogously. Q.E.D.
The energy tax and subsidy correct the externality associated with using capital that
produces energy. The investment goods tax internalizes the externality of emissions in
producing such capital. The excise taxes in Proposition 3.3 can be written in terms of
ad valorem rates. These rates are contingent regarding energy. Clearly, a noncontingent
ad valorem rate cannot induce underutilized capital below the maximum utilization rate
in a given period, because such a tax rate cannot vanish the earnings on energy in some
state and retain a profit from the energy sale in another state. The rate ν(t) that satisfies
1
1 + ν(t)
∑
s∈S
χj(s){p(s, t) + (1 + ν(t))τ
∗
j (t)} =
∑
s∈S
χj(s){p(s, t)− dj τˆ(t)} (3.25)
equalizes the equilibrium and optimal sum of net benefits for energy producers for a
constant utilization of capital aj(t) > 0. The next proposition shows how ad valorem
goods taxes implement optimal allocations.
Proposition 3.4 (a) The ad valorem rates ν(s, t) = τ(t)/(p(s, t) − τ(t)) and νˆj(t) =
τˆj(t)/(pj(t) − τˆj(t)) for the goods taxes in Proposition 3.3, all j ∈ {B,C}, and clean
energy subsidy in Proposition 3.3 implement a Pareto optimum. (b) The noncontingent
ad valorem rate ν(t) for energy that solves (3.25) for j = B, and νˆj(t) all j ∈ {B,C}
for investment goods from (a), and clean energy subsidy τ ∗C that solves (3.25) given ν(t)
implement a Pareto optimum in which dirty technology capital aB(t) > 0 is equally utilized,
uB(s, t) = uB(s
′, t) all s, s′ ∈ S.
Proof. The contingent rates follow from their definition using the excise taxes in Propo-
sition 3.3. The noncontingent rates follow from the fact that S comprises the set of all
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states with equal utilization of dirty technology capital. Q.E.D.
Allocations with underutilized dirty technology capital in all states complete the cat-
alogue of allocations. Proposition 3.1 ruled these out by assumption. In a type (III)
allocation dirty technology capital aB(t) > 0 is underutilized at the same rate in all
states, uB(s, t) = maxs′ uB(s
′, t) < 1 all s ∈ S, and in a type (IV) allocation dirty tech-
nology capital aB(t) > 0 is underutilized in all states and utilized at different rates in at
least two states, uB(s, t) < maxs′ uB(s
′, t) < 1 for some s ∈ S. The contingent energy
tax rates equal ∞ in states s in which dirty technology capital aB(t) > 0 is underutilized
below the maximum utilization rate, uB(s, t) < maxs′ uB(s
′, t), to implement a type (II)
or (IV) allocation. In these states the government efficiently takes away all revenue from
the sale of energy using dirty technology, and rebates the revenue to clean technology
users. Type (II) allocations can be optimal in the long-term. Type (IV) allocations can
be optimal in early periods if there is sufficiently large dirty capital in the initial pe-
riod. Allocations of type (I-1), (I-2) or (III) are implementable through noncontingent
ad valorem goods taxes.
There are both a tax of clean output and a subsidy of clean output. This makes
sense, even if both their rates were dollar amounts or ad valorem rates, for two practical
reasons. In the model producers pay the output tax and all energy is traded on a market.
To attain an optimal allocation users of clean technology should need to claim the subsidy.
A producer would not be able to claim the subsidy for the self-consumed amount of its
energy output. Second, the output tax can be administered as a tax that consumers
(firms in the model, and firms and households in practice) pay. Then the price of energy
is p − τ . One goods tax rate is sufficient because there is one dirty technology. The
effciently set energy tax rate would vary among these technologies if there were multiple
dirty technologies.
Capital gains tax and capital tax.—Emissions that the use of dirty technology creates
are a function of capital use. The dirty goods tax thus can be written as a capital gains
tax of financial investments in dirty production that Sinn (2008) proposes to internalize
greenhouse gas pollution.13 Analogously to the goods tax and subsidy system then a gen-
eral capital gains tax coupled with a clean capital gains subsidy implements an optimum.
In line with the vehicle tax in Fullerton & West (2002) it is easy to see that a tax τ(t)
13Sinn (2008) uses a model with substitutable capital and emissions to support such a tax, which might
not implement an optimum there despite claiming it on p. 384.
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per unit of capital implements an optimum with noncontingent utilization and noncon-
tingent dirty technology productivity. The unit net revenue on the energy market is then
πj(s, t) = p(s, t)− τ(t)/χj(s)uj(s, t). A noncontingent capital tax cannot internalize the
externality from using contingent underutilized dirty technology capital. The reason is
that the unit net earnings from the energy market depend on the utilization rate.
I pause to note that the stable unit revenue πj for j ∈ {B,C} and price p of energy
across states satisfy
ηπC + (1− η)πB = p− (1− η)(dB/B)τˆ
in all previous efficient regulations, where η is the output share of the clean technology
given noncontingent utilization, uj(s, t) = uj(s
′, t) all j ∈ {B,C}. The weighted earnings
of dirty and clean technology is smaller than the average price of energy—except if the
clean technology is exclusively used, η = 1.14
Investment tax and output subsidy.—Energy producers efficiently invest indirty technol-
ogy only if the investment goods are immediately—in the period succeeding the period of
investment—fully utilized in at least one state. This can be shown using the arguments in
Chapter 2 on capital utilization with one subperiod. Then type (III) and (IV) allocations
do not follow investment in optimum. Such allocations or type (II) allocations in which
capital is underutilized until the date of investment cannot be implemented by taxing
investment or subsidizing output. Underutilization is optimal because of environmental
cost which is not internalized. The following holds.
Proposition 3.5 The investment goods tax τˆj = (ρB/εB)τˆ(t)+(dBQB/εB)τˆ(t+1)/Rˆ(t+
1) all j ∈ {B,C} and clean output subsidy τ ∗C = (dBQB/QC)ǫ(t + 1)/ψ(t + 1) + Rˆ(t +
1)(ρBεC − ρCεB)/QC implement a Pareto optimum in which dirty technology capital
aB(t) > 0 is fully utilized in all states, uB(s, t) = 1 all s ∈ S, all t ≥ 0.
Proof. In an equilibrium the conditions (3.10)-(3.13) and υij(t) ≤ pj(t), and the conditions
14The average unit revenue is πj(t) =
∑
s∈S χj(s)πj(s, t)/
∑
s∈S χj(s). Competitive distributors
would compute the average price p(t) = (
∑
s∈S p(s, t)
∑
j mj(s, t))/
∑
s∈S
∑
j mj(s, t) = (1− η)(πB(t) +
(dB/B)τˆ) + ηπC(t) given utilization uj(s, t) = uj(s
′, t). This formula holds if there are multiple clean
technologies in set C letting ηj =
∑
s∈S mj(s, t)/
∑
j
∑
s∈S mj(s, t) all technologies j and η =
∑
j∈C ηj .
The algebra simplifies for noncontingent production, mj(s, t) = mj(s
′, t). Then ηπC + (1 − η)πB =
p− (1− η)(dB/B)τˆ holds at arbitrary η ∈ [0, 1] because consumption is noncontingent.
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(3.14) and Bpˆ(s, t) = p(s, t), imply that
1
Rˆ(t+ 1)
∑
s∈S
χj(s)
{
B(∂U/∂c)(s, t+ 1)
ψ(t+ 1)
+ τ ∗j (t+ 1)− wˆij(t+ 1)
}
≤ pj(t) ≤
B∂U/∂c(s, t)
εjψ(t)
+ (ρj/εj)τˆ(t) + (τˆj(t)− (ρj/εj)τˆ(t)),
at equalities if aj(t + 1) > 0 and xj(t) > 0, all t ≥ 0. The optimality condition (3.19)
implies that
1
Rˆ(t+ 1)
∑
s∈S
χj(s){τ
∗
j (t+ 1) + dj τˆ(t+ 1)} = τˆj(t)− (ρj/εj)τˆ(t)
which delivers τˆB for j = B. Substituting τˆB and premultiplying by εBεC yields the clean
technology subsidy. Q.E.D.
The investment goods tax has two components. The first part internalizes the environ-
mental cost from using the investment good. The second part internalizes the externality
from building capital. The payment of the investment goods tax by both dirty and clean
technology investors motivates the clean technology subsidy. The internalization of the en-
vironmental cost of investment explains the second term in the clean technology subsidy if
the emission intensity relative to the productivity in manufacturing differs, ρBεC 6= ρCεB.
A differentiated investment tax and no subsidy to clean output can implement the same
type of allocation. The tax rate on investment in multiple dirty technologies would vary
among these technologies.
The next section examines a form of clean output subsidy that the German government
practices since 1991, which is fully-funded.15 The volume of this so-called feed-in tariff
was roughly 12 billion EUR in 2012. Other regional and federal governments use similar
policies.
3.1.5 Fully-funded feed-in premium or feed-in tariff
Producers of consumption goods and investment goods buy energy at unit price p(s, t).
I assume that consumption is constant in all states, albeit it takes away the price stabi-
15Stromeinspeisungsgesetz since 1991, Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz since 2000 translated as Renew-
able Resources Act.
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lization aspect to proponents of subsidies, to simplify the algebra. Constant consumption
is optimal in (I-1), which is likely when the environmental shadow cost is sufficiently low
so that dirty capacity is sufficiently high or when the variance of clean technology pro-
ductivity is sufficiently low. Then p(s, t) is the same in all states, so that p(t) = p(s, t).
The distributors pay πB dollars for one unit of dirty output and πC dollars per unit of
clean output using revenue from the sale of energy to users. Producers and distributors
take the feed-in tariff πC and the surcharge rate τ
∗ as given.16 The legal requirement
ηπC = τ
∗ of the fully-funded system leads to (p − τ ∗) dollars unit net revenue where p
is the average price.17 Distributors make zero profit if the proceeds of dirty technology
users equal the funds net of the surcharge, (1−η)πB = p−τ
∗. Then the weighted average
of unit revenue
ηπC + (1− η)πB = p (3.26)
is the price in equilibrium. The unit earnings πj(s, t) is the same in all states in a given
period t. To suit the discussion of supporting renewables there are multiple clean tech-
nologies, for example, through locational differences in productivity χj(s). The emission
intensity in creating capital is equal for all technologies at ρ = ρj all j ∈ J for simplicity.
The return on investment is the discounted net earnings divided by the current cost of
investment, the left side divided by the right side in the following weak inequality. The
necessary equilibrium condition
1
Rˆ(t+ 1)
εj
∑
s∈S
χj(s)πj(s, t+ 1)
{
≥
=
}
min
s
p(s, t) + ρτˆ(t)
if
∑
i
aij(t+ 1)
{
= a¯j
∈ (0, a¯j)
all j ∈ J is analogous to (3.24) for t ≥ 0 and implies that QBπB = QjπC , assuming that
some clean technology j ∈ J , with dj = 0, equilibriates the return on investment to that
of dirty technology. See above for the definitions of the marginal product Qj all dj ≥ 0.
16The German feed-in tariffs weakly diminish over time for a given machine—for example be fixed for
the first five years since installation and then decrease to a lower level. An argument for this might be
the term structure of the repayment of debt that finances the investment.
17Transmission cost is excluded here for simplicity. This cost can drive a wedge between dirty and
clean technology output prices when dirty technology output requires transmission to users and clean
technology output is produced at the location of use.
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The marginal rate of substitution of consumption is R(t+1) = ∂U/∂c(t)/(β∂U/∂c(t+ 1))
if consumption does not vary with the state. This equals the real marginal gross return to
holding assets. The latter condition and (3.26) yield, under the assumption of constant
consumption, the real marginal benefit of energy production one period after investment
QBQj
ηQB + (1− η)Qj
= R(1 + ρ(τˆ /p)′)
which the left panel in Figure 3.2 plots as a function of the marginal product Qj of clean
technology for two values of the portion η of clean technology output.18 Here prime
denotes previous period’s values and MC′ = 1 + ρ(τˆ /p)′ is the real marginal cost of
investment. The curves merge at QB. The dashed line depicts the optimal minimum rate
of return on investment in clean technologies because
Qj ≥ R(1 + ρ(τˆ /p)
′)
all j with xij > 0 some i given τˆ(t) = pˆ(t)ǫ(t)/(∂U/∂c(t)) holds in a Pareto optimum.
Investment in clean technology types with lower marginal product than its optimal mini-
mum level is worthwhile to private agents in equilibrium, if dirty technology investment is
optimal, η < 1. Thus there is an overinvestment in clean technologies relative to a Pareto
optimum if clean technologies exist with QC between the equilibrium level Qj and the
minimum optimal level Qj. The distortion is smaller the greater the portion η of clean
technology output holding it at the same level in an optimal allocation and an equilibrium
allocation. As η increases the unit earnings πC of clean technology users and the price
p come closer so that the rate of return on investment better reflects its optimal level
BQj/(B + ρj τˆ), given τˆ is set efficiently to internalize the marginal effect of emissions of
investment on society. Dirty technology investment and output are greater than in opti-
mum if the portion η of clean technology output is not too large relative to its optimal
level, and there is overinvestment in clean technologies. Output exceeds its optimal level,
and the excess output is distributed over both dirty and clean technologies. This implies
excess emissions and long-term pollution. The fully-funded feed-in tariff that implements
the optimal share of clean technology output η and the optimal marginal real rate of
18The earnings are generally weighted by output. Equal consumption implies that the sum of pro-
ductivities can be factored out. The real marginal rate of return R(s, s′, t + 1) is the inverse of
β∂U/∂c(s′, t+ 1)/(∂U/∂c(s, t)).
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Note: The marginal product Qj for clean technologies, dj = 0, is on the x-axis, the
marginal benefit QBQj/((η/(1 − v))QB + (1 − η)Qj) is on the y-axis, at v = 0 in
the left panel.
Figure 3.2: Marginal product of clean technologies.
return R in an economy with a dense set of return rates of a set of clean technologies (for
example, in different locations or engineering systems) leads to greater output of both
dirty and clean technologies and greater emissions than in optimum. Implementation of
the efficient scale of clean technology, through the efficient Qj, induces a greater marginal
rate of return on investment than in optimum. Thus savings is greater, and thereby
investment in dirty technology is greater than optimally.
These results seem to hold in case (II) when consumption is not equalized. The algebra
is more complicated than above because the price is not constant.
Feed-in premium.—The following describes three schemes used to support renewable
energy investment in practice such that producers sell at the market price p and receive
a premium to show that these schemes have in common the condition (3.26) and thus
premium and tariff induce the same allocations. How the premium emerges depends
on the regime. (i) Suppose that the government sets the premium. Since the 2012
amendment the German law allows clean technology producers that sell their electricity
on the wholesale market to receive a premium rate that is determined monthly. A portion
of the difference between the unit revenues equals the surcharge, η(πC − πB) = τ
∗, and
the unit net revenue of dirty technology equals the net market price, πB = p−τ
∗, if a unit
premium (πC − πB) is paid to clean energy producers in addition to the net market price
p − τ ∗. (ii) In a second regime, practiced in Italy and Sweden, τ ∗ is the market price of
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a credit. The unit net revenue of a dirty technology producer is πB = p− α(η/(1− η)τ
∗.
Each dirty technology producer must hold credits equal to the proportion αη/(1− η) of
dirty technology output. A producer satisfies this requirement through purchasing credits
on a market or using clean technology. The regulator endogenously distributes credits to
each clean technology producer proportional to output that the latter does not consume.
Let there be α credit per clean output unit. Then πC = p+ατ
∗ is the net revenue of a unit
of clean output. (iii) Another renewable energy support scheme is the procurement of
power purchasing agreements through auctions and levy of the incremental cost of energy
on all consumers to induce a renewable portfolio standard η > 0 that the regulator sets.
The policy satisfies η(πC − p) = τ
∗ and (1− η)(p− πB) = τ
∗ in equilibrium in which the
auction winners supply renewable energy offering the lowest surcharge τ ∗ or the lowest
offer price πC . According to Wiser et al. (2003, p. 37) the states California, Pennsylvania,
and New York, have used the former and Northern Ireland, the UK, and France, have
used the latter.
The outcomes are the same in each variant as for the fully-funded tariff since (3.26)
holds and all users pay the same price p. Bo¨hringer & Rosendahl (2010) find that a feed-
in tariff and tradeable green certificates lead to same outcomes.19 Novelties here are the
universal balancing condition (3.26) and the characterization of output in an equilibrium
with optimal output portions in dirty and clean technologies. Uniform surcharges that
fund the clean output subsidy induce overinvestment when R and η are at optimal levels.
Price discrimination.—In the following I examine exempting some agents from paying
the surcharge. There is an unequal treatment of energy buyers in Germany. For example,
large (export-oriented) investment goods producers do not pay the surcharge, and thus
spend (p−τ ∗) per unit of energy. The clean output subsidy is the portion ηπC = (1−v)τ
∗
of price times energy output if the fraction v of energy users is exempted from paying
the surcharge τ ∗. This implies that the marked-up feed-in tariff πC/(1 − v) is weighted
in the average price, ηπC/(1 − v) + (1 − η)πB = p. In a stationary equilibrium so that
p(t) = p(t+ 1) the marginal cost of investment (1 + (p/(p− τ ∗))ρ(τˆ /p)) = QB/R(1− η)
is greater than the dirty technology marginal product discounted by R if all investment
19Bo¨hringer & Rosendahl (2010) include an “end-user” tax τ in their feed-in tariff. This tax reduces
the unit earnings of both dirty and clean technology use. The feed-in tariff is thus greater than πC by
this tax. Then πB = p − τ so that the budget is balanced if τ = η(τ
∗ + τ) which solves for the tax
τ = βτ∗ defining β = η/(1− η) and letting α = 1 in the certificate system.
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goods producers are exempted and if there is some dirty technology investment, η < 1.
The optimal level of the marginal real rate of return cannot be implemented, if optimal
dirty technology investment is unconstrained—(3.3) is slack—and there are no emissions
of investment. A comparison of the equilibrium condition under exempted investment
goods producers to the equilibrium condition (1 + ρ(τˆ /p)) = ((p − τ ∗)/p)QB/R(1 − η)
under uniform surcharges for all energy users shows that the investment in dirty and
clean technologies is greater given the exempted investment goods producers compared
to the latter if the optimal rate of return on investment and the optimal portion of clean
technology output are implemented. Under the implementation of the efficient scale of
clean technology the exemption of investment goods producers exacerbates the distortion
in terms of savings used to invest in dirty technology.
Exempting some households from paying the surcharge reversely affects the efficiency.
Let consumption goods producers discriminate buyers in charging B(p− τ ∗) from house-
holds that comprise the fraction α in the population, and Bp from other households.
If households bought energy, then the sellers of energy would discriminate. Given con-
sumption c′ and c′′ of these groups, respectively, assume appropriate endowments and
define welfare αJ ′ + (1 − α)J ′′, because consumption amounts are heterogeneous. The
fraction of exempted agents is v = α(1− sˆ) given the savings rate sˆ when there is a unit
mass of identical energy users. Equation (3.15) that governs savings remains valid so
that R(1 + ρ(τˆ /p)′) = QBπB/p = QjπC/p. As a result greater exemption mitigates the
distorting effect of the policy on the marginal real rate of return on investment R. The
real marginal benefit of energy production
QBQj
η
1−v
QB + (1− η)Qj
= R(1 + ρ(τˆ /p)′) (3.27)
is strictly smaller when more households are exempted, v ∈ (0, 1) increases. There is a
critical level vj(η) < 1− η that satisfies the efficiency condition Qj = R(1 + ρ(τˆ /p)
′) for
the marginal clean technology j whose investment is optimal, depicted through the curve
in the right panel of Figure 3.2. When exempting a fraction of households α = vj/(1− sˆ)
from paying the surcharge such that vj is smaller than the output share of dirty technology
the policy implements an optimum with fully utilized capital.20 The intensity vj(η) of
20This level is vj(η) = (1− η)(QB −Qj)/(QB − (1− η)Qj).
140
the discrimination changes over time if the Pareto optimal levels Qj and η vary over
time, which they generally do. The intensity vj(η) depends positively on Qj/QB and
negatively on η. Thus vj(η) decreases on a path with increasing absolute and relative
output from clean technology. I discuss in Section 3.3 if discriminating the surcharge
between households is politically feasible.
Another possibility to implement an optimum might be a uniform surcharge and a
greater tax rate τˆ than pˆǫ/(∂U/∂c) for emissions in the production of investment goods.
3.2 Extraction cost
This extension relaxes a price rigidity that appears in partial equilibrium in Ambec &
Crampes (2012). Dirty technology capital that is used with fuel in fixed proportion is
fully utilized absent emissions pricing, in contrast to Ambec & Crampes (2012). The
production of
miB(s, t) = min[χBuiB(s, t)aiB(t), riB(s, t)/α]
units of energy in firm i uses the complementary factors physical capital aB and fuel rB at
some efficiency α > 0. Capital is produced one period before its use. The fuel technology
is not analogous to the dirty technology because then fuel would need to be produced and
delivered within a day. There are two interpretations of the model. (i) Fuel is produced
and purchased in the period of use. The law of motion of each firm i’s capital in fuel
production is
aiR(t+ 1) = γR(1− uiR(t))aiR + yiR(t)
all t ≥ 0 given chosen utilization rate uiR(t) ∈ [0, 1] and new capital units yiR(t) ≥ 0. Then
emissions in fuel production occur at rate dR per fuel amount miR(t) = χRuiR(t)aiR(t)
produced in period t. (ii) Fuel is produced directly using inputs and forwarded into the
next period in which it can be used. The fuel stock evolves according to
Si(t+ 1) = γR(Si(t)−miR(t)) + χRyiR(t)
in each firm i defining Si(t) = χRaiR(t). Old stock net of use, the term in parentheses, is
nonnegative and depreciates at rate (1 − γR). Then the emission intensity ρR of energy
input in fuel production accounts for emissions of fuel production, for example, in natural
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gas flaring at extraction sites of petroleum, petroleum refining, underground ventilation
of coal mines, and transportation of raw fuel. The endowment of capital in the initial
period satisfies W
∑
iB χBaiB(0) =
∑
iR χRaiR(0) > 0 so that the maximum fuel demand
equals the maximum (unproduced or existing) fuel supply. Dirty technology capital is
useful in W subperiods. Thus, in (i) underutilized capital in the fuel technology avoids
production of fuel that is not demanded, and in (ii) storing fuel balances fuel supply and
fuel demand. I abstract from other variable cost than the input cost x that yields εRx
units of new capital or χRεRx units of fuel.
Consider an emissions tax τˆ . Fuel use creates emissions at ratio dB/α per unit of the
fuel input. Then the unit revenue in the profit function (3.6) of dirty energy is πB(s, t) =
p(s, t) − dB τˆ(t) − αp
∗(s, t) given efficient fuel demand riB(s, t) = αχBuiB(s, t)aiB(t) at
unit price p∗(s, t) of fuel. The unit net revenue of fuel is πR(s, t) = p
∗(s, t)− dRτˆ(t). One
unit of clean energy earns πC(s, t) = p(s, t) dollars. The market clearing conditions (3.8)
and (3.9) remain letting J = {B,C,R}. In addition, fuel demand cannot exceed fuel
supply,
∑
s∈S
∑
i riB(s, t) ≤
∑
imiR(t) all t ≥ 0. The government budget constraint is
τˆ(t)
(∑
i
dRmiR(t) +
∑
s∈S
∑
i
[
(dB/α)riB(s, t) +
∑
j∈J
ρjxij(s, t)
])
≤ tr(t)
all t ≥ 0. The left side in the government budget constraint divided by the tax rate τˆ is
the emissions amount in period t.
In the regime (i) with emissions tax the utilization of fuel technology capital satisfies
the necessary equilibrium condition
uiR(t)


= 1
∈ (0, 1)
= 0

 =⇒ χR{p∗(s, t)− dRτˆ(t)}


≥
=
≤

 γRυiR(t) all s ∈ S (3.28)
all t ≥ 0. The result in the next proposition holds in equilibria in which the fuel price
is constant or varies over states. The productivities χB and χR in the dirty and the
fuel technology are constant. Define their marginal products QB = WεBχB and QR =
εRχR in converting energy input into energy output and energy input into fuel output,
respectively. Furthermore let the rate of fuel per energy attributable to the fuel technology
be υ = QR/(QR + αBQB) as in Chapter 2. Here αB = α(χB/χR). I assume that growth
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of consumption is optimal using the dirty technology output until the land required for
it is exhausted if there is no environmental cost.
Assumption 3.1 υQB > β
−1. QR > α if χR > χB.
The second condition ensures that in an optimum subject to no environmental cost
there is investment in the fuel technology when consumption fluctuates.21
The following proposition shows the irrelevance of the fuel technology for utilization of
capital in the dirty technology.
Proposition 3.6 Capital aiB(t) > 0 in the dirty technology is fully utilized, uiB(s, t) = 1,
in each firm i in all states s ∈ S all t ≥ 0, and capital aiR(t) > 0 in the fuel technology is
fully utilized, uiR(t) = 1, in each firm i all t ≥ 0 so that SiR(t) = miR(t) if the emissions
tax is zero, τˆ(t) = 0 all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Assumption 3.1 is equivalent to QB(QR−αB) > QR. Therefore QR > αB ≥ αBγR.
The gross return on using fuel to produce future capacity to produce fuel, QR/αB, is
greater than the gross return on storing fuel, γR. Thus, the stocks
∑
i aiB(t) and
∑
i aiR(t)
have the same ratio at t and (t+1), and all capital is fully utilized at (t+1) if all capital
is fully utilized at t. The induction starts in the period t = 0, in which the stocks match
full utilization. Underutilization of capital aiB(t) > 0 in the dirty energy technology in
some firm i, uiB(s, t) < 1 in some state s, requires that capital akR(t) > 0 in the fuel
technology is underutilized in some firm k, ukR(t) < 1, given that the maximum fuel
21Consumption can be increased by lowering the utilization of dirty technology capital and the in-
vestment in the fuel technology in any state s′ when consumption is maximized holding the input
in investment in the fuel technology in all other states and next period’s maximum fuel supply con-
stant without affecting aggregate dirty technology investment and the next period’s aggregate dirty
technology capital stock if QR < αγR. Formally, dc(s
′, t) = χBduB(s
′, t)aB(t) − dxR(s
′, t) > 0 at
αχB(duB(s
′, t))aB(t) = χR(duR(t))aR(t) < 0 and γR(duR(t))aR(t) = εRdxR(s
′, t). The first condition
implies the second necessary condition in Assumption 3.1 if χR ≤ χB .
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demand matches the aggregate fuel capacity. (i) maxs uiB(s, t) < 1 some i and s. Then
υQB(υB(t) +WαBυR(t))
≤ (υχB + (1− υ)χB)
∑
s∈S
p(s, t) (εjυj(t) ≤ p(s, t) ∀s ∈ S, υj ≤ pj = φj, (3.13))
≤ χB
[ ∑
s∈SiB
p(s, t) +
∑
s∈S\SiB
αp∗(s, t)
]
(p(s, t) ≤ αp∗(s, t) ∀s ∈ S \ SiB, (3.11), j = B)
= χB
∑
s∈SiB
{p(s, t)− αp∗(s, t)}+ χB
∑
s∈S
αp∗(s, t)
≤ γBυB(t) + χB
∑
s∈S
αp∗(s, t) (max
s
uiB(s, t) < 1, (3.12), j = B)
≤ γBυB(t) + γRWαBυR(t) (ukR(t) < 1, χRp
∗(s, t) ≤ γRυR(t) ∀s ∈ S, (3.28))
for some i and k. This contradicts Assumption 3.1. (ii) maxs uiB(s, t) = 1 all i. Then
underutilized dirty technology capital implies that uiB(s
′, t) is below the maximum uti-
lization rate for some i, that is, S \ SiB is nonempty. Then
εRυR(t) ≤ p(s
′, t) (υR ≤ pR = φR, (3.13), j = R)
≤ αp∗(s′, t) (uiB(s
′, t) < 1, s′ ∈ S \ SiB, (3.11), j = B)
≤ (α/χR)γRυR(t) (ukR(t) < 1, χRp
∗(s, t) ≤ γRυR(t) ∀s ∈ S, (3.28))
all s ∈ S and γR ≤ 1 imply that QR ≤ α. Assumption 3.1 and QB > 0 and QR = εRχR >
0 contradict this. Q.E.D.
The extraction of fuel using energy in the technology R is more productive than the
conversion of fuel into energy in the technology B, that is, QR > αB, if the combined
marginal product of energy-to-energy exceeds one, υQB > 1. Then investing in energy
technology that uses fuel and in fuel technology is more profitable than postponing the
use of capital or fuel when emissions pricing is absent.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter has characterized efficient allocations when clean technology productivity
fluctuates and there is irreversible investment in dirty and clean technologies. Consump-
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tion and investment are distributed such that investment occurs only in subperiods when
consumption is maximized. In these subperiods the opportunity cost of investing is mini-
mized. Adjustment costs likely yield investment only in subperiods in which consumption
is sufficiently large. In some of these subperiods dirty technology capital may be underuti-
lized because clean technology is very productive. Thus contingent investment efficiently
absorbs the fluctuation in clean technology output in states in which consumption is max-
imized, and investment does not occur in other states so that consumption absorbs it in
the subperiods of these states in which dirty technology capital is fully utilized.
Chapter 3 modifies the view of exclusive investment in clean technology in the long-
term. Dirty fossil fuel technology is used to back up clean renewable energy production
to smooth consumption across subperiods when the renewable energy supply fluctuates
because of weather and produced energy cannot be stored at low cost.
The underutilization of dirty technology capital, such as coal power plants, in the long-
term is motivated by the fluctucation of clean technology productivity and the disutility
of emissions expressed as the environmental shadow cost. Fuel cost does not play a role
because the price of dirty output adjusts to the price of fuel.
The environmental shadow cost is constant over subperiods in a given period, because
emissions in all subperiods have the same marginal effect on pollution and pollution is
the same in each subperiod. For this noncontingency it is irrelevant whether the marginal
effect of the environment on society occurs in each subperiod or once in any period. The
reason for the state history independence of the environmental shadow cost over periods
is that the frequency of states is certain.
The results on government policy can be summarized in four points. (i) A clean output
subsidy can be combined with a tax on output or equipment purchases to implement an
optimum. In the former system a tax on capital purchases accounts for the emissions in
building capital. The system with output tax is preferred among these variants of a tax-
rebate system if dirty technology capital is unequally utilized across states in optimum,
because it induces the efficient utilization of capital. The system with taxed investment
to internalize both the marginal effects of emissions in using and building capital does not
induce underutilized capital. (ii) An excise tax or a contingent ad valorem tax is needed
rather than a noncontingent ad valorem tax to implement contingent underutilization
through indirect taxes. These tax rates can be expressed in terms of the Pigouvian emis-
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sions tax. (iii) Agents that use wind turbines or solar panels to produce electricity may
not have access to techniques that forecast wind speed or solar radiation and machines
that use electricity can be pregrogrammed conditional on the state. A contract that
yields a constant revenue across states in which consumption optimally fluctuates does
not hamper efficiency if capital is equally utilized in all states in optimum. Government
intervention is not needed to stabilize the price, because distributors offer a stable price.
These distributors can be seemingly risk-averse because all states occur with certainty in
some subperiod. The role of the government is to internalize the externality. (iv) A clean
output subsidy that is funded by a surcharge such that consumers pay a uniform price
leads to excessive investment in both dirty and clean technology relative to an optimum
if the implemented marginal rate of return on investment is optimal and the implemented
portion of clean technology output is not too high relative to its optimal level. The reason
is that the revenue of clean technology users is too high relative to the price of its output
compared to an optimum of pollution control. This induces too much clean output. The
condition on the relative output between dirty and clean technologies implies that there
is too much output in dirty technology. For example, the marginal real rate of return
on investment is the inverse of the time discount factor when consumption is constant
across periods. The optimal marginal real rate of return on investment and the optimal
portion of clean technology output are jointly implementable only if there are emissions of
investment if only households pay a uniform surcharge, because the emissions tax receives
a greater weight relative to the factor price in the marginal cost of investment given this
exemption compared to uniform price for all energy users. There is greater output in dirty
and clean technologies relative to the allocation in equilibrium with uniform surcharge for
all energy users. But an optimum is implementable if some households are exempted from
the surcharge because the revenue of clean technology users decreases in the fraction of
exempted households for given portion of clean technology output. Discriminating among
households as opposed to between households and investment goods producers retains the
efficient relative price of output and the investment goods that produce output.
Governments in EU member countries use fully-funded tax-subsidy systems to promote
investment in wind and solar renewable energy. In particular, in Germany large electricity
users such as investment goods producers are exempted from paying the surcharge. The
distortion that exists under uniform surcharges is exacerbated when investment goods
producers are exempted from paying the surcharge assuming the real interest rate and the
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portion of clean technology output are optimal. Examining other situations, for example,
nonoptimal marginal rate of return on investment subject to international trade in assets,
is a topic for further research. A more detailed analysis of environmental policy under
price discrimination is warranted in future research because in practice larger electricity
users pay lower prices that are not fully explained by the exemption of the environmental
charge.
Usefulness of policies. An emissions tax or a tax-subsidy system with energy tax
rates and emissions tax rate in the investment sector can implement all optimal alloca-
tions. The latter system requires different tax rates for multiple dirty technology types
such as fuel types and vintages that have a different emission intensity of output. This
information is needed to administer the emissions tax too if emissions are not measured
directly. The carbon dioxide and methane emissions are inferred indirectly, for example,
from fuel input use. Thus the information requirement may be the same for these policies.
The capital gains tax and capital tax implement only noncontingent allocations. A
capital gains tax or capital tax seems impractible to internalize greenhouse-gas pollution
because these policies require to disentangle dirty and clean technology capital in the
portfolios of firms and households. The financial balance sheets contain nominal capital
amounts so that further accounts must be investigated to differentiate output between
fossil-fuel using and renewable energy technologies.
A system with an investment goods tax and an emissions tax rate in the investment
sector only implement allocations with fully utilized capital. The information of capital
vintages should be collectable at the same cost as the information for an emissions tax on
emissions that are not directly measurable. However paying for the emissions not occured
yet may pose a legal problem.
Fully-funded renewable energy subsidies implement allocations with full utilization of
capital from an environmental perspective. The variant with exempted households seems
politically feasible given the large popularity of both feed-in tariffs and feed-in premia
and of distributional policies. The identity of households that pay the surcharge does not
matter for Pareto efficiency assuming preferences that admit an essential independence
between the environment and the distribution of consumption. Thus efficiency can be
combined with distributional goals. Beside more differentiated rates than two surcharge
levels implement a Pareto optimum and redistribute income. A Mirrleesian approach to
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redistribution by an incompletely informed government is a topic for further research.
Limitations. Menanteau et al. (2003) argue that increased intermittent capacity
creates a need for additional capacity to stabilize the grid. The impact of grid stabilization
on capacity building originates in fluctuation of supply that does not arise in absence
of intermittent sources. This issue is blended out in the present paper, and may be
considered in further work.
Households pay a contingent price if an equilibrium is subject to noncontingent taxes
or subsidies and consumption fluctuates. I make the assumption that distributors of
energy do not discriminate between energy users that produce consumption goods and
energy users that produce investment goods. Thus I restrict attention to economies in
which households and producers of consumption goods and investment goods act on
contingent markets or make contingent contracts. The inability of electricity users, in-
cluding households, that produce consumption goods to respond to contingent prices of
electricity because it is not metered every day prevents efficiency if consumption should
fluctuate. Consumption fluctuation is likely optimal when the environmental shadow cost
is sufficiently high so that dirty capacity is sufficiently low or when the clean technology
productivity varies much. A question for further research is when the benefit of fluctuat-
ing consumption in terms of saved dirty capacity outweighs the cost of devices for daily
metering.
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